University of Central Florida

STARS
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019
2008

Moderators Of Trust And Reliance Across Multiple Decision Aids
Jennifer Ross
University of Central Florida

Part of the Psychology Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
Ross, Jennifer, "Moderators Of Trust And Reliance Across Multiple Decision Aids" (2008). Electronic
Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019. 3754.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/3754

MODERATORS OF TRUST AND RELIANCE
ACROSS MULTIPLE DECISION AIDS

by

JENNIFER MARIE ROSS
B.A. University of North Carolina in Asheville, 2002
M.S. University of Central Florida, 2004

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Psychology
in the College of Sciences
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Spring Term
2008

Major Professors: P.A. Hancock
James L. Szalma

© 2008 Jennifer M. Ross

ii

ABSTRACT
The present work examines whether user’s trust of and reliance on automation, were affected
by the manipulations of user’s perception of the responding agent. These manipulations included
agent reliability, agent type, and failure salience. Previous work has shown that automation is not
uniformly beneficial; problems can occur because operators fail to rely upon automation
appropriately, by either misuse (overreliance) or disuse (underreliance). This is because
operators often face difficulties in understanding how to combine their judgment with that of an
automated aid. This difficulty is especially prevalent in complex tasks in which users rely
heavily on automation to reduce their workload and improve task performance. However, when
users rely on automation heavily they often fail to monitor the system effectively (i.e., they lose
situation awareness – a form of misuse). However, if an operator realizes a system is imperfect
and fails, they may subsequently lose trust in the system leading to underreliance. In the present
studies, it was hypothesized that in a dual-aid environment poor reliability in one aid would
impact trust and reliance levels in a companion better aid, but that this relationship is dependent
upon the perceived aid type and the noticeability of the errors made. Simulations of a computerbased search-and-rescue scenario, employing uninhabited/unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs)
searching a commercial office building for critical signals, were used to investigate these
hypotheses. Results demonstrated that participants were able to adjust their reliance and trust on
automated teammates depending on the teammate’s actual reliability levels. However, as
hypothesized there was a biasing effect among mixed-reliability aids for trust and reliance. That
is, when operators worked with two agents of mixed-reliability, their perception of how reliable
and to what degree they relied on the aid was effected by the reliability of a current aid.
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Additionally, the magnitude and direction of how trust and reliance were biased was contingent
upon agent type (i.e., ‘what’ the agents were: two humans, two similar robotic agents, or two
dissimilar robot agents). Finally, the type of agent an operator believed they were operating with
significantly impacted their temporal reliance (i.e., reliance following an automation failure).
Such that, operators were less likely to agree with a recommendation from a human teammate,
after that teammate had made an obvious error, than with a robotic agent that had made the same
obvious error. These results demonstrate that people are able to distinguish when an agent is
performing well but that there are genuine differences in how operators respond to agents of
mixed or same abilities and to errors by fellow human observers or robotic teammates. The
overall goal of this research was to develop a better understanding how the aforementioned
factors affect users’ trust in automation so that system interfaces can be designed to facilitate
users’ calibration of their trust in automated aids, thus leading to improved coordination of
human-automation performance. These findings have significant implications to many real-world
systems in which human operators monitor the recommendations of multiple other human and/or
machine systems.
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INTRODUCTION
Advances in modern technology are increasing the ability of human beings to travel and
communicate, as well as automate their work. The development of complex robotics and
mathematical algorithms to guide artificial intelligence allows for the technology to permit nonhuman agents to simulate and hence automate many human intellectual functions. The capacity
of these electronic avatars is growing as a function of increasing computational capacity (see
Moore, 1965), granting automation functions that include actively selecting data, transforming
information, making decisions, and associated output processes (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce,
2002; Lee & See, 2004). Such advances have revolutionized the role of semi-autonomous and
autonomous agents in military, transportation, medical environments, and a spectrum of other
applied realms.
The use of robotic-agents offers a wide range of advantages, including increased safety
for human operators. With the application of a non-human agent with a remote operator, the
human becomes one-step removed from the dangerous situation (e.g., gathering reconnaissance
information in a combat environment). This allows Unmanned Vehicles (UVs) to act “fearlessly”
in battle, operate in areas contaminated with biotoxins or radiation, and removes the need for
expensive on-board environmental systems (Mouloua, Gilson, & Hancock, 2003). Further, a
large potential benefit for the military and industry is that employing autonomous and semiautonomous agents reduces personnel requirements. A hypothetical example of this benefit
would be a single operator controlling multiple UVs, perhaps hundreds of Unmanned Arial
Vehicles (UAVs) to a single operator (Hancock, Mouloua, Gilson, Szalma, & Oron-Gilad, 2007;
Squire, Trafton, & Parasuraman, 2006). This can be compared to traditional manned vehicles
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which may each require a separate individual operator or in some cases multiple operators (e.g.,
M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle System requires a crew of 3: the commander, gunner, and driver;
Global Security, 2007). Additionally, one of the primary uses of automation is to make repetitive
or detailed tasks easier (e.g., using automated speed dial rather than dialing a phone number one
digit at a time; Wiener, 1988).
However, automation is often applied haphazardly without regard to the intricacies of the
human-automation interaction. This can often lead to negative consequences, such as, operator
complacency (Chappell, 1997; Morgan, Herschler, Wiener, & Salas, 1993), increased user
monitoring requirements (Kantowitz & Campbell, 1996), and degeneration of operator manual
skills (McClumpha, James, Green, & Belyavin, 1991). One factor that has been shown to
strongly affect how an operator will interact with a system is operator system trust (i.e., one’s
confidence in an automated system). If an operator has too little trust in a system they may fail to
use the automated system, which in effect negates the potential of the automated system to
benefit operator performance (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Automated systems are often
developed at great cost to the organization, but operator trust is essential to ensure that they are
utilized. On the other hand, if an operator overtrusts a system this may lead to complacency and
automation bias (Barnett, 2000).
As the goal of automation is to extend human capabilities, often by using multiple
machine systems, it becomes imperative to examine whether individuals are able to
compartmentalize their trust of individual automated systems or if there is a blending of trust
levels across systems. That is, could a soldier working with a network of UVs observe an error
on one of the robotic systems and still respond in an unbiased manner to the other vehicles, or
would this error then predispose the soldier to lose trust in the other systems (i.e., trigger disuse
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across all systems)? To ensure the future of successful collaboration between humans and
machines, it is imperative that designers know in what way operators are able to calibrate their
actions with those of ‘intelligent’ machines (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2002) and in what ways
their calibrations are influenced by defective agents.

Organization of the Thesis
This thesis proposes that complex (i.e., dual-aid) environments will encounter carry-over
bias between mixed reliability aids. However, it is believed that this effect will be influenced by
the type of the agent (i.e., whether operators believe they are working with other humans or
robotic aids). This problem is examined first by setting the theoretical and empirical grounding
for the following studies and subsequently explicating the methodology ad results of a series of
four experiments.
The first and second experiments focus on validation and construction of the
experimental test bed. Drawing from methods from psychometrics, these studies sought to
minimize potential sources of error and variance associated with the task itself. The results from
study one determined the pace of the task while study two was critical for determining stimuli
error salience (i.e., the difficulty of the trials). Thus the goal of the first two experiments was to
employ a simulation of a computerized search-and-rescue scenario without a decision-aid to
determine required trial duration, trial inter-stimulus interval (ISI), and analyze stimuli difficulty.
The third experiment was designed to extend experiment one and two, by applying a
single automated-decision aid to the created search-and-rescue test bed and varying the reliability
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of the aid. The goal of the third experiment was to examine trust and reliance levels on the
automated aid and to determine appropriate low and high levels of reliability.
The fourth experiment extended this information one step further by adding a second
decision-aid. This final experiment examined operator trust and reliance on automatic decision
aids when working with multiple agents. This experiment provides empirical evidence on the
influence and possible biasing effects of monitoring multiple decision-aid agents of varying
reliability, agent type, and error salience. The overall goal of this research was to develop a
better understanding how the aforementioned factors affect users’ trust in automation so that
system interfaces can be designed to facilitate users’ calibration of their trust in automated aids,
thus leading to improved coordination of human-automation performance.
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Automation has often been touted as a panacea for improving how human beings interact
with their environment. Indeed, automation has given us modern day assembly lines, automobile
cruise control, aircraft autopilot features, and even semi-autonomous vacuum cleaners. As almost
any task can be, and often is, automated, we find that automation is becoming increasingly
prevalent in modern day society. With this progress the shift from operators serving as active
controllers (i.e., directly involved with the system) to supervisory controllers (i.e., indirect
management of a system) has become more common (Lee & Moray, 1994). Accompanying this
evolution of the operator from their original role, there is a need to explore the components that
influence effective cooperation between operators and semi-autonomous agents. One particular
area of study is that of when the use of automation backfires (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).

Problems with Automation
There can be potentially harmful consequences of automation when users fail to rely
upon automation appropriately, through either misuse (overreliance) or disuse (underreliance;
Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). That is, human judges may face difficulty in understanding how to
calibrate their judgment with that of an automated aid (Bass & Pritchett, 2006).

Misuse
Individuals may misuse automation by over relying on automation when a manual
alternative would have achieved a better end (Mouloua, Gilson, & Koonce, 1997). Operators
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who have high levels of trust in an automated system may assume, often incorrectly, that it is
highly reliable and requires little to no monitoring (Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993).
Overdependence on automated systems has been related to skill degeneration or inattention in
the lab; which may result in more serious consequences in the real world (Young & Stanton,
2001). For example, pilots trusting the ability of their autopilot, failed to intervene and take
manual control even as the autopilot crashed the Airbus A320 they were flying (Lee & See,
2004). In another instance, an automated navigation system malfunctioned and the crew failed to
intervene, allowing the Royal Majesty cruise ship to drift off course for 24 hours before it ran
aground (National Transportation Safety Board, 1997). Misuse of automation often occurs in
cases where people have attributed greater intelligence to the automation than it actually
possesses. Bergeron and Hinton (1985) pointed out that “the pilot thinks of the autopilot as a
copilot and expects it to think for itself. He allows himself to become completely engrossed in
other tasks once the autopilot is set. Hence, he is frequently late in resetting new functions, or he
may become confused as to exactly where he is in the approach” (p. 145). Trusting automation to
function on its own without supervision is a flawed approach. Automation is inherently limited
to what it was programmed to do (i.e., dumb and dutiful) which may not always be desirable or
even expected by the operator (Wiener, 1988; Sheridan, 2002). These ‘automation surprises’
occur when the system is behaving according to its programmed specifications, yet in a way that
is contrary to what the operator expects or desires (Young & Stanton, 2001).
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Disuse
On the other hand, disuse occurs when users under-utilize automation by manually
performing a task that could best be done by automation. For instance, some operators rejected
automated controllers in paper mills, undermining the potential benefits of competent and
reliable automation (Zuboff, 1988). In one form of disuse automation may hinder performance
by raising workload levels. This can occur when operators perform the task manually but then
check the automation anyway thereby adding to their workload (Bainbridge, 1983). Indeed,
unwillingness of workers to accept effective technology is frequently cited as an impediment to
improving worker productivity (DiBello, 2001).
In the case of automated internet commerce technology trust becomes a critical factor in
determining if potential customers are willing to submit personal information (e.g., credit card
numbers) to a commercial website. Research by Karvonen and Parkkinen (2001), found that trust
was a necessary factor in order to indulge in the risk to personal privacy (i.e., identity theft). This
research points out how the use of automation entails a certain amount of accepted vulnerability
by the user. In a separate study by de Vries and colleagues (2003), in which participants wagered
study credits on the likelihood of accurate automation performance, it was found that higher risk
was correlated with higher ratings of system trust. With distrust users are less willing to take risk
and in the case of internet commerce they withdraw from the website and the company loses
business.
One of the most dangerous forms of disuse is that of the ‘cry wolf effect’ (Bliss, 1993), in
which case a user ignores warning signals that have previously signaled a false alarm (e.g., a fire
alarm that has previously only been yearly tests). In his book Set Phasers on Stun (1993), Casey
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points out a particularly ingenious use of automation disuse, in which a prisoner deliberately sets
off a motion detector alarm during his escape. While this might seem counter-intuitive the
prisoner (a very astute fellow) was well aware of the previous high false alarm rates and the
subsequent distrust of the alarm by the guards. Thus, even though the alarm correctly signaled a
prisoner’s break out, the guards responded slowly to the alarm believing it was merely another
automation error, allowing the prisoner to escape!

Calibrated Reliance
Misuse and disuse are two examples of inappropriate reliance on automation that can
compromise safety, profitability, and performance. Ideal reliance in an automated system
requires discriminating operators who can determine a proper calibration between their own and
system performance; that is, they know when to and when not to depend upon automation (see
Figure 1).

Figure 1. Reliability calibration (Gempler & Wickens, 1998).
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When operators place unquestioned trust in the perceived reliability of the automation,
that is not appropriate given the actual reliability of the automation, they fall into the region of
over-trust/complacency. In this case operators often fail to monitor the automation adequately
because they exhibit excessively high confidence in the system. A lower level of trust in this case
would be more appropriate. On the other hand when operators fall into the region of under-trust,
they perceive the reliability of the automation as lower than the actual reliability of the system.
In this case their lack of trust in the automation leads to disuse. Between these two extremes is
the region of proper trust calibration, in which the operator trusts the automation enough to use it
when it is helpful but distrusts it enough to monitor it for proper operation (Barnett, 2000).

Human-Automation Interaction
To appreciate the impact of trust on properly calibrating user reliance, an understanding
of how humans and machines work together is needed. While, neither humans nor machines are
infallible, exploiting the strengths of each can lead to a joint performance that is higher than
either’s individual performance alone (Young & Stanton, 2001). That is, the hybrid humanautomated system should exhibit superior performance compared to the human alone (Hancock
& Parasuraman, 1992; Hancock, Parasuraman, & Byrne, 1996). An optimally calibrated
interaction involves a human user who knows when to heed or ignore an aid’s suggestion (Bass
& Pritchett, 2006). The question then becomes what processes do people use to determine when
to rely on themselves or when to rely on an automated aid? Several studies have established that
humans actually respond socially to technology, and reactions to computers can be similar to
reactions to human collaborators (Muir & Moray, 1996; Reeves & Nass, 1996).
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Social Response to Technology
Research suggests that misuse and disuse of automation may depend on certain feelings
and attitudes that operators hold. These feelings and attitudes may be miscalibrated and distort
one’s perception of the automation. One particular factor that past research has shown to guide
reliance is trust (Halpin, Johnson, & Thornberr, 1973; Muir, 1988; Sheridan & Hennessy, 1984).

Trust
Trust is a basic feature of all social situations that demand cooperation and
interdependence (Corritore, Kracher, & Wiedenbeck, 2001). This social psychological concept is
particularly important for understanding human-automation partnerships, and can be defined as
the belief that an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation characterized by
uncertainty and vulnerability (De Vries, Midden, & Bouwhuis, 2003). In this definition, an agent
can be any entity that actively interacts with the environment on behalf of the individual (e.g.,
another human being, an automated aid, etc.). Research has shown that just as trust mediates
interactions between people (Deutsch, 1958, 1960; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985; Ross &
LaCroix, 1996; Rotter, 1967), it has also been established that trust mediates the relationship
between people and automation (Lee & Moray, 1992; Lee & See, 2004; Lewandowsky, Munday,
& Tan, 2000; Muir, 1994; Seong, Bisantz, & Gattie, 2006; Sheridan & Hennessy, 1984). Indeed,
in a series of empirical studies by Jian, Bisantz, and Drury (2000) it was demonstrated that
people do not perceive concepts of trust differently across general trust, human-human trust, and
human-automation trust.
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One model of trust is Barber’s (1983) taxonomy of trust which divides trust into three
specific expectations: persistence, technical competence, and fiduciary responsibility (See Table
1). Barber defines persistence as the foundation for trust. Persistence allows for trustors to form
the expectation that something will work in a predictable way; this reduces the complexity of a
task by limiting the possible outcomes. Without persistence an operator would have to consider
every possible positive and negative outcome at each step of the interaction. Of equal importance
is the notion of technical competence. Technical competence reflects the ability of the teammate
in regards to technical facility and expert knowledge. Indeed, an individual may increase or
decrease vigilance depending upon the perceived competency of a teammate (Mosier & Skitka,
1998). Perceived technical competence may vary depending on whether a task is routine or
unusual. For instance, an operator may trust automation to be technically competent to perform a
routine task, but switch to manual control for more difficult or unusual tasks. The third
dimension of trust in Barber’s model is fiduciary responsibility. Fiduciary responsibility refers to
moral and social obligations that people have to hold the interest of others above their own, and
has been contended to be irrelevant to the human-automation interaction (Uggirala,
Gramopadhye, Melloy, & Toler, 2004).
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Table 1. Barber's Taxonomy of Trust (recreated from Uggirala, Gramopadhye, Melloy, & Toler,
2004).
Expectation

Impact

Description

Persistence

Provides basis for all other forms
of trust.

The foundation of trust that establishes a
constancy in the fundamental moral and
natural laws.

Supports expectations of future
performance based on
capabilities, knowledge or
expertise.

The ability of the other partner to
produce consistent and desirable routine
performance, technical facility, and
expert knowledge.

Extends the idea of trust beyond
that based on performance to one
based on moral obligations and
intentions

The expectation that people have moral
and social obligations to hold the interest
of others above their own.

Technical Competence

Fiduciary Responsibility

Another three-stage model of trust was proposed by Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna (1985);
this model is based on a hierarchical model of trust, and contends that certain factors of trust may
change with time and increasing emotional investment (See Table 2). In this model the first stage
of trust is predictability, which is judged by the operator as the consistency and desirability of the
machines recurrent behavior (i.e., the confidence they have in their ability to predict future
behaviors). Predictability is drawn from the actual predictability of the machine’s behavior, the
operator’s ability to estimate the predictability of the machine’s behavior, and the stability of the
environment in which the system operates (Uggirala et al., 2004). The more variable a machine’s
performance the lower its predictability. As the relationship progresses an operator may enter the
second stage of trust: dependability. Dependability is an understanding of the stable dispositions
that guide a partner’s behavior. In terms of monitoring machine systems, or human systems for
that matter, this factor is dependent on positive assessments of predictability in the realm of
personal vulnerability and conflicts of interest. The final stage is that of faith, in faith an operator
summarizes past predictability and dependability experiences to summarize them into a belief in
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how the machine will operate in unknown future situations. In order to develop faith in any
particular machine, a human operator must have extensive experience with the system to let faith
develop.

Table 2. Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna's (1985) model of trust.
Stage of Trust

Description

Stage 1: Predictability

Judged by actual predictability (variance)
of the system, operator’s ability to estimate
that predictability, and environmental
factors.

Stage 2: Dependability

Related to the reliability of the system over
time.

Stage 3: Faith

Based on extensive past experiences with
the system. Summarize past experiences
based on predictability and dependability.

Both Barber (1983) and Rempel et al. (1985) have major benefits. Barber’s model
provides a broader context and richness of meaning needed to characterize many interactions in
automated systems. On the other hand Rempel and colleagues provide the dynamic factor needed
to predict how trust may change as a result of experience with the system.

Muir (1994)

combined these two models to develop a more comprehensive model of trust in automation that
contains six components: predictability, dependability, faith, competence, responsibility, and
reliability (See Table 3). Muir and Moray (1996) were able to empirically prove that subjective
trust ratings, along these constructs, from an operator could be used to measure user trust in a
system.
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Table 3. Muir's model of trust. Replicated from Uggirala and colleagues (2004).
Basis of expectation at different levels of experience
Expectation
Predictability
Dependability
Faith
(of acts)
(of disposition)
(in motives)
Persistence
Natural
Events conform to
Nature is lawful
Natural laws are constant
Physical
natural laws
Natural
Human life has
Human survival is
Human life will survive
Biological survived
lawful
Humans and
Humans and
Humans and computers
computer are
Moral
computers act
will continue to be good
Social
inherently good and
decently
and decent in the future
decent.
One’s behavior is
One has a
One will continue to be
Technical
predictable
dependable nature
dependable in the future
Competence
One’s behavior is
One has a
One will continue to be
Fiduciary
consistently
responsible nature
responsible in the future
Responsibility
responsible
Self-Confidence
The benefit of using trust to guide one’s attitude towards automation is that it serves as a
heuristic to quickly and easily compare one’s self-confidence in doing the task themselves (i.e.,
one’s own perceived reliability) to the perceived reliability of the automation doing the task
correctly. While perceived reliability in the automation is strongly determined by the actual
reliability of the system, self-confidence in one’s ability to manually perform a task is related to
Bandura’s (1986) concept of self-efficacy. Self-efficacy “refers to beliefs in one’s capacities to
organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given attainments” (Bandura,
1997, p. 3). However, self-efficacy is situation specific and while an individual may have high
self-efficacy in general or in one area (e.g., academics) they may have lack self-efficacy
concerning another area (e.g., athletics).
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In this vein, if one has worked with a system that has consistently helped them to achieve
their goals, and they have low perceived self-confidence in accomplishing the task themselves,
then most likely their trust and reliance on that system should be high. On the other hand, if the
system consistently fails in helping the individual achieve their goals, and they have high selfconfidence in their own ability to perform the task, the individual’s trust and reliance on the
system should be low. Indeed research supports that when trust in an automated agent exceeds
operators’ self-confidence, automation is likely to be used; while, if self-confidence exceeds
automation trust, then manual control is more likely to be maintained (Lee & Moray, 1994). As
one’s feelings of trust in a system vary, according to how they view the reliability of both
themselves and the automation, their corresponding use (i.e., reliance) of that system should
change as well.

Trust and Reliance
Automation reliance relates to the use of automatic rather than manual control
(Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001). Research has shown that perceived trust in an automated
system is tightly coupled with reliance upon that system (Muir, 1989). These findings typically
indicate that ratings of trust tend to be slightly more conservative than users’ reliance (i.e., actual
agreements with the aids; Muir & Moray, 1996; Wiegmann; 2001). It is also important to
mention that empirical findings by Jian et al. (2000) indicate that ratings of trust and distrust are
opposites lying along a single dimension of trust, so that low measures of trust actually reflect
distrust of a system.
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Before moving on it is important to emphasize that there is a distinction between
measures of reliance and those of performance. Reliance is the tendency to employ automation to
replace manual control. For instance, selecting the automated option 80% of the time exhibits
greater reliance than selecting the automated option 50% of the time. On the other hand,
performance is directly related to the number of correct and incorrect responses, which may or
may not be related to reliance. In this vein trust may lead to more or less reliance (i.e.,
cooperation) with the aid, which may be desirable or undesirable (i.e., calibrated or
miscalibrated) in regards to performance (Corritore, Kracher, & Wiedenbeck, 2001). Indeed,
Gempler and Wickens (1998) found that individuals became complacent when observing highly
reliable traffic-information displays. In their study, observers relied heavily on the automation
even though several automation failures reduced overall performance dramatically. Surprisingly,
no changes occurred to user reports of trust in the automation. Alternatively, Lee and Moray
(1992) found that operators, performing a simulated processing control task, demonstrated drops
in automation trust and reliance after an automation failure even though performance did not
change significantly. In a hypothetical example, you can imagine two users may have the same
level of system performance and yet their subjective interaction may be quite different. One
operator may trust the automation and use it while concurrently performing other tasks;
meanwhile, the other operator may distrust the automation, monitor it intensively or even do the
task manually, experiencing greater stress, time pressure, and mental workload. Thus, achieving
ideal performance requires that the operator properly calibrate their level of trust, and hence
reliance, in the automation to maximize performance (i.e., minimize both misuse and disuse) and
optimize their subjective interaction.
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Trust as a Function of Experience
Research by Rotter (1967) established that an individual’s general level of trust has a
temporal factor, in that it is based on past experiences with others (e.g., parents, teachers, peers,
etc.), that leads an individual to develop their generalized attitude of trust. That is, the way one
reacts in a particular situation is not only determined by that situation but by previous
experiences that individual has had. This relates to social learning theory in that “expectancies in
each situation are determined not only by specific expectancies in that situation but also, to some
varying degree, by experiences in other situations that the individual perceives as similar”
(Rotter, 1980, p. 2). Thus, children who have experienced a higher proportion of promises kept,
including threats of punishment, by parents and authority figures in the past have a higher
generalized expectancy for interpersonal trust from other authority figures (Rotter, 1971).
Research has carried these finding over to the human-automation literature as well. In this vein if
the trustee, whether human or automation, performs according to the trustor’s expectations, trust
may be maintained or increased based on these experiences. On the other hand, not living up to
expectations will lower trust (de Vries et al., 2003). Pritchett and Bisantz (2006) found that when
an alerting systems acts contrary to an operator’s expectations or produces alerts that are
interpreted as false alarms, user trust and acceptance of the automated alerting system decreases.
That is, as a user observes or believes that an automated aid has made an error they develop an
expectancy that the aid is unreliable (Lee & See, 2004).
It is also commonly accepted that individuals generally differ in their trait generalized
expectancy of trust in others (Rotter, 1967). Research has shown that individual differences in
generalized trait expectancy for automation also exist. In a national survey by Halpin, Johnson,
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and Thornberry (1973) evidence of a generalized technology trait trust expectancy was found.
Their findings indicating that while most people believed computers and other forms of
technology would improve their lives, others viewed these as dehumanizing and prone to errors.
In a similar study by McClumpha and James (1994), aircraft pilots were shown to demonstrate
previously established favorable or negative views of cockpit automation. These results were
further supported by Lee and Moray (1994), who found that individual differences in the
preference of using automation heavily influenced reliance upon automation in a laboratory
based study. That is, some operators were consistently prone to using, or not using, automation
regardless of their ratings of trust and self-confidence (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2002). On a
short-term scale, Lee and Moray (2004) conducting a time series analysis, found that future
reliance upon automation was also influenced by past use of the automation. In their discussion
of these results, the researchers took this information to mean that human beings are reluctant to
change, and that includes the use (or alternatively the disuse) of automation.
In research by Riley (1994), a definite difference in allocation strategy was found
between students and pilots using faulty automation. While nearly all the students turned off the
faulty automation, almost half of the pilots used the automation when it failed. This difference in
allocation strategy may be due to pilots employing automation more often in their work
environment; hence they were more influenced by using automation in the past. Indeed,
experience with automation has been shown to mediate generalized trust expectancies in
technology. For instance, those with experience with automation and/or computers tend to have
more favorable attitudes toward automation then those without such experience (Lee, 1991;
Lerch & Prietula, 1989; McQuarrie & Iwamoto, 1990). However, the reverse has been found
with extensive experience with the task being automated. Thus, individuals who are experts in
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the task to be automated tend to have more negative opinions of the automation. However, this
may be because they have greater self-confidence in performing the task and thus less need for
the information the aid is providing (Sheridan, Vamos, & Aida, 1983).

Task Complexity
A second related factor influencing the human-agent team interaction is that of
complexity of the task (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Task complexity can be defined as
increasing the cognitive and/or physical characteristics of a task, which correspondingly increase
demand on operator resources. It has been found that as task complexity increases it negatively
impacts operator self-confidence (Lee & Moray, 1994). Complexity makes a complete
understanding of the automation impractical, thus resulting in greater reliance upon the
automation. By guiding reliance, trust helps to overcome the cognitive complexity people face in
managing increasingly sophisticated automation. Therefore, it is theorized that task complexity
has a moderating impact on trust in automation, that is, increased trust in automation serves as a
heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing, thus simplifying the
complexity of the task at hand (Moiser & Skitka, 1996; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
In the following studies complexity has been imposed upon the operator by having them
monitor multiple agents. Automated decision recommendations help reduce the complexity of
the task if the operator trust and relies upon them, thus reducing their own processing
requirements. The concern then becomes how does trust/distrust in automation spread in a
system with multiple decision aids? If operators come to distrust one component of a system,
will their distrust spread to other components of the system? A study by Muir and Moray (1996)
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found that distrust in one automated system did spread to reduce the trust of structurally,
functionally, or causally related components. The impact of this is that distrust of a poor system
often lead to unwarranted distrust of a concurrently running correctly functioning automated
system. However, Muir and Moray also found that distrust of one component did not spread
indiscriminately over the entire system. That is, trust levels of two subsystems that are
structurally and functionally independent may not be contingent upon each other. It is important
to mention that both aids in the Muir and Moray (1996) study were not cognitive aids but
physical aids which guided several processes in a process control simulation. Additionally, Lee
and Moray (1994) were able using discriminate validity measures, to prove that operators were
able to partition their trust and self-confidence independently among several subsystems in a
pasteurization process control simulation similar to that used by Muir and Moray (1996). An
extension of this work would be to look at the effect of complexity on trust and reliance in
several different types of automated aids (see Source Characteristics below), and how this
relationship depends on agent reliability and error salience.

Agent Reliability.
Experiments assessing the association between machine reliability to performance have
yielded a collection of myriad findings (Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001). While the dominant
viewpoint has been that as automation reliability increases so does reliance upon that automation
(de Vries et al., 2003; Liu & Hwang, 2000; Moray, Inagaki, & Itoh, 2000; Muir, 1987; Muir,
1994; Riley, 1994), other lines of research found that overall reliability was not related to
reliance upon the automation (Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993; Singh, Molloy, &
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Parasuraman, 1997). As with human teams increasing the reliability of one team member’s
performance may not necessarily affect the overall team’s performance (Dzindolet, Peterson,
Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 2003).
In one of the first studies on trust upon automation usage, Muir (1989) found that
automation accuracy had a strong correspondence with automation use. However, different
results were found in a study by Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, Dawe, & Anderson (2001). In this
study individuals were told that the automation would be correct on 60%, 75%, or 90% of the
trials; additionally, there was a control condition in which no automation was presented.
Analysis indicated that there were no significant differences in the probabilities of errors
associated with the four reliability conditions; that is, reliability of the aid did not affect
accuracy. One explanation for this null effect could be that participants were unaffected by the
detector; they ignored the aid and continued with manual performance. If this is true than
participant accuracy should be independent of aid accuracy; that is, the probability of an operator
error when the aid was correct (p(error │ aid correct)) should equal the probability of an error
when the aid was incorrect (p(error │ aid incorrect)). A reliable difference between the
probabilities of an operator error associated with the agents correct and incorrect
recommendations would suggest that the detector’s responses influenced the operators’
decisions. This is exactly what they found, an incorrect recommendation by the machine caused
significantly greater probability of an operator error, than a correct recommendation by the
machine (0.27 vs. 0.13 respectively). Thus, operators’ decisions were related to the detectors
recommendations but not to the accuracy of the machine in general. Other research has shown
that trust is greatly reduced by small automation errors (compared to perfect automation
performance), and increasingly less sensitive to larger automation errors (Muir & Moray, 1996).
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System designers should not assume that more reliable decision aids will always produce
better performance by human-machine teams (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2002). In fact the
literature has shown that with perfect reliability, individuals tire of monitoring it (i.e., become
complacent), and are less able to deal with errors when they occur then if they were responding
autonomously or with a less reliable aid (Sheridan, 2002). Indeed, in a study by May, Molloy, &
Parasuraman (1993) it was found that the detection rate of automation failures varied inversely
with automation reliability. That is, the more reliable the automation the more complacent the
operator.

Object of Trust
The object of trust may simply be defined as what the trustor is trusting. In this definition
the object of trust may be another individual or even an entity (e.g., robot; Corritore, Kracher, &
Wiedenbeck, 2001). Based on past research there are some cases in which trust differs between
machines and fellow humans. One well documented case of these differences is polarization
bias.
Polarization bias refers to the unrealistic extremely favorable (perfection bias) or
unfavorable views (rejection bias) of automated decision aids. Due to this effect individuals tend
to be unforgiving of automation that deviates from perfection (Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang,
2001). On the other hand, human beings are imperfect; no one is immune to occasional mistakes.
Thus, a human operator could be expected to make a mistake on one problem and then be correct
on the next. However, automated devices are generally considered to work perfectly or not at all.
For instance, if the numbers are entered correctly a calculator it will give one the correct or
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incorrect answer to every problem (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2002). Machines, like calculators,
tend to be either functional or dysfunctional.
In a study by Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, and Dawe (2001) individuals were asked to rate
the expected performance of either a human or a machine partner in a detection study. The
detection study asked participants to view slides that displayed only terrain or terrain plus a
camouflaged soldier (in various levels of camouflage). The users were also presented with their
partner’s (who they were lead to believe was either human or machine) decision on whether the
photo contained a human form. Participants consistently rated the machine as being more
accurate, “perfection bias”, prior to experience using the automation. However, after practice
with the soldier detection task there were no significant differences in user expectations between
human and machine partners. In another study by Wiegmann and colleagues (2001), “rejection
bias” was found in which user’s underestimated a system’s true reliability because the automated
diagnostic aids were not perfectly reliable. While this bias has been found it has not been
investigated among multiple agents of varying reliability levels.

Failure Salience
Failure salience is defined as how visible an automation failure is to users. Failure
salience may significantly impact trust in automation (Barnett, 2000). In a study by Beck and
colleagues (2001), participants were briefly shown pictures that did or did not contain a
camouflaged soldier. For each trial, participants first reported whether or not they had detected a
soldier; after their response they received a recommendation from an automated contrast detector
as to whether or not it had detected a soldier in that trial. When a user did detect a signal, but the
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aid did not, they could be certain that the detector had indeed missed the signal. On the other
hand, when an operator did not detect a signal, but the aid did, they were unsure whether they
had missed the signal or the automation was in error. That is, if the human monitoring the
display detected nothing and the decision aid reported the presence of a signal, one would not
know if there really was nothing present (a false alarm on part of aid) or that the human observer
actually did miss a signal (a miss on part of the participant). One study by Mosier and Skitka
(1998) observed the effect of faulty automation cues on aircrews during a flight simulation. One
such faulty automation cue was a false alarm indicated an engine fire. Rather than lose trust in
the automation, 74% of the aircrews erroneously recalled diagnostic cues to support the engine
fire alert. Thus, it appears that operators may interpret automation false alarms in varying ways,
even to the point of misremembering information to support the automation false alarm. On the
other hand operators tend to lose automation trust and be more confident in their own responses
when confronted with highly salient misses by the automation. Operators may thus establish a
false belief in their superiority because the detector’s misses may be more noticeable than their
own misses. Another potential explanation is that initially users have a “perfection bias” in
automation, observing errors made by the automation are inconsistent with the expectation (i.e.,
schema) of perfect automation performance and are thus going to be more vivid in memory and
play a larger role in information processing.
To examine this issue of failure salience Beck and colleagues (2001) paired students with
machines that performed at an inferior or superior level to their own manual performance. They
then instructed students that their extra credit for participation in research would be dependent on
the number of correct trials among 10 random trials drawn from their or the machine’s
performance (200 total trials). No misuse occurred, students working with inferior machines
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made no biased decisions. However, despite being given feedback that the machine had superior
overall performance, it was found that 31 of 36 students made extra credit contingent on their
own inferior performance (disuse). There are several potential explanations for this finding,
students may have felt a desire to be mentally engaged in the activity (i.e., avoid boredom), a
moral obligation to contribute to the task, a need to be in control of the process, or a false and
distorted belief perseverance (Lee & Moray, 1994; Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001). In regards
to belief perseverance this is when false ideas (e.g., more salient machine error rate) can continue
to influence attitudes after they have been discredited (i.e., when the students were informed of
the machines superior overall performance). In this vein memory is highly selective and not all
mistakes are going to have an equal influence on future judgments (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce,
2002); that is, an operator who may have vivid memories of the detector’s errors may have less
prominent recollections of their own errors. Operators are attuned to the worst observed machine
behaviors, so to encourage trust automation must be desirable and consistent. Thus, even if
automation only degrades system performance momentarily it may still highly degrade trust.
Another potential avenue related to failure salience is the difficulty of the trial in which
the automation makes the error. That is, in easier trials in which a signal is highly apparent an
error in the automation would be quite obvious. However, an error in a more difficult trial would
be less salient. A hypothetical example would be to use a automated weapon shape contrast
detector with a baggage screening task; in this case a large assault rifle would be a highly salient
signal (an error in the detector would be quite blatant), compared to a less salient partially
occluded handgun (an error would be less obvious). It would stand to reason that the more
apparent and vivid an error the greater the decrement to user trust. This has been found in the
case of Lee and Moray’s work (1992) examining the effect of automation with different levels of

25

error (i.e., large or small error). They found that trust was found to decline with increasing
magnitude of the faults. However, the nature of the aid and the task was quite different from the
current research. It is of theoretical and practical important to see if these findings, with a
physical aid in a simulated pasteurization task, hold true with a decision aid in a simulated
search-and-rescue task.

Additional Moderating Factors.
Of course, these variables are not the only influencing factors upon trust and reliance of
automated aids. Other factors include workload, situational awareness (SA), validity,
transparency, utility, etc (Liu & Hwang, 2000; De Vries et al., 2003). Further there are other
constraints that may interfere with reliance. For example, the operator may not have enough time
to engage the automation even if they trust it and intend to use it, the effort to engage the
automation may outweigh its benefits, or they may simply use automation they don’t trust
because they are unable to do the task themselves (Corritore, Kracher, & Wiedenbeck, 2001).
For example, in one study by Desmond, Hancock, and Monette (1998) it was found that
monitoring an automated system that drove an automobile was just as fatiguing as actually
driving the automobile. Another important issue is that of social loafing which can occur when
individuals operate in groups in which their individual performance is masked by the efforts of
others (Burdick, Skitka, & Mosier, 1997; Dzindolet, Beck, Pierce, & Dawe, 1998). Indeed,
research has shown that merely providing operators with the opportunity to rely on an automated
aid actually decreases their motivation to perform the task, though conflicting research has found
that social loafing does not occur in human-automated-interaction as there is still only one person
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who bears responsibility for the system. In this light another human must be present for the
responsibility to be shared between the individuals (Lewandowsky, Mundy, & Tan, 2000).
Another factor influences trust is the consistency of error within the automation. If an automated
system has constant error users learn to compensate for the constant error and trust in the
automated system increases, on the other hand with variable error systems trust stays low even
with practice with a system. Indeed, Muir and Moray (1996) found that a small variable error is
just as damaging as a large constant error on trust. All of these factors may influence operator
trust and reliance in an automated system, but are beyond the scope of the current dissertation, it
would be recommended that future research examine these factors in combination with the
variables examined in the current research.

Purpose of the Current Study
Although several researchers have examined the differences in trust in relating to humans
or machines agents separately, the literature is severely lacking in examining how operator trust
is impacted by interacting with multiple human or machine agents who vary in their actual
reliability levels. Therefore, the present study was undertaken to determine if operator trust in an
agent is affected by a concurrent agent, and to what degree this relationship is moderated by
agent type, mixed reliability levels, and salience of the automation failures.

Mixed Reliability Levels
Several researcher mentioned previously have examined the effect of various automation
reliability levels on user acceptance of the automation. Muir (1994) has suggested that
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developing trust in an automated system requires being able to predict its operation. This stands
to reason that increased experience with a transparent system will increase users’ ability to
predict an automated systems response. However, when users are monitoring multiple automated
aids of mixed reliability (i.e., low and high reliability), increased experience with a low
reliability aid may negatively impact user reliance on a concurrent high reliability aid. However,
the degree of impact of this automation bias crossover is currently unknown. It is also, for
theoretical and practical interest, important to examine whether this bias works in the opposite
direction; that is, whether experience with a high reliability aid increases reliance in a concurrent
low reliability aid.
For the present research, it was decided to evaluate a human operator monitoring two
automated agents. To accomplish this goal four experiments were conducted employing a
search-and-rescue task. The testbed was created and adjusted in experiments 1 and 2. Based on
the results of experiment 3, the reliability of the low- and high-reliability aids were determined.
In Experiment 4, effects of reliability conditions (i.e., both low, mixed, both high) and agent
characteristics (i.e., human agents, same-type robotic agents, different-type robotic agents) were
tested. Bias between the mixed reliability levels were examined by comparing them to the
uniform reliability levels.

Agent Type
Differences, such as polarization bias, have been found in the way humans trust other
humans versus how they trust machines. In general, it has been found that operators are less
forgiving of machine failures. In this study I examined how agent type influenced operator trust
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and reliance on multiple agents. It’s predicted that robotic-agents will suffer greater drops in trust
following errors compared to human agents, due to polarization bias. Additionally, I believe that
agent type will influence the biasing effect that I expect to occur between mixed reliability
levels. That is, two human agents will be perceived as independent so the mixed reliability bias
should not occur. However, two similar machine agents will be perceived as very similar so the
mixed reliability bias should occur. An intermediate level was chosen for comparison in which
two unique machine agents performed the task. In this last case it is believed that some bias
would occur but to a lesser degree than it would with two similar machine agents. This effect
was examined, in Experiment 4, by having participants monitoring what they believe is two
human agents, two same-type robotic agents, or two different-type robotic agents.

Salience of Automation of Failures
It is known that number of errors, in the form of overall reliability, often affects user’s
trust and reliance in an automated system (Lee & Moray, 1992). Given this it would be
interesting to examine if type of automation error impacted user trust and reliance in different
ways. That is, will automation errors on easier difficulty trials cause greater drops in operator
trust and reliance? It stands to reason that how visible a failure is to users may have a significant
effect on their confidence in the automation they use. Further, it is believed that this effect will
be moderated by the object of trust. The literature demonstrates that automation bias indicates
that any error on the part of the machine is detrimental to operator trust and reliance. However, it
is believed that if the error comes from a human agent that users will be more forgiving of an
error, especially if the error occurred on a particularly difficult trial.
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Testing the Theories
The following studies tests the above theories by having participants perform a task in
which they are aided by two automated systems. The experimental groups were divided into the
cells of a 3 (reliability condition) x 3 (source characteristics) x 3 (failure salience) mixed design
with within subjects on the latter factor. Participant self-confidence, trust, reliance, and
performance in the automated systems were measured.
During the task the automated systems would occasionally fail, the number of times
would be dependent upon the reliability condition. The participants’ trust and reliance in the two
automated agents would be compared between the mixed vs. uniform reliability groups for each
reliability level (i.e., low and high). Any differences between group scores would support the
theory that mixed reliability levels experience a biasing effect.
The interface of the design will be manipulated so that the automated agents are either
represented as distributed human agents, machine agents of similar types, or machine agents of
dissimilar types. The participant responses across these groups and the interaction between
reliability levels and agent type will be examined. Difference in a main effect would support the
theory that operators respond differently to other humans compared to machines. An interaction
would indicate that not only do operators respond differently to humans compared to machines
but that this is impacted by the reliability levels of the agents.
Finally the failure salience will be manipulated so that trials in which automation errors
occur will vary in their difficulty. This examines whether aids are viewed as more reliable if their
errors occur on more difficult stimuli. One way to examine this would be to look at participant
reliance following automation errors on easy trials compared to reliance following automation
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errors on more difficult trials. Here an effect would indicate that the salience of the error impacts
user reliance. It would be most advisable to include multiple levels of automation error difficulty
levels so as to examine interaction effects. That is, to examine whether the salience of an
automation failure would differ depending on what reliability level a user was experiencing (i.e.,
a difficult error may go unnoticed in a high reliability condition due to operator complacency) or
particular agent characteristics (i.e., humans may differ in how they treat difficult errors by other
humans and automation, but not to how they treat easy errors by either group). In regards to
agent type, Dzindolet et al. (2003) mention determining agent competence based on item
difficulty is a somewhat flawed strategy, due to the fact that humans and automated aids often
process information differently. What might be considered an easy unambiguous stimulus for a
human decision-maker may be considered an ambiguous and difficult stimulus for an automated
decision aid. The greater this difference, the less trustworthy an automated aid may be perceived
to be.

Research Hypotheses
Therefore, the present studies were designed to test these theories. Regarding the role of
reliability, source characteristics, and failure salience with an automated system, a number of
hypotheses emerge.
1. In a complex, dual-aid, condition there will be bias between two agents of mixed
reliability compared to two uniform agents.
a. Trust and reliance of a high-reliability agent will be negatively influenced
by a concurrent low-reliability agent.
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b. Trust and reliance of a low-reliability agent will be positively influenced
by a concurrent high-reliability agent.
2. Operators experiencing high automation reliability will have significantly more
subjective trust in the automation than those experiencing both low or the mixed
reliability conditions. Additionally those with low automation reliability will
experience significantly less subjective trust of the automation than those in the
mixed reliability condition (HO = There is no significant difference between
reliability group trust scores).
a. Increased levels of automation trust will be accompanied by increased
levels of reliance on the aid and lower levels of reported workload.
b. Decreased levels of automation trust will be accompanied by decreased
levels of reliance on the aid and higher levels of reported workload.
3. Subjective levels of trust, automation reliance, and workload are expected to
differ across agent type (i.e., human, similar computer agents, dissimilar computer
agents). Such that human agents have increased trust, increased reliance, and
decreased workload, compared to the computer agents. The computer agents are
not expected to differ in overall trust, reliance, or workload (HO = There is no
significant difference between agent type group trust ratings, reliance, and/or
workload).
4. In a mixed reliability condition the agent type is expected to significantly impact
crossover bias between the two agents. (HO = There is no significant interaction
between reliability and agent type).
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a. Two agents perceived to be human will experience the least crossover bias
in the mixed reliability condition. Thus, a low-reliability human aid will
have little impact on a concurrent high-reliability human aid.
b. The same-type robotic agents will experience the most crossover bias in
the mixed reliability condition. Thus, a low-reliability same-type robotic
agent will have a strong impact on a concurrent high-reliability same-type
robotic agent.
c. The different-type robotic agents will experience an intermediate level of
crossover bias in the mixed reliability condition. Thus, a low-reliability
different-type robotic agent will have an intermediate impact on a
concurrent high-reliability different-type robotic agent.
5. The failure salience of the automation error is expected to influence the likelihood
of relying on the aid in the future trials. Such that as the salience increases the
lower temporal reliance becomes (temporal reliance is measured by the agreement
with an aid on the trial following an aid error). (HO = There is no significant effect
between failure salience groups for temporal reliance).
a. High salience failures (i.e., obvious errors) will cause a significantly less
temporal reliance on the aid compared to less salient errors (moderate and
low salience failures).
b. Moderate salience failures will cause less temporal reliance compared to
low salience failures but maintain higher temporal reliance than high
salience failures.
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c. Low salience failures will maintain the highest level of temporal reliance
compared to the more salient errors.
6. It is expected that source characteristics of the agents and the salience of the agent
errors will interact to affect temporal reliance. (HO = There is no significant
interaction between source characteristics and failure salience).
a. Agents perceived to be human will experience drops in temporal reliance
proportional to the increasing simplicity of the error made. Also it is
expected that participants will be more forgiving of human errors
compared to robotic errors, especially on more difficult stimuli.
b. The computer agents will experience equivalent drops in reliance across
all types of errors. This reflects automation bias, in which automation is
expected to work perfectly or not at all. Participants will be unforgiving of
all robotic errors regardless of error salience.

Independent Variables
Agent reliability will be manipulated so that there will be a low-reliability and a highreliability condition. As reliability levels are highly dependent upon the task in question,
Experiment 3 will serve to determine appropriate values for this study. As prior research has
shown that prior experience with one reliability level impacts trust/reliance of subsequent
reliability levels agent reliability was kept as a between-subjects measure (i.e., both high, both
low, or mixed: one high and one low).
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Source characteristics will be manipulated so that individuals are told that they are
monitoring decisions from either two human agents, two similar computer agents, or two
dissimilar computer agents. Images of the agents were placed on the display to increase the
salience of this independent variable. To increase the believability of agent type, source
characteristics was kept as a between-subjects measure.
Error salience will be manipulated so that the automation makes errors that are low,
moderate, and high salience. The salience of the errors were determined by experiment 2 which
will evaluate the difficulty of the clips, with more difficult clips (i.e., fewer participants correctly
identifying) as being less salient (i.e., less obvious). Error salience will be a within subjects
measure.

Dependent Variables.
Subjective Measures.
As Muir (1989) found people are able to generate meaningful subjective ratings of trust.
Participant trust ratings are sensitive to the properties of the automation and related in a sensible
way to those properties (Lewandowsky, Mundy, & Tan, 2000). Thus, the following studies
employed previously used subjective measures of trust before and after experience with the
agents. The pre-questionnaire, used in the fourth study, asked participants to estimate their and
their automated aids expected performance on the coming trials (See Table 1). The postquestionnaire queried participants on their subjective experience of the trials they have just
completed and asked them to make a decision regarding how their performance score would be
calculated (See Table 2 for post-questionnaire questions; format varied depending on whether
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questionnaire was used in experiment 3 or 4). The use of the choice for score calculation was
selected because trust involves some degree of vulnerability on the part of the trustor.
Additionally personality measures were obtained to examine general trust expectancies,
anthropomorphic tendencies, and automation complacency potential.
Table 4. Pre-questionnaire questions for experiment 4. Questionnaire adapted from Dzindolet,
Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 2003.
Question
Scale
How well do you think the agent will
perform during the 120 trials?

Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Not Very
Well” – “Very Well”

How well do you think you will perform
during the 120 trials?

Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Not Very
Well” – “Very Well”

Who do you think will make more errors
during the 120 trials? I will make…

Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Many More
Errors” – “Far Fewer Errors”

How many errors do you think you will
make during the 120 trials? I will make
about _______ errors.

Numerical value entered by participant,
range from 0 to 200.

How many errors do you think the agent
will make during the 120 trials? The agent
will make about _______ errors.

Numerical value entered by participant,
range from 0 to 200.

To what extent do you believe you can
trust the decisions the agent will make?

Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” –
“A Great Amount”

To what extent do you believe you can
trust the decisions you will make?

Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” –
“A Great Amount”

How would you rate the expected
performance of the agent relative to your
expected performance? The agent will
perform…

Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Better Than I
Will Perform” – “Much Worse Than I Will
Perform”
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Table 5. Post-questionnaire questions. (Questionnaire adapted from: Dzindolet, Peterson,
Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 2003; Master, Gramopadhye, Bingham, & Jiang 2000).
Question

Competence: To what extent does the agent
perform this search-and-rescue task effectively?
Predictability: To what extent can you anticipate
the agent’s behavior with some degree of
confidence?
Reliability: To what extent is the agent free of
errors?
Faith: To what extent do you have a strong belief
and trust in the agent to do the search-and-rescue
task in the future without being monitored?

Scale

Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” – “A
Great Amount”
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” – “A
Great Amount”
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” – “A
Great Amount”
Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” – “A
Great Amount”

Overall Trust: How much did you trust the
decisions of the agent overall?
What percentage of responses by the agent do
you think were correct?

Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” – “A
Great Amount”

How often did you notice an error made by the
agent?

Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Not At All” – “Many
Times”

To what extent did you lose trust in the agent
when you noticed it made an error?

Likert Scale 1-9, endpoints “Very Little” – “A
Great Amount”

Imagine that there are ten more video clips that
need to be examined for terrorists, civilians, and
IEDs. Also imagine that we were to offer you an
additional compensation, of either $5.00 or an
extra credit point for each of these ten additional
video clips that is correctly identified. However,
due to a software problem only you or Teammate
B can make the decisions. Would you prefer that
this additional compensation be based on the
decisions made by the automated aid or the
decisions made by you? (circle one)

“Agent’s Decisions” or “My Own Decisions”

We would like to know what led to your decision
to base your performance on either your decisions
or on the decisions of the aid. Please tell us
everything you thought of in coming to this
decision. Do not worry about spelling or
grammatical errors. Use the back side of this
paper if necessary.

Free Response. Previous study divided answers
into 4 major categories. 1) Trust in computers (“I
don’t trust computers that much. I know a lot
about their tendency for errors”), 2) detection of
obvious errors (“There were a few times that I’m
pretty sure I saw a terrorist, but the program said
he was absent”), 3) confidence in self (“I was not
that confident in what I saw” or “I chose to use
‘my decisions’ because I trust my observations,
and I never second guess my self”), & 4) relative
performance (“I had less errors than the
computer”, “The contrast detector made less
errors”, or “The computer made more mistakes
compared to mine”).

Range 0% to 100%
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Behavioral Measures
To measure objective trust of an automated system, reliance was analyzed. Reliance was
measured as the combined total of the times the participant agreed with the aid. Additionally,
temporal reliance was examined by looking at the likelihood of automation reliance on a trial
immediately following an automation failure trial. In all cases, the automation correctly worked
on the trial immediately following an automation failure.
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EXPERIMENT 1: METHODOLOGY
Experimental Purpose
Due to the requirement for certain features to address the overarching research questions
in this line of research, it was required that an experimental platform be developed that could test
these questions. An experimental platform was designed that could serve as an interface for users
to monitor the progress of an Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) through an office building.
Experiment 1 served as a pilot study to determine that users monitoring the UGV are receiving
adequate time to view the video clips (i.e., duration of the stimuli) and adequate time to respond
to the video clips (i.e., inter-stimulus interval; ISI). The goal of this experiment is to ensure that
the basic task itself was possible for participants to perform. That is, the task is set to a pace that
is neither too fast nor too slow for participants. The selected video durations and ISI were
maintained for the other studies in this dissertation.

Experimental Participants
Twenty-five participants were recruited through the University of Central Florida extracredit website and they received course credit for their participation. Participation were limited to
those with normal or corrected to normal vision. Total participation time did not to exceed 1
hour.
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Experimental Procedure
Participants first completed an informed consent (See Appendix B), followed by a brief
introduction to the task (See Appendix C) and a practice session. Participants then completed the
experimental session, which is composed of 108 trials divided into 9 blocks. After each block the
participant completed a brief questionnaire (See Appendix D). At the end of the experimental
blocks the participant were thanked for their participation.

Training Procedure
The purpose of the training was to acquaint the participant with the nature of the task, the
response buttons, and the stimuli. Participants received the training in the form of an
experimenter read script (See Appendix C) and a computerized practice session. The script
described in detail the scenario, what stimuli the participant would view, and how they were to
respond. The computerized practice session had the same layout as the experimental display with
the addition of three stationary images of the critical signals above the video feed (See Figure 2).
The video feed presented 4 video clips during the practice session. These clips were presented
for 5 seconds, with 5 second inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs). Four video clips were chosen to
demonstrate each of the four potential stimuli: a terrorist (See Figure 3), an Improvised
Explosive Device (IED; See Figure 4), a civilian (See Figure 5), and an empty room (See Figure
6). Participants were able to respond to the practice trials to become familiar with the interface.
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Figure 2. Practice interface for experiment 1.

Figure 3. Video clip demonstrating a terrorist.

Figure 4. Video clip demonstrating an unconscious civilian.
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Figure 5. Video clip demonstrating an IED.

Figure 6. Video clip demonstrating an empty room.
Experimental Task
The experimental interface of the UGV search-and-rescue scenario was similar to the
practice session, the main difference being the removal of the stationary stimuli images from the
top of the screen (See Figure 7). Participants were able to respond after each video clip ends, by
using the mouse to click on one of the response buttons (located beneath the video feed).
Participants were able to respond only once per trial, this limitation was imposed by having the
response buttons become deactivated after a participant had made a selection. Additionally, since
the ISI was held constant during each block, participants were informed that it may take several
seconds to move onto the next video after they have made their selection and that this was
perfectly normal.
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Figure 7. Video presentation interface for experiment 1.
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Figure 8. Response interface for experiment 1.
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Experimental Conditions
The properties of video duration and ISI were manipulated in this study. Video duration
was either 5, 7, or 10 seconds (video panning rate was held approximately constant). ISI was also
either 5, 7, or 10 seconds in length. This lead to nine possible experimental conditions (See Table
6). Each experimental condition was composed of 12 randomly selected video clips, with the
restriction that the 12 clips contained 3 of each kind of stimuli (i.e., terrorist, civilian, IED, and
empty).
Table 6. Duration and ISI conditions.
Block

Trial Duration

ISI

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

5
7
10
5
7
10
5
7
10

5
5
5
7
7
7
10
10
10

Total Time in
Minutes (12 trials
per block)
2
2.4
3
2.4
2.8
3.4
3
3.4
4

Measurement and Analysis

Subjective Measures
Subjective measures were obtained after each block by using a post-block questionnaire
(See Appendix D). All questions were presented in a Likert-style format, with the scale range of
0 to 10. Question 1 and 2 measured subjective satisfaction with the duration and ISI of each
block, the scale endpoints were set so that an ideal satisfaction was rated in the midpoint of the
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scale (5; with higher and lower values reflecting either too much or too little time respectively).
Questions 3 thru 6 queried participants on whether they believed they would be able to monitor
and respond to either 2 or 4 UGVs given the same durations and ISIs; scale endpoints were set to
‘Definitely Yes’ and ‘Definitely Not.’ This measure was used to reflect the participant’s
confidence in taking on a more complex task and provides some exploratory data as to whether
individuals will be able to monitor multiple aids in following experiments.
The final six questions on the questionnaire, Question 7 thru Question 12, are the six
rating scales from the NASA-Task Load Index (NASA-TLX; Hart & Staveland, 1988). The
NASA-TLX uses six dimensions to assess workload: mental demand, physical demand, temporal
demand, effort, performance, and frustration. Each dimension was rated by the participant on a
scale from 0 to 10 with higher numbers reflecting greater workload. These values were then
averaged into an overall rating of workload. Though the individual scales of temporal demand
and perceived performance were of particular interest and were also examined individually.

Objective Measures
Objective measures were obtained for performance accuracy and reaction time (RT). In
regards to performance accuracy I examined performance in terms of percentage correct across
the different durations and ISIs manipulations. However, because the experiment was withinsubjects different video clips were randomly selected for each block, thus performance
comparisons may reflect differences in the inherent difficulty of the selected clips rather than
differences due to the duration/ISI manipulation.
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Reaction-time data was examined to determine the average reaction time needed to
respond to a trial and its 95% confidence interval. This provided a general measure of the time
most individuals would require for responding to the stimuli.

Experimental Equipment
The videos were recorded in three commercial and educational office buildings in the
Central Florida area. Recordings were made using a standard digital video recorder set on a
tripod dolly. To maintain maximum consistency a single operator, experienced with musical
timing, controlled the pan rate of the camera. The terrorist in the video clips was held constant;
such that, in each clip he was portrayed by the same individual, carried the same simulated
assault rifle, an airsoftTM AK-47, and was outfitted in the same black outfit/mask to prevent any
gender/racial/ethnic stereotyping (See Figure 3). Civilians were composed of a variety of
volunteer participants of various genders and ages who were recruited at random from the three
office locations. In all civilian clips the volunteers averted their faces; this was done to minimize
the chance that participants might recognize any of the particular individual civilians (See Figure
4). The IED was held constant in all clips, and was composed of two metal canisters connected
via wires to a timer (See Figure 5).
After obtaining the video stimuli it was then edited for length and noise using Adobe
Premiere 2.0. Static was overlaid onto the video and the frame per second (fps) rate was reduced,
from 30 fps to 15 fps, to develop brief choppy and realistic first-person video clips simulating an
UGV exploring a commercial office building after a terrorist attack. The interface used to present
the videos was created using Visual Basic.net. The interface contained one video display and
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four response keys. Responses were recorded into a data file that records accuracy and response
time (See Table 7). The simulation itself was presented on a desktop computer with a 20-inch
widescreen monitor and an optical mouse for responding. Participants were instructed to wear
headphones during the task to block out any extraneous noise.
Table 7. Recorded output from UGV simulation. All variables are recorded for each trial with the
exception of participant # and date/time.
Name
Meaning
Example
Identifies each
Participant #
1
participants data file
Records date and
Date/Time
7/27/2007 4:51:56pm
time of participant
Clip
The video clip file name.
G5C1.avi
The experimental condition
Group
5
(Duration and ISI)
The type of stimulus that is
Signal
Civilian
presented
Response
The participants response
Empty
Whether the response is
Correct
E
correct “C” or an error “E”
The response time in
Reaction Time
01.0156875
seconds.
Hypothesized Outcome
The main determinant of ensuring adequate video duration and ISI are the responses to
questions 1 and 2 from the subjective questionnaire. It was hypothesized that, while all the tested
durations and ISIs would be sufficient for performance and reaction time measures, a subjective
preference would emerge benefiting moderate durations and ISIs (e.g., 7 second duration and
ISI; Hypothesis 1). It was further postulated that this would be reflected in both overall and
subscale workload scores (Hypothesis 2). However, self-confidence in handling additional video
feeds is hypothesized to be greater for longer durations and ISIs (Hypothesis 3; see Table 8).
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These hypotheses were based on experimenter experience with the task during the development
phase.
Table 8. Hypotheses for Experiment 1.
Dependent Measure
Response Time

Hypothesis Number
1
2
Ample Time = [D5, D7 , D10]
Ample Time = [I5 < I7 < I10]
Ample Performance = [D5, D7 , D10]
Ample Performance = [I5 < I7 < I10]

3

Performance
(% Correct)
Satisfaction with Video
D7 > [ D5, D10]
Duration
Satisfaction with Video ISI
I7 > [ I5, I10]
D7 > [ D5, D10]
Overall and Subscale Workload
I7 > [ I5, I10]
Scores
Self-confidence in monitoring
D5 < D7 < D10
I5 < I7 < I10
two feeds
D5 < D7 < D10
Self-confidence in responding
I5 < I7 < I10
to two feeds
*D5 = Duration 5 Second, D7 = Duration 7 Second, D10 = Duration 10 Second, I5 = ISI 5 Second, I7 = ISI 7 Second,
I10 = ISI 10 Second

49

EXPERIMENT 1: RESULTS
The purpose of the first experiment was to ensure adequate video duration and response
ISI for manual performance of the UGV monitoring task. Below the results are discussed for the
performance and subjective data (see Table 9).
Table 9. Findings for hypotheses for Experiment 1.
Dependent Measure
Response Time
Performance
(% Correct)
Satisfaction with Video
Duration
Satisfaction with Video ISI

Hypothesis Number
1
2
Ample Time = [D5, D7 , D10]
Ample Time = [I5 < I7 < I10]
Ample Performance = [D5, D7 , D10]
Ample Performance = [I5 < I7 < I10]

3

D7 > [ D5, D10]
I7 > [ I5, I10]
D7 > [ D5, D10]
I7 > [ I5, I10]

Overall and Subscale
Workload Scores

Self-confidence in monitoring
D5 < D7 < D10
I5 < I7 < I10
two feeds
D5 < D7 < D10
Self-confidence in responding
I5 < I7 < I10
to two feeds
*D5 = Duration 5 Second, D7 = Duration 7 Second, D10 = Duration 10 Second, I5 = ISI 5 Second, I7 = ISI 7 Second,
I10 = ISI 10 Second

Performance Data

Response Time
The 95% CI for overall RT was examined. The mean overall reaction time (RT) was
921.7 ms, with a lower bound of 852.2 ms and an upper bound of 991.3 ms. Additionally, a 3
(duration) by 3 (ISI) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on RT. The main effect in all
cases for duration, ISI, and the interaction between ISI and duration was not significant (p > .05).
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Percent Correct
A 3 (duration) by 3 (ISI) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the percentage of
correct detections. Video duration was statistically significant, F(2, 42) = 43.48, p < .0005, η² =
0.67. Pairwise comparison indicated that the 10 second duration had significantly fewer correct
answers then the 5 or 7 second duration, which did not significantly differ from each other (See
Figure 9). The interaction between duration and ISI was also significant, F(4, 84) = 10.35, p <
.0005, η² = 0.33 (See Figure 10). The main effect for ISI was not statistically significant (p >
.05).

Figure 9. Percent correct as a function of duration of the video clips.
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Figure 10. Percent correct as a function of video duration and ISI.
Subjective Data

Duration and ISI Subjective Satisfaction
The main determinant of ensuring adequate video duration was question 1 which
concerned participant’s subjective feeling of satisfaction with the amount of time they had to
view each video clip. A 3 (duration) by 3 (ISI) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the
data. The main effect for duration was significant, F(2, 42) = 6.69, p = .003, η² = 0.24. The main
effect for ISI (F(2, 42) = 0.08, p = .92, η² = 0.004) and the interaction effect between duration
and ISI were both not significant (F(4, 84) = 2.09, p = .09, η² = 0.09). Pairwise comparisons
were conducted on duration, which indicated a significant difference between the 5 second and
10 second conditions, all other groups were not significantly different (p > .05; See Figure 11).
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Figure 11. Perceived satisfaction of time to view each video clip as a function of video clip
duration. Note that the line across the center represents optimal satisfaction with duration (a rating
of 5), values above this line represent too much time, below this line too little time. Bars represent
standard error.
The main determinant of ensuring adequate response ISI was question 2 which concerned
participant’s subjective feeling of satisfaction with the amount of time they had to respond to
each video clip. A 3 (duration) by 3 (ISI) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the data.
The main effect for ISI was significant, F(2, 42) = 4.65, p = .015, η² = 0.181. The main effect for
duration (F(2, 42) = 0.60, p = .55, η² = 0.028) and the interaction effect between duration and ISI
were both not significant (F(4, 84) = 0.91, p = .46, η² = 0.042). Pairwise comparisons were
conducted on ISI, the 10 second ISI was significantly different from both the 5 and 7 second ISIs
(the latter two did not significantly differ from each other, p > .05; See Figure 12).
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Figure 12. Perceived satisfaction of time to respond to each video clip as a function of ISI of each
video clip. Note that the line represents optimal satisfaction with ISI (a rating of 5), values above
this line represent too much time to respond, below this line too little time to respond. Bars
represent standard error.

Overall and Subscale Workload
A 3 (duration) by 3 (ISI) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on overall workload
and each of the individual subscales. The main effect in all cases for duration, ISI, and the
interaction between ISI and duration was not significant (p > .05).

Confidence in Handling Additional Video Feeds
To examine user’s confidence in handling two agents Q3 and Q4 of the subjective
questionnaire examined user confidence in monitoring and responding to two aids. A 3
(duration) by 3 (ISI) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on Q3 regarding perceived
confidence in monitoring two video feeds. Video duration was statistically significant, F(2, 42) =
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5.10, p = .01, η² = 0.20. Pairwise comparison indicated that the 5 second duration was rated
significantly lower in perceived confidence then the 7 or 10 second duration, which did not
significantly differ from each other (See Figure 13). The main effect for ISI and the interaction
between ISI and duration were both not significant (p > .05).

Figure 13. Perceived confidence in being able to monitor 2 video clips as a function of duration
of video clips.
A 3 (duration) by 3 (ISI) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on Q4 regarding
perceived confidence in responding to two video feeds. The main effect for duration, ISI, and the
interaction between ISI and duration were all not significant (p > .05).
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EXPERIMENT 1: DISCUSSION
It was hypothesized that all the tested durations and ISIs would be sufficient for
performance and reaction time measures but that a subjective preference would emerge
benefiting moderate durations and ISIs (e.g., 7 second duration and ISI).

Duration Results
This original hypothesis was confirmed, in that all duration did not significantly impact
participant RT. It was incorrect in that there was a main effect for duration in regards to percent
correct. However, by examining the data it was concluded that the performance data was quite
noisy. That is, by randomly distributing the video clips, some groups received easier or more
difficult clips than others (See Appendix E). Visual inspection of the distribution of errors across
videos in the conditions demonstrated that the 10 second duration groups (i.e., with 5, 7, and 10
second ISI) indicated not a random distribution of errors but instead a clustering of errors on just
a few videos that proved to be particularly difficult. Therefore, it is believed that the performance
duration main effect and the duration by ISI interaction are merely artifacts of random selection
of videos without regard to their innate difficulty, which is the focus of study 2. Nevertheless,
regardless of the difficulty of the videos that made up a condition it was apparent that user’s had
adequate time to view the videos as evident by their high accuracy across all conditions (all
scores over 80% correct).
In examining the subjective data it was demonstrated that users preferred a shorter video
duration (5 seconds) over a longer video duration (10 seconds; the 7 second duration was not
significantly different from either of these conditions). In examining confidence in observing an
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additional video feed, users rated themselves as less confident for the 5 second condition as
compared to the other two conditions. While, this might indicate that a longer duration should be
used to improve user confidence, it is actually in the interest of this research program, more
experimentally useful to cause a drop in user’s confidence in manually performing the task with
the addition of added task complexity (i.e., increasing their need for automated aids).
While my initial hypothesis had suggested a 7 second duration, the results of this study
indicate that a 7 second duration offers no measurable advantage over the 5 second duration. It
was further evident that the 5 second duration did indeed offer a measurable advantage over the
10 second duration. Thus, the 5 second video duration was chosen.

ISI Results
The hypothesis was correct, in that all ISIs were more than adequate given user average
response time (M = 0.92 seconds). Further, no significant differences in RT or percent correct
were found across the main effects for ISI conditions. A duration by ISI interaction was found
for percent correct but as previously mentioned this effect appears to be the result of error caused
by the random distribution of video clip difficulties across conditions. However, regardless of the
difficulty of the videos that made up a condition it was apparent that user’s did have adequate
time to respond (all scores over 80% correct).
In examining the subjective measures I found that users preferred the 5 second ISI over
the 10 second ISI, which they reported as reflecting too much time to respond (i.e., the task
seemed to drag). There was no significant difference in their satisfaction with the time between 5
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and 7 seconds. In regards to the perceived workload and confidence data there was no significant
difference among any of the ISI conditions.
While the initial hypothesis suggested employing a 7 second ISI, the results of this study
indicate that a 7 second ISI offers no measurable advantage over the 5 second ISI. It was further
evident that the 5 second ISI did indeed offer a measurable advantage over the 10 second ISI.
Thus, the 5 second ISI was chosen.
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EXPERIMENT 2: METHODOLOGY
Experimental Purpose
The first study has established that the basic task is set at a pace that allows manual
performance. That is, when automation is added in the following experiments users may choose
to employ it or they may manually complete the task themselves. However, as the first study
demonstrated when performance accuracy was examined, the inherent difficulty of the video
clips may not be sufficiently or uniformly sensitive (i.e., restriction of range of the task itself). In
order to ensure sensitivity of the performance measure I conducted a second pilot study, using
Item Response Theory (IRT; Inman, 2001) to ensure that a range of video clips difficulties (i.e.,
easy, moderate, and hard discriminations) for stimulus types was selected. The goal of this
experiment was to prevent a possible ceiling or floor effect from stimuli difficulty. An additional
purpose of having item difficulty quantified is that it allowed me to examine the impact of
automation error salience on user reliance.

Experimental Participants
To determine item difficulty I examined the responses of sixty-five undergraduate
students. Participants were recruited through the University of Central Florida extra-credit
website and they received course credit for their participation. Participation was limited to those
with normal or corrected to normal vision, and to those that had not participated in the prior
experiment.
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Experimental Procedure
Participants first completed an informed consent and demographic questionnaire (See
Appendix B and F). Next participants received a short training and practice session, followed by
the full experimental session. After completion of the experimental session the participants were
thanked for their participation. The entire experiment took approximately 1 hour.

Training Procedure
Training was the same as in experiment 1, with minor exceptions (See Appendix G).

Experimental Task
The same computer-based simulation of a UGV search-and-rescue scenario that was used
in experiment 1 was used in experiment 2. However, in this study all video clips were the same 5
second duration and the same 5 second ISI. Additionally, the number of trials was increased to
300. To minimize the effect of a vigilance decrement, participants were offered a short break
every 10 minutes of participation. Additionally video clips were presented in a random order to
each participant to further prevent a vigilance decrement from influencing only certain video
clips.

Experimental Conditions
The properties of stimulus difficulty were examined in this study. That is, the video clips
were altered using various levels of added static noise and statistically tested to obtain a range of
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stimuli difficulties. The final goal of the experiment was to take the 225 video clips with signals
embedded in them (75 videos were empty rooms and served as distracters during the task) and
divide them into easy, moderate, and difficult categories for the three signals (i.e., terrorist,
civilian, & IED) so that at least 8 clips fell into each category (See Table 10).
Table 10. Division of trial difficulties.
Stimuli
Difficulty
Terrorist
Easy
Moderate
Hard
Civilian
Easy
Moderate
Hard
IED
Easy
Moderate
Hard
Total Clips

Clips
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
72

Measurement and Analysis

Item Response Theory
Stimuli were mapped for difficulty using the item difficulty index βi from Item Response
Theory (IRT). The index of item difficulty βi is often used to determine the difficulty of multiplechoice questions; however, in this study it will be used to determine the difficulty of the stimulus
(i.e., the video clips). That is the difficulty parameter βi refers to the proportion of participants
who answered an item correctly; thus, the smaller the value of βi the harder the item (Inman,
2001). The equation for deriving item difficulty is presented below (see Equation 1). According
to this equation a difficulty index of 100% indicates that all participants selected the correct
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answer and that item was very “easy.” A value of 0% indicates that none of the participants
selected the correct answer and so that item was very “difficult” (Hotiu, 2006).

Equation 1. Difficulty index formula. Where c is the number who selected the correct answer and
n is the total number of respondents.
βi = (c/n)*100

In this study items were categorized into three distinct levels of difficulty; that is, low
difficulty, moderate difficulty, and high difficulty. Item difficulty could range between 0 and
100, with higher values indicating a greater proportion of participants responding correctly to the
item (i.e., an easy item). For the purposes of our research easy items were defined as those
ranging in βi from 67 – 100 (i.e., detected by 2/3 or more of the participants), moderately
difficult items will have βi scores from 34 - 66 (i.e., detected by 1/3 to 2/3 of the participants),
and difficult items will have βi scores from 0 – 33 (i.e., detected by 1/3 or fewer of the
participants). These difficulty levels were selected across the full possible difficulty range to
obtain a full array of item difficulties and prevent restriction of range.

Experimental Equipment
The video stimuli were 300 video clips obtained from three commercial and educational
office buildings (75 clips of each potential stimulus: terrorist, civilian, IED, and empty). All
features of the videos and interface were the same as those used in experiment 1, the only
difference being that the duration of the videos were held constant in this study and the amount
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of noise added to the clips in Adobe Premiere 2.0 varied to improve the differentiation between
the difficulty levels.

Hypothesized Outcome
The outcome of this study will be a division of videos based on item difficulty that will
be employed in experiments 3 and 4 of this dissertation. The purpose of this is to prevent
restriction of range in the performance measure of these studies. Additionally, it is of interest to
quantify item difficulty so that the impact of automation errors upon subsequent user reliance, in
experiment 4, may be related to the salience of that error (with easier items being typically more
salient than more difficult items).
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EXPERIMENT 2: RESULTS
The purpose of the second experiment was to select the videos, based on their difficulty,
for use in experiments 3 and 4. Item difficulty was determined for each of the civilian, terrorist,
and IED clips. The resulting item difficulties for each of the 225 clips are presented in Appendix
H.
The results of experiment two were not as predicted. People were far better at picking
critical signals out of the video clips than originally anticipated. Initially it was desired to include
8 easy (more 2/3 participants detect), 8 moderate (more 1/3 less 2/3), 8 hard video clips (less 1/3
correct detection) from each kind of stimuli (terrorist, civilian, and IED) for a total of 72 signals.
Unfortunately the data did not cooperate, after removing all 100% detection rates (which were
not diagnostic; there were no 0% detection rates), there were five out of 9 divisions that did not
contain the minimum number of clips (see Table 11). These results required that the video
inclusion criteria be altered to allow for an equal selection of video clip difficulties while
maintaining adequate number of trials for study power.
Table 11. Division of type of video clips into difficulty levels.
Stimuli
Difficulty
Clips Needed
Terrorist
Easy
8
Moderate
8
Hard
8
Civilian
Easy
8
Moderate
8
Hard
8
IED
Easy
8
Moderate
8
Hard
8
Note: Video clips with 100% detection were removed as they
diagnostic.
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Actual Clips
53
0
0
58
7
1
51
18
5
were viewed as being not

EXPERIMENT 2: DISCUSSION
It was hypothesized that there would be sufficient video clips across the full spectrum of
possible signal types and item difficulties (i.e., 8 clips from each difficulty level for each of the
three types of signals: terrorist, civilians, and IEDs). However, results indicated that participants
exceeded performance expectations and that the detection rate across subjects was quite high (M
= 87.97, SD = 6.38). Thus, there were fewer hard and moderate difficulty clips than anticipated
(i.e., only 6 total video clips meet current requirement for high difficulty compared to the desired
24 clips). Thus, several adaptations had to be made to the methodology.
First, due to effects outside of our experimental controls (e.g., human-beings exceptional
detection of biological motion) no terrorist clips fit into either the hard or moderate difficult
classification (see Table 11). Thus, in order to maintain the measure of item difficulty, signal
type was collapsed. This was a viable solution since hypotheses for study 4 were concerned with
the difficulty of the detection more so than ‘what’ per say was being detected.
Therefore, the selection of equal numbers of each type of stimulus in each difficulty level
was abandoned and instead equal numbers of video clips in general from each difficulty level
was used. However, due to the excellent detection rate across subjects (M = 87.97, SD = 6.38)
there were fewer hard and moderate clips than anticipated. Study plans had called for 240 clips
with a 30% event rate, thus requiring 72 videos with embedded stimulus (i.e., terrorist, civilian,
or IED). However, even after collapsing over stimulus-type there were only 6 rather than the
anticipated 24 high difficulty clips. This would substantially reduce the number of video clips in
the following two studies from 240 to only 60 total video clips. Thus to increase the number of
potential total videos (i.e., trials) in the following two studies the difficulty index associated with
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low, moderate, and high difficulty was slightly adjusted. So that, low difficulty index became 75100 (i.e., more than 75% of participants detect), moderate difficulty index 50-75, and high
difficulty index 25-50. This resulted in the exclusion of a single video clip that had a 17
difficulty index. By adjusting difficulty level slightly, I was able to maintain a natural
progression in difficulty of the video clips, but double the number of future trials from 60 (with
18 signals) to 120 (with 36 signals).
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EXPERIMENT 3: METHODOLOGY
Experimental Purpose
The first and second experiments have been concerned with the stimulus durations, the
given ISI for responding, and the difficulty of the stimulus. The third experiment will now
examine the addition of an automated decision aid to a participant monitoring a single agent in
the search-and-rescue task. The purpose of this study was to establish appropriate high- and lowreliability levels for the automated-aids. While, aid reliability levels in the literature can vary a
great deal, they are often task dependent. In order to maximize the potential effects of conflicting
reliability levels in experiment 4 (i.e., improve power of the aid mixed-reliability manipulation) I
tested seven potential reliability levels and compared them for user automation reliance and
perceived automation trust.

Experimental Participants
To obtain 20 participants per reliability condition and a control condition (i.e., no aid),
one-hundred-forty participants were recruited through the University of Central Florida.
Participants received either course credit or cash payment for their participation (equivalent to
1pt extra credit or $5). Participation was limited to those with normal or corrected to normal
vision, and who have not participated in any of the prior experiments. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of the seven conditions with the restriction that equal genders were
present in each group (70 male, 70 female). Average age of the participants was 21 years old (SD
= 5).
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Experimental Procedure
Participants first completed an informed consent and demographic questionnaire (see
Appendix I and F). Next, participants received a short training session (see Appendix J and K).
Finally, participants completed the experimental session, which was composed of 120 trials
(approximately 20 minutes). After completion of the experimental session the participants
completed the exit questionnaire (see Appendix L) and were thanked and compensated for their
participation. The entire experiment took approximately 30 minutes to complete.

Training Procedure
The purpose of the training was to acquaint the participants with the basic task, as before,
but also to familiarize them with the automated aid. This was accomplished using an
experimenter read script (see Appendix J), a follow-along mission folder (see Appendix K), and
a computerized practice session. The script and mission folder described in detail the scenario,
what stimuli the participant would view, how to respond, and how the automated aids worked.
The computerized practice session had the same layout as the experimental display (see Figure
14). For practice the participants were presented with 8 video clips, 4 without the aid (see Figure
15) followed by 4 with the use of the aid (see Figure 16). The video clips were all of easy
difficulty and were drawn from the four types of potential stimuli, such that each type of
stimulus appeared once without the aid and once with the aid. Participants were to respond to the
practice trials to become familiar with the interface.
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Figure 14. Practice interface for experiment 3.

Figure 15. Experimental interface experiment 3 without the aid.
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Figure 16. Experimental interface with the automated-aid. Note that: Aid recommendation reads
“Terrorist Present.”
Experimental Tasks
Participants were given the same basic search-and-rescue scenario from the prior
experiments, with the addition of an automated decision aid. Participants were told that the
automated aid works as a ‘contrast detector’ using an algorithm to identify certain patterns such
as civilians, terrorists, and IEDs in complex scenes. Users were informed that use of the aid was
completely optional and that the responsibility of the final decision was their own and that they
could choose either to accept the aid’s proposed diagnosis or to ignore it. Users were not
informed about the aid’s reliability.
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Experimental Conditions
The property of aid reliability was examined in this study. The aid had a set reliability of
either 75%, 80%, 85%, 90%, 95%, 99%, or Control (i.e., no aid recommendations). The aid had
occasional misses and false alarms, within each reliability condition the number of misses and
false alarms were equal (see Table 12). In all cases one-third of the trials (36 trials of the total
120) contain an embedded signal (i.e., terrorist, civilian, or IED). Automation errors were
randomly distributed throughout the automation so as to prevent operators from developing a
strategy for compensating for the automation errors. It is important to stress here that all
participants received the same number of embedded signals the only variation is the accuracy of
the automated decision aid in detecting those embedded signals.
Table 12. Reliability level false alarms and miss rates
Reliability Level

False Alarms

Misses

N

99%

1

1

20

95%

3

3

20

90%

6

6

20

85%

9

9

20

80%

12

12

20

75%
Control (No Aid
Recommendations)

15

15

20

N/A

N/A

20

Measurement and Analysis
For performance I examined reliance (which is defined as the percent of times the users
decision matched the aids decision) and performance. The two reliability levels chosen for the
fourth study must have significantly different reliance, with higher reliance for the high71

reliability condition and lower levels of reliance for the low-reliability condition. Additionally, in
terms of performance control performance (% correct) should be higher than the actual reliability
of the low-reliability aid and lower than the actual reliability of the high-reliability aid.
In terms of trust I examined subjective evaluations of perceived trust after interacting
with the automation (see Appendix L). The subjective trust ratings were based on the self-report
measures used by Dzindolet et al. (2003) and Master et al. (2000) Dzindolet et al (2003) and
administered after participants interacted with the automation (see Table 5). In the questionnaire
participants were asked to rate their perceived trust in the automated decision aid. The two
reliability levels chosen for the fourth study must have significantly different perceived trust,
with higher trust for the high-reliability condition and lower levels of trust for the low-reliability
condition.

Experimental Equipment
As in the previous studies the simulation was presented on a 20” widescreen monitor on a
desktop computer. Participants responded using a mouse. The interface was created using
VisualBasic.net.

Hypothesized Outcome
The outcome of this study was the selection of a high- and low-reliability level for study
4. The purpose of this was to improve the measure of mixed reliability in experiment 4 (i.e., have
improved power of the measure). To accomplish this purpose it is required that the aids differ in
perceived trust, reliance, and performance. It is hypothesized that differences will be consistently
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obtained between reliability levels of 99% and 75%; however, it has been shown that if
automation is faulty beyond a certain point operators will completely ignore it and focus solely
on manual control. To prevent complete misuse of the low-reliability aid in experiment 4, it is
desirable to use as high a reliability level for the low-reliability aid as possible that still maintains
significantly less reliance and trust compared to the high-reliability condition. A final restriction
is that the actual reliability for the low-reliability condition must be below control user
performance and the actual reliability for the high-reliability must be above control user
performance.
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EXPERIMENT 3: RESULTS
The purpose of the third experiment was to ensure appropriate high- and low-reliability
levels for the automated aids in experiment 4. While, aid reliability levels in the literature can
vary a great deal, they are often task dependent. Thus, in order to maximize the potential effects
of conflicting reliability levels in experiment 4 (i.e., improve power of the aid mixed reliability
manipulation) I tested six potential reliability levels and compared them for performance,
reliance, and trust differences.

Performance and Behavioral Data

Percent Correct
It was required that the set reliability of the low-reliability aid be below average operator
performance. Since, the control group indicated that average operator performance on this task
was around 82% accuracy (SD = 5%), the 75% reliability level was selected to serve as the lowreliability level, as it was the only reliability level below average user performance. It was also
required that the set reliability level of the high-reliability aid be significantly above average
operator performance, this criteria was satisfied by the 90%, 95%, and 99% reliability
conditions. However, these values were for the set reliability (i.e., actual reliability of the aid), a
univariate ANOVA was conducted on all 140 participants for overall performance accuracy (i.e.,
how participants calibrated their performance with that of the aid; See Figure 17). A significant
effect for reliability of the aid on user overall performance, as measured by percent correct, was
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found, F(6, 133) = 9.72, p < .0005, η² = 0.31. Correlation data indicated that as aid reliability
increased so did user performance (r = .34).

Figure 17. Percent correct as a function of automation reliability. Note that the control group that
received no automated recommendations.

Reliance
A univariate ANOVA was performed on the 120 participants who interacted with the aid
to examine reliance, as measured by the number of times the participant agreed with the
automated aid. Aid reliability was found to have a significant effect on participant reliance, F(5,
114) = 19.62, p < .0005, η² = 0.46. Correlation data indicated that as aid reliability increased so
did user reliance on the aid (r = .66; see Figure 18). Given that the 75% reliability condition has
been selected for the low reliability, it is important that the high reliability condition is relied on
significantly more than the 75% reliable condition. All reliability conditions, except the 80%
reliable condition, had significantly higher reliance than the 75% reliable condition (p < .05 in all
cases).
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Figure 18. User reliance as a function of automation reliability. Note that user reliance is
measured as the percent of time the participant agreed with the aid.
Subjective Data

Perceived Trust
A univariate ANOVA was performed to examine trust of the aid, as measured by a 9point Likert scale, with higher numbers reflecting greater trust. Aid reliability was found to have
a significant effect on participant trust, F(5, 114) = 2.86, p = .018, η² = 0.11. Correlation data
indicated that as the aid’s reliability increased, so did user perceived trust of the aid (r = .29; see
Figure 19). Given that the 75% reliability condition had been selected for the low-reliability, it
was important that the high-reliability condition garnered significantly more trust than the 75%
reliable condition. Only the 95% and 99% conditions had significantly higher levels of selfreported trust compared to the 75% reliable condition (p < .05 in all cases).
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Figure 19. Participant perceived trust as a function of reliability of aid.
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EXPERIMENT 3: DISCUSSION
Given the findings for experiment 3 it was decided that the low-reliability condition
would be 75% based on the fact that it was the only reliability condition with an actual set
reliability level below average user performance. Either the 95% or 99% reliability conditions
would work for the high-reliability aid, in that they both had set reliabilities above average user
performance, both were significantly more trusted than the low-reliability aid, and both were
relied upon significantly more often than the low-reliability aid. However, it was decided to go
with the 95% reliable aid, as it would allows for 6 automation errors during the 60 trials in study
4 (3 for each agent) and thus allow the examination of error salience (i.e., high difficulty,
moderate difficulty, or low difficulty) on subsequent automation reliance. Whereas, use of the
99% reliable measure would allow for only 2 automation errors during the 60 trials (1 for each
agent), thus forcing the measure of error salience to be dropped from study 4 (since making error
salience a between-subjects measure would be prohibitive in terms of the increase to samplesize; i.e., from 300 to 840 participants).
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EXPERIMENT 4: METHODOLOGY
Experimental Purpose
The first three experiments resulted in the creation of a test bed for the fourth experiment;
which examined operator trust and reliance on automatic decision aids when working with
multiple agents. In this experiment, participants monitored two video feeds and two concurrent
automated decision agents. These agents were manipulated in terms of their reliabilities and
agent type. The purpose of this study was to examine how inappropriate biasing of trust and
reliance calibrations occur when an operator is exposed to two agents of different reliabilities
(e.g., does disuse of a high-reliability aid occur when combined with a low-reliability aid and
does misuse of a low-reliability aid occur when combined with a high-reliability aid).
Additionally, it was of interest to examine whether this biasing effect was influenced by the
perceived independence of the agents. That is, can ‘what’ one believes the agents are, influence
how one reacts to them (i.e., reliance) and thinks of them (i.e., perceived trust)? In the following
study this question was examined by looking at three levels of agent independence (i.e., two
human agents – highest independence, two different-type robotic agents – moderate
independence, and two same-type robotic agents – intermediate independence; see Figures 20,
21, & 22) and three levels of reliability (uniform low, mixed, and uniform high).

79

Figure 20. Human agent condition.

Figure 21. Same-type robotic agent condition.
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Figure 22. Different-type robotic agent condition.

Experimental Participants
A total of 330 participants (150 males, 180 females) from the University of Central
Florida volunteered to participate in the study, this ensured adequate power of measurement
(assuming ΔI = 0.55, α = .05, & β = .20). Participants were compensated with course credit or
cash payment for their participation (2pts course credit or $8 paid). Participation was limited to
those with normal or corrected to normal vision and to those who have not participated in any of
the prior experiments. Participants ranged from 18 to 57 years of age, with most subjects being
close to the mean age of 21 years (SD = 5).
Due to the large sample size the laboratory was set-up to allow running of up to eleven
participants at a time. Cubicle dividers and noise-canceling headphones were employed to
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mitigate any visual or auditory interference between participants. Participants were randomly
assigned to the cells of a 3 (source characteristics: humans, generic machines, unique machines)
x 3 (reliability: both low, mixed, both high) between participant design (or a control condition),
with the restriction that equal genders were equally distributed in each condition. One male
participants data was lost due to a technical failure and the following results are thus based on
329 participants.

Experimental Procedure
Participants were tested in groups ranging in size from 1 to 11. Regardless of size of the
group participants completed the same experimental order. That is, they first completed an
informed consent (see Appendix M), demographic questionnaire (see Appendix F),
anthropomorphism questionnaire (ATS; see Appendix N), interpersonal trust scale (ITS; see
Appendix O), and complacency potential rating scale (CPRS; see Appendix P). Next participants
completed a short training session (see Appendix Q) followed by a trust pre-questionnaire (see
Appendix R). Finally, participants completed the experimental session, which entailed
monitoring two video feeds with agent recommendations for 60 trials each (10 minutes; see
Figure 23). After completion of the experimental session the participant completed three exit
questionnaires. One questionnaire queried participants on their own performance by asking them
to rate their own self-confidence in performing the task and to complete the NASA-TLX (which
was computer based; see Appendix S). The other two exit questionnaires queried the participants
on their trust in their Teammate A and Teammate B (see Appendix T). After completing the exit
questionnaires participants were debriefed on the nature of the study (See Appendix U),
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compensated, and thanked for their participation. The entire experiment took approximately 1
hour to complete.

Figure 23. Experimental interface experiment 4.

Training Procedure
The training for experiment 4 was identical to the training session for experiment 3
except that participants were instructed on performing two monitoring tasks concurrently and
informed that they would be interacting with a particular kind of agent. This was accomplished
by using an experimenter read script (see Appendix Q) and a computerized practice session (see
Figure 24). The practice session presented 8 sets of video clips, the first four without the aid of a
teammate and the last four with the aid of a teammate (see Table 13). Participants were to
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respond to the practice trials to become familiar with the interface. Participants were informed
that the practice sessions were preprogrammed for demonstrational purposes and did not reflect
the recommendations of their future teammates. During the practice session decision aids were
held at 100% reliable.

Figure 24. Practice interface for experiment 3.

Table 13. Video orders for experiment 4 practice session.
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Trial
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Video 1
Terrorist
Empty
IED
Empty
Terrorist
Civilian
IED
Terrorist

Video 2
Empty
Civilian
Empty
Empty
Terrorist
Civilian
IED
Civilian

Experimental Tasks
Participants were given the same basic search-and-rescue scenario from experiment 3,
with the addition of a second video feed and automated decision aid (See Figure 23). The size of
the display was held constant. The instructions participants received in the training condition
differed depending on whether they were in the same-type robotic aid (see Figure 20), differenttype robotic aid (see Figure 21), or human condition (see Figure 22). Participants in the robotic
aid conditions were informed that they would be monitoring the responses of two robotic agents;
they were informed that the robotic agents made decisions based on mathematical algorithms. To
maximize the perceived difference between different-type and same-type robotic aids their
different nature was emphasized in the instructions and also the UGVs were represented by
either two of the same-type or two different-type robots (see Figure 25). The robots were both
wheeled prototypical robots that differed in color and exact form. On the other hand participants
in the human condition were informed that they would be interacting with two students who had
previously completed this study. It was stated that the students had previously completed the
study to account for the fact that their pictures were employed in the simulation. The pictures of
the two students were actually facial compilations of 65 female faces and 35 male faces to give
an ‘average’ male and an ‘average’ female. Averaged faces were used to minimize the chance of
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participants recognizing the ‘student’ and to provide a level of control for the manipulation of
human agents (see Figure 26). Male and female faces were used to allow for the examination of
any differences in trust and reliance on the agents based on sex characteristics of the operator and
the agents.

Figure 25. Robotic teammates. Note that robots were counterbalanced so that half of the
participants in the same-type aid received the yellow robot and half the white robot.

Figure 26. Human agent facial compilations for male and female teammates.
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Regardless of the specifics of the agent type (i.e., whether they are distributed human
agents, unique computer agents, are identical computer agents) the participant received the same
experimental task and always played the role of monitor (i.e., observing the scenario, and the
recommendations by the agents, to make a final decisions). Users were explicitly informed that
use of the aids was completely optional and that the responsibility of the final decision was their
own and that they could choose either to accept the agents proposed diagnosis or to ignore them.
This low level of automation was used as it has been argued that trust is only relevant in
situations that can be characterized by a certain degree of free will in placing oneself in a
situation of risk (de Vries et al., 2003). That is, the users are free to agree with or ignore the
automation, but the automation will not take action independently of the operator. Participants
were not informed about the agent’s reliability levels.

Experimental Conditions
The properties of aid reliability and source characteristics were manipulated in this study.
Agents were set at either the same reliability level (either low or high) or mixed reliability (one
agent operates at high reliability and the other at low reliability). Additionally, participant
attributions of the agent were manipulated so that they believed they are working with human
teammates, same-type robotic teammates, or different-type robotic teammates. An additional
condition in which the operator received no teammate recommendations served as a control. This
results in a 3 by 3 between-subjects ANOVA (plus control condition). Between-subjects was
used because it was believed that participants would be influenced by switching reliability levels
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and agent source would become less effective as a within-subject variable (i.e., that agent source
as a manipulation would become less believable if within).

Measurement and Analysis
It is critical to obtain subjective measures to measure the psychological construct of
automation trust, as well as behavioral data to evaluate automation reliance, since often times
performance and subjective measures are imperfectly calibrated (Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang,
2001).

Subjective Measures
Exit questionnaires were administered to evaluate perceived workload, trust, and selfconfidence based on interacting with the automated agents (see Appendix S & T). Automation
trust, self-confidence, and perceived reliability of the aids were obtained using 9-point Likerttype scales.
The literature provides evidence that it is important to examine how personality
differences (e.g., generalized trust expectancies, anthropomorphic tendencies, and complacency
potential) affect trusting behavior. For example, studies have shown that those who score highly
on interpersonal trust are generally more cooperative with other people (Rotter, 1967), it would
be interesting to examine if interpersonal trust is related to being more cooperative (i.e., higher
reliance) with robotic aids. One method to do this is by employing the Interpersonal Trust Scale
(ITS; Rotter, 1967).
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The ITS is a 25 item questionnaire that examines an individual’s level of interpersonal
trust. Some of the items on the scale measure trust in a variety of social objects and some items
measure general optimism regarding society. Of the 25 trust items, 12 are written so that an
“agree” response indicates trust and 13 are written so that a “disagree” response indicates trust
(Rotter, 1967). The items use five Likert response categories from (1) strongly agree to (5)
strongly disagree. Scores can range from 25 (lowest trust) to 125 (highest trust), with a neutral
score or midpoint of 75. Test-retest reliability for the questionnaire has been found to be .56 or
.68 (Rotter, 1967). The scale was designed to measure one’s expectation that the behavior,
promises, or (verbal or written) statements of other individuals can be relied upon (Wrightsman,
1991). The ITS is not significantly related to intellectual aptitude, but have been found to be
related to birth order (youngest lower trust), self religion (any religious beliefs reflects greater
generalized trust), parents religion (individuals with parents of differing religions have lower
interpersonal trust scores compared to those whose parents are of the same religion), and
socioeconomic level (individuals in lower socioeconomic levels have lower ITS scores compared
to individuals in higher socioeconomic levels; Rotter, 1967). Additionally, scores on the ITS
have been related to the likelihood of giving others a second chance (Rotter, 1980), but not to
gullibility or dependence (Rotter, 1967).
Participants were also given the Complacency Potential Rating Scale (CPRS). The CPRS
is designed to assess attitudes (favorable and unfavorable) toward everyday automated devices
(e.g., automatic teller machines). An attitude can be defined as a personal disposition common to
individuals, but possessed by them to different degrees, which impels them to react to objects or
situations in favorable or unfavorable ways (Singh, Molloy, & Parasuraman, 1993). That is, the
CPRS is designed to measure one’s attitude toward automation (e.g., overconfidence) which may
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in particular situations (e.g., high workload, routine, repetition) lead to complacent behavior. The
concept of complacent behavior is defined by Parasuraman, Molloy, and Singh (1993) as
inaccuracy and/or delay in detecting a failure in an automated system. The CPRS measures this
attitude with an internal consistency (r = .87), overall reliability (r = .90), and test-retest
reliability (r = .90). The scale measures four main factors which lead to complacency, they are:
confidence, reliance, trust, and safety. This scale is composed of 12-items, each measured by a 5point Likert-type scale with anchors ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). As
these anchors were the opposite direction of the ITS all participants were cautioned of the
conflicting anchors prior to filling out the questionnaires. Mean CPRS scores in validation
research were 57.69 (SD = 6.09), and scores range from 40 to 75.

Objective Measures
Automation reliance was determined by examining the agreement probabilities of the
operator with the agents. Temporal reliance was determined by examining the likelihood of
agreement with a correct aid recommendation following an aid error. Distribution of the errors
was constrained so that each error was followed by a correct automation recommendation.

Experimental Equipment
Decision agents were referred to as ‘Agent A’ and ‘Agent B’ during the duration of the
experiment. This was done to emphasize that the agent is conducting an activity that could
conceivably be done by a person or machine, and to reflect the collaborative nature of the
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operator’s interaction with the agents (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2002; Bowers, Oser, Salas, &
Cannon-Bowers, 1996; Bubb-Lewis & Scerbo, 1997; Scerbo, 1996; Woods, 1996).
Agents were set to reliability levels as determined in experiment 3: 75% for the lowreliability agent and 95% for the high-reliability agent. Depending on the condition assigned
participants interacted with two high-reliability agents, two low-reliability agents, or two agents
of mixed-reliability. Reliability level was held constant for the duration of the experiment.
In regards to the interface for Experiment 4 (see Figures 20, 21, & 22), there were
illustrations next to each agent recommendation. These illustrations were employed because past
research has shown that teammates using video channels or face-to-face interaction established
trust and cooperation more quickly than did teammates using only textual communication
(Corritore, Kracher, & Wiedenbeck, 2001). Furthermore, in regards to the interface at large, past
research using internet websites found that design quality as composed of strict grouping, formal
language, the use of real photos, and employing empty space as a structural element, has been
found to improve perceived trust (Karvonen & Parkkinen, 2001). Thus the use of these structural
elements was utilized to minimize the negative effect of overall visual impression on perceived
trust of the system, allowing participants to focus on the rational evaluation of the decision aids
themselves (i.e., the utility and source of the recommendations) to guide their use of the agents.
The agents themselves were set at automation level 5 according to the level of automation
classification of Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens (2000; see Table 14). Automation level 5
was chosen based on research by Young & Stanton (2001) that found that ideally technological
support systems should act like a driving instructor in the passenger seat – subtle enough so as
not to cause interference, but accessible enough so as to provide assistance when needed. That is,
the automation offered the operator a recommendation but did not automatically execute that
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recommendation. Thus, the operator had to commit a voluntarily action of trusting the agent
(Corritore, Kracher, & Wiedenbeck, 2001). For example, if an aid identified a terrorist agent in a
video clip the operator had a limited amount of time to approve the automation’s
recommendation or enter their own decision before moving on to the next trial. Additionally,
operators were told that using the automation was optional, and they could accept or ignore the
automation on each trial during the experiment. Participants were not informed of the reliability
level of the automated agent. Thus, the difficult position of determining whether or not one
should rely on the decision aid was placed entirely upon the participant.

Table 14. Table of automation levels (adapted from Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens, 2000)
Automation
Description
Level
10
The computer decides everything, acts autonomously, ignoring the human.
9
informs the human only if it, the computer decides to
8
informs the human only if asked, or
7
executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human, and
6
allows the human a restricted time veto before automatic execution, or
5
executes that suggestion if human approves, or
4
suggests one alternative
3
narrows the selections down to a few, or
2
The computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives, or
1
The computer offers no assistance: human must make all decisions and actions.
Hypothesized Outcome
There were six central hypotheses to experiment 4 (see Table 15).
1. In a complex, dual-aid, condition there will be bias between two agents of mixed reliability
compared to two uniform agents.
a. Trust and reliance of a high-reliability agent will be negatively influenced by a
concurrent low-reliability agent.
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b. Trust and reliance of a low-reliability agent will be positively influenced by a
concurrent high-reliability agent.
2. Operators experiencing high automation reliability will have significantly more subjective
trust in the automation than those experiencing both low or the mixed reliability conditions.
Additionally those with low automation reliability will experience significantly less
subjective trust of the automation than those in the mixed reliability condition (HO = There is
no significant difference between reliability group trust scores).
a. Increased levels of automation trust will be accompanied by increased levels of
reliance on the aid and lower levels of reported workload.
b. Decreased levels of automation trust will be accompanied by decreased levels of
reliance on the aid and higher levels of reported workload.
3. Subjective levels of trust, automation reliance, and workload are expected to differ across
agent type (i.e., human, similar computer agents, dissimilar computer agents). Such that
human agents have increased trust, increased reliance, and decreased workload, compared to
the computer agents. The computer agents are not expected to differ in overall trust, reliance,
or workload (HO = There is no significant difference between agent type group trust ratings,
reliance, and/or workload).
4. In a mixed reliability condition the agent type is expected to significantly impact crossover
bias between the two agents. (HO = There is no significant interaction between reliability and
agent type).
a. Two agents perceived to be human will experience the least crossover bias in the
mixed reliability condition. Thus, a low-reliability human aid will have little impact
on a concurrent high-reliability human aid.
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b. The same-type robotic agents will experience the most crossover bias in the mixed
reliability condition. Thus, a low-reliability same-type robotic agent will have a
strong impact on a concurrent high-reliability same-type robotic agent.
c. The different-type robotic agents will experience an intermediate level of crossover
bias in the mixed reliability condition. Thus, a low-reliability different-type robotic
agent will have an intermediate impact on a concurrent high-reliability different-type
robotic agent.
5. The failure salience of the automation error is expected to influence the likelihood of relying
on the aid in the future trials. Such that as the salience increases the lower temporal reliance
becomes (temporal reliance is measured by the agreement with an aid on the trial following
an aid error). (HO = There is no significant effect between failure salience groups for
temporal reliance).
a. High salience failures (i.e., obvious errors) will cause a significantly less temporal
reliance on the aid compared to less salient errors (moderate and low salience
failures).
b. Moderate salience failures will cause less temporal reliance compared to low salience
failures but maintain higher temporal reliance than high salience failures.
c. Low salience failures will maintain the highest level of temporal reliance compared to
the more salient errors.
6. It is expected that source characteristics of the agents and the salience of the agent errors will
interact to affect temporal reliance. (HO = There is no significant interaction between source
characteristics and failure salience).
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a. Agents perceived to be human will experience drops in temporal reliance proportional
to the increasing simplicity of the error made. Also it is expected that participants will
be more forgiving of human errors compared to robotic errors, especially on more
difficult stimuli.
b. The computer agents will experience equivalent drops in reliance across all types of
errors. This reflects automation bias, in which automation is expected to work
perfectly or not at all. Participants will be unforgiving of all robotic errors regardless
of error salience.
Table 15. Hypotheses for Experiment 4.
Hypothesis Number
Dependent
Measure

1

2

3

4

Perceived
Trust

MHR ≠ UHR
MLR ≠ ULR

UHR > M > ULR

H > [D, S]

Reliance

MHR ≠ UHR
MLR ≠ ULR

UHR > M > ULR

H > [D, S]

UHR < M < ULR

H < [D, S]

Workload

5

6

(ES: HMHR ≠ HUHR) <
(ES: DMHR ≠ DUHR) <
(ES: SMHR ≠ SUHR)
(ES: HMLR ≠ HULR) <
(ES: DMLR ≠ DULR) <
(ES: SMLR ≠ SULR)
(ES: HMHR ≠ HUHR) <
(ES: DMHR ≠ DUHR) <
(ES: SMHR ≠ SUHR)
(ES: HMLR ≠ HULR) <
(ES: DMLR ≠ DULR) <
(ES: SMLR ≠ SULR)
HFH < HFM < HFL
FH <
FM <
FL

Temporal
Reliance

[SFL , DFL] < HFL

[SFH ,DFH] <
[SFM, DFM ] <
[SFL, SFL]
*H = Human Agents, D = Different-Type Agents, S = Same Type Agents, UHR = Uniform High-Reliability, ULR =
Uniform Low-Reliability, M = Mixed-Reliability, MHR = Mixed High-Reliability, MLR = Mixed Low-Reliability, FH
= High Failure Salience, FM = Moderate Failure Salience, FL = Low Failure Salience, ES = Effect Size
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EXPERIMENT 4: RESULTS
The purpose of the fourth experiment was to examine the effect of agent type, reliability
condition, and agent error salience upon subjective trust ratings, perceived workload, and
behavioral measures (i.e., reliance; see Table 16). The following analyses focus first on main
effects and then interactions. The final section of results examines findings regarding individual
differences and how these may have influenced the results. Overall result means and standard
deviations for each condition are given in Appendix V.
Table 16. Results for hypotheses for Experiment 4.
Hypothesis Number
Dependent
Measure

1

2

3

Perceived
Trust

MHR ≠ UHR
MLR ≠ ULR

UHR > M > ULR

H > [D, S]

Reliance

MHR ≠ UHR
MLR ≠ ULR

UHR > M > ULR

H > [D, S]

UHR < M < ULR

H < [D, S]

Workload

4

5

6

(ES: HMR ≠ HUR) <
(ES: DMR ≠ DUR) <
(ES: SMR ≠ SUR)
(ES: HMR ≠ HUR) <
(ES: DMR ≠ DUR) <
(ES: SMR ≠ SUR)
HFH < HFM <
HFL
FH <
FM <
FL

Temporal
Reliance

[SFL , DFL] < HFL
[SFH ,DFH] =
[SFM, DFM ] =
[SFL, SFL]

*H = Human Agents, D = Different-Type Agents, S = Same Type Agents, UHR = Uniform High-Reliability, ULR =
Uniform Low-Reliability, M = Mixed-Reliability, MHR = Mixed High-Reliability, MLR = Mixed Low-Reliability, FH
= High Failure Salience, FM = Moderate Failure Salience, FL = Low Failure Salience, ES = Effect Size
Hypotheses in bold and underlined were supported by the results. Hypotheses with plain text were not supported.
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Subjective Data

Self-Rated Confidence
Contrary to anticipated results operator perceived self-confidence in performing the
search-and-rescue task themselves was not related to actual reliance on the automated aids (r =
0.08, p = .20). Additionally, when self-confidence was subtracted from automation trust, agent
correlations between trust-self-confidence and reliance were lowered or removed altogether
(compared to direct automation trust and automation reliance correlations). Therefore, it was
believed that self-confidence as measured in this study added more error than power to the
analysis, and was therefore excluded from the rest of the analyses.

Self-Rated Trust
Self-Rated Trust Main Effect of Agent
Results were analyzed using a 3 (agent type) * 3 (reliability condition) univariate
ANOVA on self-rated trust. The main effect for agent was not significant, F(2, 287) = 0.41, p =
.66, η² = .00 (see Table 17).
Table 17. Self-reported trust of agents across agent-type.
Agent Type
Mean
Human
6.27
Different-Type Robotic
6.43
Same-Type Robotic
6.21

SD
1.56
1.56
1.75

Self-Rated Trust Main Effect of Reliability
Results were analyzed using a 3 (agent type) * 3 (reliability condition) univariate
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ANOVA on self-rated trust. The main effect for reliability condition was significant, F(2, 287) =
23.73, p < .0005, η² = .14. Pairwise comparison indicated that the three reliability conditions
were significantly different in the predicted direction (see Figure 27).

Figure 27. Agent trust as a function of reliability condition. Error bars represent standard error.

Self-Rated Trust Bias by Reliability Condition
It was hypothesized that there would be bias in the mixed reliability aids compared to the
uniform reliability aids. That is, that a low-reliability aid would negatively affect the trust in a
concurrent high-reliability aid, and that a high-reliability aid would positively affect the trust in a
concurrent low-reliability aid. To measure this I first conducted paired-samples t-test to ensure
that the trust ratings in the low and high-reliability mixed condition were significantly different,
t(97) = 3.72, p < .0005, g = 0.45. Results were in the predicted direction with the low-reliability
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aid (M = 6.02, SD = 2.07) being rated as significantly less trustworthy than the high-reliability
aid (M = 6.84, SD = 1.60). I then conducted a paired-samples t-test for the two agents used in the
uniform-high and uniform-low reliability conditions to ensure that they were sufficiently similar
to take an average high and average low score. The uniform low (t(97) = 0.47, p = .64, g = 0.05)
and high-reliability (t(96) = 0.21, p = .83, g = 0.02) aids were not significantly different in terms
of self-reported trust. A one-tailed independent-samples t-test was conducted between the low
reliability trust scores in the mixed-reliability condition and the averaged low reliability trust
scores in the low-uniform-reliability condition. A one-tailed independent-samples t-test was also
conducted between the high reliability trust scores in the mixed-reliability condition and the
averaged high reliability trust scores in the high-uniform-reliability condition. A measure of the
magnitude of the effect for each of the t-tests was obtained by calculating Hedges g from the
means and standard deviations of each group. This gave me a non-significant result for the high
reliability condition, t(194) = 1.06, p = .15, g = 0.15, though the means were in the right direction
(High uniform: M = 7.07, SD = 1.43; High-mixed: M = 6.84, SD = 1.60). On the other hand,
there was a significant result in the predicted direction for the low reliability condition (t(196) =
1.71, p = .04, g = 0.24; Low uniform: M = 5.59, SD = 1.56; Low-mixed: M = 6.03, SD = 2.06).
Self-Rated Trust Interaction between Agent Type and Reliability
These results were analyzed for the effect-size difference for each agent for their trust in
the mixed reliability vs. trust in the uniform reliability. The same process from the previous
section was used to calculate ES for each bias measure.
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Human Agent and Trust
Limiting analysis to those participants in the human-agent condition only, a pairedsamples t-test was conducted to examine trust in the mixed reliability condition. It was evident
that the low reliability aid (M = 6.30, SD = 1.57) and high reliability aid (M = 7.21, SD = 1.29)
had significantly different perceived rated trust, (t(32) = 2.39, p = .02, g = 0.64; See Figure 28
blue line). Paired-samples t-test were then used to examine trust in the two aids used in the
uniform low-reliability condition (Agent A: M = 5.45, SD = 1.62; Agent B: M = 5.36, SD = 1.78;
t(32) = 0.28, p = .78, g = 0.05; See Figure 29 blue line) and uniform high-reliability condition
(Agent A: M = 6.70, SD = 2.02; Agent B: M = 6.61, SD = 1.98; t(32) = 0.32, p = .74, g = 0.04;
Figure 30 blue line), both of which did not significantly differ. Since the perceived trust did not
significantly differ, in terms of the t-test or ES values, for the Agents in either of the uniform
reliability conditions, these values were combined to allow for comparison against the mixedreliability condition (See Figure 31; uniform values are represented by hollow diamonds). Using
an independent-samples one-tailed t-test the perceived trust for the low-reliability human agent
in the mixed-reliability condition (M = 6.30, SD = 1.57) was compared against the averaged lowreliability human agent trust in the low-uniform condition (M = 5.40, SD = 1.42; t(64) = 2.42, p =
.009, g = 0.59). Results indicated that the low-reliability agent in the human mixed-reliability
condition was rated as significantly higher in terms of trust than the low-reliability human agents
in the uniform low-reliability condition. Next the biasing effect on a high-reliability human agent
was examined. Using an independent-samples two-tailed t-test, two-tailed was used because the
means did not match the direction of the hypothesis, high-reliability human agent trust in the
mixed-reliability condition (M = 7.21, SD = 1.29) was compared against the averaged high-
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reliability human agent trust in the uniform high-reliability condition (M = 6.65, SD = 1.83; t(64)
= 1.44, p = .16, g = 0.35). Results were not significant for the biasing effects in the human agent
condition for perceived trust.
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Figure 28. Perceived trust as a function of agent reliability by agent type in the mixed-reliability
condition.

Self-Reported Trust in the Agent

7.5
Human
7
Different-Type
Robotic
Same-Type
Robotic

6.5

6

5.5

5
Agent A

Agent B
Agent Reliability

Figure 29. Perceived trust as a function of agent type in the low-reliability condition.
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Figure 30. Perceived trust as a function of agent type in the high-reliability condition.
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Figure 31. Perceived trust as a function of agent reliability for human agents. Note that mixedreliability are the solid diamonds and uniform-reliabilities are represented by the hollow
diamonds.
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Different-Type Robotic Agent and Trust
The next sets of analyses were limited to those participants in the different-type robotic
agent condition. To conduct this analysis a paired-samples one-tailed t-test was conducted to
examine trust in the mixed reliability condition. Surprisingly the low-reliability different-type
robotic agent (M = 6.15, SD = 2.25) did not significantly differ in terms of perceived trust from
the high-reliability different-type robotic agent (M = 6.64, SD = 1.60; t(32) = 1.33, p = .10, g =
0.27; See Figure 28). However, additional analyses were still conducted to see if the degree of
biasing in the agent scores was lower or higher in this agent compared to the other agents.
Paired-samples t-test were used to examine trust in the two aids used in the low-uniform
different-type robotic condition (Agent A: M = 5.82, SD = 1.81; Agent B: M = 5.61, SD = 2.00;
t(32) = 0.56, p = .58, g = 0.11; See Figure 29) and high-uniform conditions (Agent A: M = 7.23,
SD = 1.50; Agent B: M = 7.35, SD = 0.88; t(30) = 0.50, p = .65, g = 0.10; See Figure 30), both of
which did not significantly differ. Since the perceived trust did not significantly differ, in terms
of the t-test or ES values, for the Agents in either of the uniform-reliability different-type robot
conditions, these values were combined to allow for comparison against the mixed-reliability
condition. Using an independent-samples one-tailed t-test the perceived trust for the lowreliability different-type robotic agent in the mixed reliability condition (M = 6.15, SD = 2.25)
was compared against the averaged low-reliability different-type robotic agent trust in the lowuniform condition (M = 5.71, SD = 1.56; t(64) = 0.92, p = .18, g = 0.23; See Figure 32). Results
indicated that the low-reliability agent in the different-type robotic mixed condition was not
significantly different in terms of trust than the uniform low-reliability agents in the differenttype robotic condition. Next, the biasing effect on a high-reliability different-type robotic agent
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was examined. Using an independent-samples one-tailed t-test high-reliability different-type
robotic agent trust in the mixed-reliability condition (M = 6.64, SD = 1.60) was compared against
the averaged high-reliability different-type robotic agent trust in the high-uniform condition (M =
7.34, SD = 0.98; t(63) = 2.15, p = .036, g = 0.53; See Figure 32).
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Figure 32. Perceived trust as a function of agent reliability for different-type robotic agents. Note
that mixed-reliability are the solid squares and uniform-reliabilities are the hollow squares.

Same-Type Robotic Agent and Trust
The final set of analyses were limiting to those participants in the same-type robotic agent
condition only. To conduct this analysis I used a paired-samples t-test to examine trust in the
mixed-reliability condition, it was apparent that the low reliability aid (M = 5.63, SD = 2.33) and
high reliability aid (M = 6.63, SD = 1.81) had significantly different perceived rated trust, (t(31)
= 2.46, p = .01; See Figure 28). Paired-samples t-test were then used to examine trust in the two
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aids used in the low-uniform (Agent A: M = 5.58, SD = 1.82; Agent B: M = 5.61, SD = 2.05;
t(31) = 0.10, p = .78, g = 0.02; See Figure 29) and high-uniform conditions (Agent A: M = 7.18,
SD = 1.40; Agent B: M = 7.24, SD = 1.39; t(32) = 0.30, p = .77, g = 0.04; See Figure 30), both of
which did not significantly differ. Since the perceived trust did not significantly differ, in terms
of the t-test or ES values, for the same-type robotic agents in either of the uniform reliability
conditions, these values were combined to allow for comparison against the mixed-reliability
condition. Using an independent-samples one-tailed t-test the perceived trust for the lowreliability same-type robotic agent in the mixed reliability condition (M = 5.67, SD = 2.31) was
compared against the averaged low-reliability same-type robotic agent trust in the low-uniform
condition (M = 5.63, SD = 1.73; t(64) = 0.95, p = .48, g = 0.01; See Figure 33). Next the biasing
effect on a high-reliability same-type robotic agent was examined. Using an independentsamples one-tailed t-test high-reliability same-type robotic agent trust in the mixed-reliability
condition (M = 6.63, SD = 1.81) was compared against the averaged high-reliability same-type
robotic agent trust in the high-uniform condition (M = 7.21, SD = 1.27; t(63) = 1.52, p = .07, g =
0.37; See Figure 33), again results were not significant.
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Figure 33. Perceived trust as a function of agent reliability for same-type robotic agents. Note that
mixed-reliability are the solid triangles and uniform-reliabilities are the hollow triangles.
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Effect-Size Analysis of Agent and Trust
The effect-sizes of the difference between the mixed and uniform agents of the same
reliability are presented in Table 18. In absolute average terms, human agents demonstrated the
largest average effect-size between the mixed and uniform conditions, meaning that they
demonstrated the greatest biasing effect when presented in a mixed condition. The same-type
robotic agents experienced the least biasing effect between the mixed and uniform conditions,
meaning that these agents were the most insensitive to whether they were presented uniformly or
in a mixed condition. Finally, different-type robotic agents experienced an intermediate level of
effect-size biasing between the mixed and uniform conditions.
Table 18. Effect-size measures for degree of difference between mixed and uniform reliability
conditions for trust. Note that negative values indicate that the mixed value is lower than the
uniform value, while positive values indicate that the mixed value is higher than the uniform
value.
Absolute
Agent Type
Low Reliability ES
High Reliability ES
Average ES
Human

+0.59

+0.35

0.47

Different-Type
Robotic Aid

+0.23

-0.53

0.38

Same-Type
Robotic Aid

-0.01

-0.37

0.19

Workload
It was hypothesized that automation trust would be positively correlated to reliance on
the agent and negatively correlated to workload. That is, with higher levels of trust in an agent
reliance on the agent should increase and perceived workload should decrease. On the other
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hand, it was also believed that with lower levels of trust in an agent, reliance on the agent would
decrease, and perceived workload of the participant would increase. There was partial support
for this hypothesis. In regards to reliance, there was a significant positive correlation to selfreported trust in the agent (r = .37; p < .0005). However, in regards to workload, there was not a
significant relationship to perceived trust in the agents (r = .03, p = .60, n = 294) or participant
reliance (r = .004, p = .94, n = 294). Thus, while users may rely more heavily on an agent’s
decisions with increased trust, this increased reliance is not associated with a decrease in
workload.
Additionally, it was hypothesized that there would be a main effect for workload by agent
type. This was examined using a 3 (agent type) by 3 (reliability condition) univariate ANOVA.
Results indicated that there was not a main effect for agent type, F(2, 285) = 0.63, p = .53, η² =
0.004. All other effects were also not significant. Means and standard deviations for the NASATLX and its subscales are presented in Table 19. Note that two participants did not complete the
NASA-TLX.
Table 19. NASA-TLX means and standard deviations for search-and-rescue task.
NASA-TLX Measure

Mean

Standard Deviation

Overall Workload

70.52

13.34

Mental Demand

80.44

16.15

Physical Demand

21.24

19.65

Temporal Demand

74.05

22.06

Performance

55.12

22.24

Effort

72.93

18.69

Frustration

58.45

25.37
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Behavioral Measures

Automation Reliance and Trust
It was hypothesized that automation reliance would be significantly correlated to
automation trust. A Pearson correlation was conducted and there was a significant correlation
between automation trust and automation reliance (r = .37, p < .0005). That is, as self-rated agent
trust increased so did user reliance as measured by agreement with the agent.

Automation Reliance Main Effect of Reliability Level
Reliance was first analyzed using a 3 (agent type) by 3 (reliability condition) univariate
ANOVA. There was a main effect for reliability level, F(2, 287) = 48.51, p < .0005, η² = 0.25.
Results were in the predicted direction with higher reliability levels having higher levels of
reliance (see Figure 34). All other effects were not significant (p > .05 in all cases).

Figure 34. Reliance as a function of reliability condition. Note that error bars represent standard
error.
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Reliance Main Effect of Agent
In examining participant reliance with the univariate ANOVA, it was evident that the
main effect of agent type was not significant, F(2, 287) = 2.28, p = .10, η² = 0.02. That is, the
reliance scores across all three aids were approximately 80% (see Table 20).
Table 20. Reliance on agents across agent-type.
Agent Type
Mean
Human
.79
Different-Type Robotic
.81
Same-Type Robotic
.81

SD
.06
.07
.07

Reliance Bias by Reliability Condition
It was hypothesized that there would be reliance bias in the mixed reliability aids
compared to the uniform reliability aids. That is, that a low-reliability aid would negatively affect
the reliance in a concurrent high-reliability aid, and that a high-reliability aid would positively
affect the reliance in a concurrent low-reliability aid. A paired-samples t-test indicated that the
reliance between the low and high-reliability agents in the mixed condition was significantly
different, t(98) = 11.71, p < .0005, g = 1.04. Results were in the predicted direction with the lowreliability aid (M = 0.77, SD = 0.06) being relied on significantly less than the high-reliability aid
(M = 0.83, SD = 0.06). Conducting a paired-samples t-test for the two agents used in the
uniform-high and uniform-low conditions indicated that they were sufficiently similar to take an
averaged high and an averaged low reliability aid score. The uniform low-reliability aids were
not significantly different (t(98) = 0.62, p = .54, g = 0.05). The uniform high-reliability aids were
also not significantly different in terms of operator reliance, (t(97) = 1.38, p = .17, g = 0.10). A
one-tailed independent-samples t-test was then conducted between low-mixed and average-low-
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uniform as well as high-mixed and average-high-uniform reliance. The last step was to calculate
Hedges g from the means and standard deviations of each group. This gave a non-significant
result for low-reliability (t(196) = 0.06, p = .96, g = 0.01). There was a significant result in the
predicted direction for high-reliability condition for reliance, t(195) = 1.99, p < .05, g = 0.28 (see
Figure 35). Such that the uniform high-reliability condition (M = 0.85, SD = 0.06) was relied on
significantly more often than the high-reliability in the mixed condition (M = 0.83, SD = 0.06).

Figure 35. Reliance as a function of reliability condition. Note that the solid squares represent the
mixed-reliability condition and the hollow diamonds represent the uniform conditions.

Agent Reliance: Interaction between Agent Type and Reliability
The next step was to examine the hypothesis on whether the type of agent impacts how a
concurrent conflicting reliability agent can bias reliance. These results were analyzed for effectsize difference for each agent for reliance in the mixed-reliability vs. reliance in the uniformreliability condition.
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Human Agent and Reliance
Limiting analysis to those participants in the human-agent condition only, I used a
paired-samples t-test to examine reliance in the mixed reliability condition It was apparent that
the low reliability aid (M = 0.75, SD = 0.06) and high reliability aid (M = 0.82, SD = 0.06) had
significantly different operator reliance, (t(32) = 7.42, p < .0005). Paired-samples t-test were then
used to examine reliance in the two aids used in the low-uniform (Agent A: M = 0.75, SD = 0.05;
Agent B: M = 0.76, SD = 0.07; t(32) = 0.23, p = .82, g = 0.04) and high-uniform conditions
(Agent A: M = 0.85, SD = 0.06; Agent B: M = 0.83, SD = 0.06; t(3237) = 2., p = .02, g = 0.32).
While the agents in the low-uniform condition did not significantly differ, the high-uniform
agents did significantly differ in terms of reliance. Thus, overall effect-size was calculated
separately for the high-reliability agents. Using an independent-samples two-tailed t-test the
reliance towards the low-reliability agent in the mixed-reliability condition (M = 0.75, SD =
0.05) was compared against the averaged low-reliability agent reliance in the low-uniform
condition (M = 0.75, SD = 0.06; t(64) = 0.28, p = .78, g = 0.07). This indicates that the
concurrent presence of a high-reliability human agent did not lead participants to rely any more
on a low reliability human agent. Next the biasing effect of a high-reliability human agent was
examined. Since the uniform-high-reliability agents differed significantly two analyses were
conducted. In both cases the mixed-reliability condition was lower, but in only one case
significantly. Using an independent-samples one-tailed t-test high-reliability agent reliance in the
mixed-reliability condition (M = 0.82, SD = 0.06) was compared against the high-reliability
agents reliance values of either the left aid M = 0.85 (SD = 0.06; t(64) = 1.88, p = .03, g = 0.46)
or the right aid M = 0.83 (SD = 0.06; t(64) = 0.68, p = .50, g = 0.17). An average effect-size
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difference between mixed-high reliability and uniform-high-reliability human agents is 0.32.
Thus, while it appears there may be a trend for positive biasing of subjective trust ratings, as
presented earlier, reliance was generally unsusceptible to the manipulation of agent type (see
Figure 36).

Figure 36. Reliance as a function of agent reliability for human agents. Note that mixed-reliability
are the solid diamonds and uniform-reliabilities are the hollow diamonds.

Different-Type Robotic Agent and Reliance
Next I turn to the different-type robotic agents. Conducting a paired-samples t-test on
different-type robotic agent reliance between the low and high-reliability agents, it was apparent
that reliance on the aids did significantly differ, t(32) = 7.05, p < .0005, g = 0.99. Paired-samples
t-test were then used to examine reliance in the two aids used in the low-uniform (Agent A: M =
0.76, SD = 0.07; Agent B: M = 0.77, SD = 0.08; t(32) = 0.77, p = .45, g = 0.11) and high-uniform
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conditions (Agent A: M = 0.85, SD = 0.07; Agent B: M = 0.85, SD = 0.07; t(31) = 0.06, p = .95,
g = 0.01), both of which did not significantly differ. Using an independent-samples one-tailed ttest the reliance towards the low-reliability agent in the mixed-reliability condition (M = 0.78, SD
= 0.07) was compared against the averaged low-reliability agent reliance in the low-uniform
condition (M = 0.76, SD = 0.07; t(64) = 1.07, p = .14, g = 0.26). Next the biasing effect of a
high-reliability human agent was examined. Using an independent-samples one-tailed t-test highreliability agent reliance in the mixed-reliability condition (M = 0.84, SD = 0.06) was compared
against the averaged high-reliability agent trust in the high-uniform condition (M = 0.85, SD =
0.06; t(63) = 0.83, p = .21, g = 0.21; see Figure 37).

Figure 37. Reliance as a function of agent reliability for different-type robotic agents. Note that
mixed-reliability are the solid squares and uniform-reliabilities are the hollow squares.
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Same-Type Robotic Agent and Reliance
Finally, the reliance bias for same-type robotic agents was examined. Conducting a
paired-samples t-test on same-type robotic agents reliance on the low-reliability and highreliability aid in the mixed reliability condition, it was found that they were significantly
different, t(32) = 5.86, p < .0005, g = 1.02. Next paired samples t-tests were conducted on
uniform-low (M = 0.78, SD = 0.06 vs. M = 0.78, SD = 0.07; t(32) = 0.05, p = .96, g = 0.01) and
uniform-high reliability conditions (M = 0.85, SD = 0.07 vs. M = 0.85, SD = 0.08; t(32) = 0.13, p
= .90, g = 0.07). As these scores were not significantly different in terms of effect size or
standard significance reliance scores within each uniform condition were combined for the next
step of analysis. I then compared the reliance in the mixed-low-reliability aid (M = 0.77, SD =
0.06) to the averaged-uniform reliability aids (M = 0.78, SD = 0.06) using a two-tailed
independent samples t-test, t(64) = 0.83, p = .41, g = 0.20). Results were also not significant for
the mixed-high-reliability aid (M = 0.83, SD = 0.06) compared to the averaged-uniform
reliability aids (M = 0.85, SD = 0.07) using a one-tailed independent samples t-test, t(64) = 1.26,
p = .11, g = 0.31; see Figure 38).
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Figure 38. Reliance as a function of agent reliability for same-type robotic agents. Note that
mixed-reliability are the solid triangles and uniform-reliabilities are the hollow triangles.

Effect-Size Analysis of Agent and Reliance
The effect-sizes of the differences by agent-type are presented in Table 21. In general all
agents tended to have similar effect-size differences between the mixed and uniform conditions,
but the pattern of results supported the research hypotheses. That is, human agents had the
smallest effect-size differences for reliance; which means, that they had the least amount of
difference in terms of agreement with a human agent when it appeared with another person of
similar reliability or different reliability. In terms of agreement with robotic agents ES were
slightly higher. Same-type robotic aids had the largest average effect-size difference (i.e., the
most carryover bias), while different-type robotic aids feel in between the reliance bias of human
and same-type agents. However, because the effect-sizes are so close the results provide only
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limited support for our experimental hypothesis (i.e., that agent type impacts crossover bias
between two agents, such that human agents are the most independent: smallest ES difference
between mixed and uniform conditions, different-type robotic aids: moderate ES difference
between mixed and uniform conditions, and same-type robotic aids: largest ES difference
between mixed and uniform conditions). One point of possible contention of these results is that
the single highest biasing component was the high-reliability human agents. That is, a concurrent
low-reliability human dropped agreement with a concurrent high-reliability human agent by a
third of a standard deviation, which was the single largest impact on reliance observed in this
analysis! This result was especially surprising given the beneficial effects that mixed-reliability
had on self-rated perceived trust in the human agents (both low and high).
Table 21. Effect-size measures for degree of difference between mixed and uniform conditions
for reliance. Note that negative values indicate that the mixed value is lower than the uniform
value, while positive values indicate that the mixed value is higher than the uniform value.
Absolute
Agent Type
Low Reliability ES
High Reliability ES
Average ES
Human

-0.07

-0.32

0.20

Different-Type
Robotic Aid

+0.26

-0.21

0.24

Same-Type
Robotic Aid

-0.20

-0.31

0.26

Failure Salience on Reliance
The next analysis examines how failure salience (i.e., the obviouness of the agent’s
errors) influences the likelihood of relying on the aid in future trials. The hypotheses predicted
that the more salient an error by the agent was the lower temporal reliance would be. Temporal
117

reliance is defined here as agreeing with the agent on the next correct trial. Unfortunately, due to
programming errors experimental automation errors were not applied to high-difficulty video
clips in the high-reliability condition. Therefore, analysis was limited to low-reliability
conditions. As error salience is a within-subjects manipulation a repeated measures ANOVA was
conducted on the three types of error, with temporal reliance on the agent during the following
trial as the dependent measure. There was a significant effect for error type in the predicted
direction, F(2, 392) = 210.18, p < .0005, η² = 0.52. Pairwise comparisons indicated that reliance
on the agent after an error was significantly related to the salience of the error (p < .05 in all
cases; see Figure 39).

Figure 39.Temporal reliance as a function of error salience. Note that error bars represent
standard error.
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Failure Salience and Agent Type
Next the analysis on failure salience was conducted when Agent Type was added as a
between subjects variable. There was a significant main effect for agent type on temporal
reliance, F(2, 194) = 4.82, p = .009, η² = 0.05. However, as evidenced by the eta squared value
this was a weak effect and pairwise comparisons indicated that a significant difference occurred
only between the human agent and the different-type (p = .055) and same-type (p = .002) robotic
agents (which did not significantly differ from each other; p = .26; see Figure 40). These results
were contrary to the predicted direction, and actually indicated that participants were more
distrusting of human agents following an error compared to robotic agents.

Figure 40. Temporal reliance as a function of agent type.
There was an agent by error type interaction, F(4, 388) = 3.04, p = .017, η² = 0.03. Visual
inspection of the results (see Figure 41) indicated that temporal reliance varies more greatly for

119

agents when errors are more obvious (i.e., high or moderate salience). In these cases it appears
that the human agents have less reliance following an error than the computer-agents. One-way
ANOVAs confirmed this pattern of results. There was a significant difference within the high
salience (i.e., obvious errors), F(2, 195) = 3.94, p = .02. Pairwise comparison indicated that the
human agents were significantly different from the same-type robotic agents (p = .006) and there
was a trend for them to be different from the different-type robotic agents as well (p = .08). The
two robotic aids did not significantly differ from each other (p = .31). Next a one-way ANOVA
was conducted on moderate salience errors. Results were significant, F(2, 195) = 4.55, p = .01.
In this case pairwise comparison indicated that the human agents were significantly different
from both robotic agents, which again did not significantly differ from each other. The final oneway ANOVA was conducted on the low-salience (i.e., least obvious errors), F(2, 195) = 2.26, p
= .11. Examination of pairwise comparisons indicated that the same-type and different-type
robotic agents significantly differed in terms of temporal reliance, such that different aids had
less observer agreement following a low-salience aid error. In low-salience errors user temporal
reliance did not differ from between the human and robotic agents (p > .05 in both cases).
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Figure 41. Temporal reliance as a function of error salience by agent type.

Miss and False Alarms
A paired samples t-test was conducted on temporal reliance following misses and false
alarms, t(295) = 15.41, p<.0005. Contrary to prior research, in this study false alarms had
significantly lower temporal reliance (M = 80.00, SD = 14.35) than misses (M = 95.21, SD =
9.97). The literature typically states that FA can be construed in several ways by participants
making them more ambiguous and reducing trust and reliance levels less than misses which
when noticed by participants indicates more clearly that the agent was indeed in error. However,
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the literature supports that it is the clarity of the message that drives this relationship and this is
more clearly typified in this research by the error salience. Thus, the current findings indicate
that when error salience is controlled false alarms can be more detrimental to subsequent reliance
compared to misses in this task.

Individual Differences

Participant Sex
Participants were assigned equally to control for any participant sex effects on the main
factors of interest in the experiment: trust and reliance. An independent samples t-test indicated
that participant sex did not influence trust (t(294) = 0.36, p = .72) or reliance (t(294) = 0.18, p =
.86) in the study. This effect was also ns when broken down by agent type, reliability condition,
and agent by reliability condition (p > .05 in all cases).

Questionnaire Data
Participants were assigned randomly to one of twelve between-subjects condition (3
reliability conditions * 3 agent types). As individual differences were a concern three trait
questionnaires were administered at the start of the experiment: Anthropomorphic Tendency
Scale (ATS), Interpersonal Trust Scale (ITS), and Complacency Potential Rating Scale (CPRS).
The scales were given prior to study participation, and the questionnaires were designed to
measure trait personality measures, thus by random assignment the groups should be
approximately equal.
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Anthropomorphic Tendency Scale (ATS)
There are four factors within the ATS: Extreme Anthropomorphism, Anthropomorphism
of Pets, Anthropomorphism towards Gods or Deities, and Negative Anthropomorphism. A 3
(agent type) by 3 (reliability condition) univariate ANOVA was conducted on each of the four
anthropomorphic factors to examine if there were any differences among the between-subjects
groups. Additionally correlation analysis were conducted to examine if anthropomorphism
scores correlated with the main variable of interest, these correlations were done overall, by
agent, by reliability condition, and by agent*reliability condition (only significant correlations
are reported in the text for a full list of correlations see Appendix W).

Extreme Anthropomorphism
Mean score for extreme anthropomorphism was 32.80 (SD = 9.78; coefficient α = 0.92).
The analysis on extreme anthropomorphism indicated that there were no significant difference
between groups (in all cases p > .05; See Table 22). Additional analysis indicated that there were
no sex difference in terms of extreme anthropomorphism (t(327) = 0.29, p = .77; See Table 23).
In regards to correlations there was a nonsignificant correlation between extreme
anthropomorphism to trust and reliance (r = -.07 and r = -.05 respectively). There was also no
significant correlation for trust or reliance by reliability level. When broken down by agent there
was a small negative correlation for self-rated trust in the different-type robotic agents (r = -.29).
By breaking agent type down by reliability condition it was demonstrated that this effect was
caused by a moderate negative correlation between extreme anthropomorphism and self-rated
trust in the mixed-reliability different-type robotic agent condition (r = -.47). This effect was
further examined by looking at how extreme anthropomorphism in the different-type mixed
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reliability was significantly correlated to trust in the low-reliability aid (r = -.62, p < .0005) but
not to trust in the high-reliability aids (r = -.09, p = .60). This indicates that when interacting
with different-type robots in mixed reliability those high in extreme anthropomorphism had
lower trust in the low reliability aid than those with lower extreme anthropomorphism scores (see
Figure 42). However, this effect did not affect reliance or trust on high-reliability aids and was
not apparent in the human or same-type robotic agent conditions (p > .05 in all cases).
Table 22. Extreme anthropomorphism among condition assignment. Note that SD are shown in
parenthesis.
Agent Type
Reliability
Different-Type
Human
Same-Type Robotic
Condition
Robotic
Both High

30.99 (7.88)

32.67 (9.87)

33.00 (11.35)

Mixed

35.51 (11.04)

31.20 (7.59)

32.63 (9.64)

Both Low

31.66 (8.55)

32.76 (9.26)

32.63 (11.30)

Table 23. Anthropomorphism by participant sex.
ATS Factor
Participant Sex
N
Female
180
Extreme
Male
149
Female
180
Pets
Male
149
Female
180
Gods or Deities
Male
149
Female
180
Negative
Male
149
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Mean
32.65
32.97
39.56
38.10
30.26
28.26
12.18
11.61

SD
8.60
11.06
6.03
6.35
8.58
8.34
4.29
4.47
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Figure 42. Extreme anthropomorphism as a function of perceived trust of the low-reliability aid.
Note that results are for participants in the different-type robotic mixed condition.

Pet Anthropomorphism
Mean score for pet anthropomorphism was 38.90 (SD = 6.21; coefficient α = 0.90). The
analysis on pet anthropomorphism indicated that there was a significant difference between agent
conditions for levels of pet anthropomorphism, F(2, 286) = 3.63, p = .028, η² = 0.03. The
extremely small eta squared value indicates that even though this effect was significant it was
extremely small. All other effects were non-significant (p > .05 in all cases; See Table 24).
Additional analysis indicated that there were sex difference in terms of pet anthropomorphism
(t(326) = 2.14, p = .03). These results indicated that females have significantly higher pet
anthropomorphism scores than males, though this was a small effect, g = .24 (See Table 23).
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Table 24. Pet anthropomorphism among condition assignment. Note that SD are shown in
parenthesis.
Agent Type
Reliability
Different-Type
Human
Same-Type Robotic
Condition
Robotic
Both High

39.33 (5.74)

41.63 (4.04)

36.77 (6.59)

Mixed

39.59 (5.77)

38.54 (5.53)

38.27 (6.35)

Both Low

39.19 (6.43)

39.01 (6.76)

37.57 (7.27)

In regards to correlations, the overall correlation of pet anthropomorphism to trust and
reliance were not significant (r = .10 and r = .02 respectively). There was also no significant
correlation for trust or reliance by agent type. However, when broken down by reliability level
there was a small positive correlation for agent reliance in the mixed-reliability condition (r =
.22). By breaking agent type down by reliability condition it was demonstrated that this effect
was caused by a moderate positive correlation between pet anthropomorphism and participant
reliance in the mixed-reliability different-type robotic agent condition (r = .42). This effect was
further examined by looking at how pet anthropomorphism was significantly correlated to
reliance in the low-reliability aid (r = .51, p = .003) but not to reliance in the high-reliability aids
(r = .23, p = .19). This indicates that those high in pet anthropomorphism were more likely to
rely on the low-reliability aid than those with lower pet anthropomorphism scores (See Figure
43). However, this effect did not affect trust ratings on high-reliability aids and was not apparent
in the human or same-type robotic agent conditions (p > .05 in all cases).

126

Figure 43. Pet anthropomorphism as a function of reliance on the low-reliability aid. Note that
results are for participants in the different-type robotic mixed condition.

God or Deity Anthropomorphism
Mean score for God or Deity anthropomorphism was 29.36 (SD = 8.51; coefficient α =
0.93). The analysis on God or Deity anthropomorphism indicated that there was a significant
difference between agent condition, F(2, 287) = 3.45, p = .033, η² = 0.02. The extremely small
eta squared value indicates that even though this effect was significant it was of negligible size.
All other effects were not significant (p > .05 in all cases; See Table 25). Additional analysis
indicated that there were sex difference in terms of God or Deity anthropomorphism (t(327) =
2.13, p = .03). These results indicated that females have significantly higher God or Deity
anthropomorphism scores than males, though this was a small effect size, g = .24 (See Table 23).
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Table 25. God or Deity anthropomorphism among condition assignment. Note that SD are shown
in parenthesis.
Agent Type
Reliability
Different-Type
Human
Same-Type Robotic
Condition
Robotic
Both High

27.44 (8.58)

29.69 (9.31)

29.51 (8.65)

Mixed

26.64 (9.38)

30.80 (7.82)

28.84 (7.75)

Both Low

26.64 (9.38)

28.93 (8.56)

34.11 (6.09)

In regards to correlations, the overall correlation of God or Deity anthropomorphism to
trust and reliance were both not significant (r = .04 and r = -.07 respectively). There were also no
significant correlations for trust or reliance by agent type or reliability condition. However, by
breaking agent type down by reliability condition it was demonstrated that there was a moderate
positive correlation between God or Deity anthropomorphism and participant trust in the highreliability same-type robotic agent condition (r = .49) and the low-reliability different-type
robotic agent condition (See Figures 44 and 45). However, this effect did not affect trust ratings
on any other conditions (including mixed reliability conditions analyzed by low and high aid; p >
.05 in all cases).
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Figure 44. God or Deity anthropomorphism as a function of perceived trust. Note that results are
for participants in the both high-reliability same-type robotic condition.

Figure 45. God or Deity anthropomorphism as a function of perceived trust. Note that results are
for participants in the both low-reliability different-type robotic condition.
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Negative Anthropomorphism
Mean score for negative anthropomorphism was 11.92 (SD = 4.38; coefficient α = 0.84).
The analysis on negative anthropomorphism indicated that there was a significant difference
between reliability conditions for levels of negative anthropomorphism, F(2, 287) = 3.66, p =
.027, η² = 0.03. The extremely small eta squared value indicates that even though this effect was
significant it was of negligible size. All other effects were not significant (p > .05 in all cases;
See Table 26). Additional analysis indicated that there were no sex difference in terms of
negative anthropomorphism (t(327) = 1.18, p = .24; See Table 23).
Table 26. Negative anthropomorphism among condition assignment. Note that SD are shown in
parenthesis.
Agent Type
Reliability
Different-Type
Human
Same-Type Robotic
Condition
Robotic
Both High

12.03 (3.86)

12.55 (4.52)

12.29 (5.27)

Mixed

12.81 (4.46)

13.16 (4.01)

11.91 (3.99)

Both Low

11.02 (4.57)

11.55 (4.02)

10.60 (3.66)

In regards to correlations, the overall correlation of negative anthropomorphism to trust
and reliance were both not significant (r = .02 and r = .05 respectively). There was also no
significant correlation for trust or reliance by reliability condition. However, there was a small
but significant positive correlation between negative anthropomorphism and agent reliance in the
different-robotic agent condition (r = .22). By breaking agent type down by reliability condition
it was demonstrated that there was a small to moderate negative correlation between negative
anthropomorphism and participant reliance in the high-reliability same-type robotic agent
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condition (r = -.35; See Figure 46) and a small to moderate positive correlation between negative
anthropomorphism and reliance in the mixed reliability different-type robotic agent condition.
By further analyzing the mixed-reliability different-type robotic agent effect by low and high
reliability agent it was found that negative anthropomorphism was moderately positively related
to reliance on the high reliability aid (See Figures 47). These results indicate that while negative
anthropomorphism can lead to punishing the aid by not relying on it in inappropriate situations
(i.e., both high reliability aids), it can also aid participants in allowing them to limiting their
punitive efforts to only the unreliable aid in some conditions (i.e., mixed-reliability different-type
robot condition).

Figure 46. Negative anthropomorphism as a function of reliance. Note that results are for
participants in the both high-reliability same-type robotic condition.
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Figure 47. Negative anthropomorphism as a function of reliance on the high-reliability aid. Note
that results are for participants in the mixed-reliability different-type robotic condition.

Interpersonal Trust Scale
Mean score for interpersonal trust was 85.10 (SD = 9.00; coefficient α = 0.52). The
interpersonal trust scale was examined to see if the randomly assigned participants differed in
terms of general trust level. Results from a 3 (agent type) by 3 (reliability level) univariate
ANOVA with ITS score as the dependent measure indicated that agent type, reliability level, and
the interaction between the two, did not differ in terms of ITS score (p > .05 in all cases). This
indicates that by random assignment the experimental groups did not differ in ITS score
distribution. Additional analysis indicated that there was a sex difference in terms of ITS score,
(t(327) = 2.61, p = .01). These results indicated that females had significantly higher
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interpersonal trust scores than males (M = 86.27, SD = 8.17 and M = 83.69, SD = 9.76
respectively). Analysis of effect size indicated that this was a small to moderate effect, g = .29.
In regards to correlations these correlations were done overall, by agent, by reliability
condition, and by agent*reliability condition (only significant correlations are reported in the text
for a full list of correlations see Appendix X). There were no overall significant correlations of
interpersonal trust to rated trust or reliance on the agents (r = -.10 and r = -.07 respectively). In
examining the data divided among agent type there was a negative correlation between ITS
scores and reliance on human agents (r = -.21). Visual inspection of the data however indicated
that this was a weak effect (see Figure 48). A second significant correlation was found in regards
to agent-type. In this case there was a negative correlation between ITS score and trust in sametype robotic agents (r = -.28; see Figure 49). In examining across reliability conditions there was
a significant negative correlation between ITS scores and trust in low reliability aids (r = -.20;
see Figure 50); such that, individuals with higher interpersonal trust have significantly lower
self-rated trust in uniform low-reliability agents. Further analysis of this relationship indicated
that as ITS scores increase trust in human agents (r = -.35) and same-type robotic agents in the
uniform low-reliability conditions decreases (r = -.43; see Figure 51 and 52 respectively). It is
also useful to mention that in regards to pretrust measures there was no correlation between ITS
scores and trust in the aids prior to interacting with them (r = -.08, p > .05).
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Figure 48. ITS as a function of reliance for human agents.

Figure 49. ITS as a function of perceived trust for same-type robotic agents.
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Figure 50. ITS as a function of perceived trust in the low-reliability condition.

Figure 51. ITS as a function of perceived trust in the low-reliability human agent condition.
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Figure 52. ITS as a function of perceived trust in the low-reliability same-type robotic agent
condition.

Complacency Potential Rating Scale
In analyzing the CPRS there was an overall general score and four factors: Confidence,
Reliance, Trust, and Safety. A 3 (agent type) by 3 (reliability condition) univariate ANOVA was
conducted on each of the five divisions of the CPRS to examine if there were any differences
among the between-subjects groups. Additionally, correlation analyses were conducted to
examine if complacency potential scores correlated with the main variables of interest: trust and
reliance. These correlations were done overall, by agent, by reliability condition, and by
agent*reliability condition (only significant correlations are reported in the text for a full list of
correlations see Appendix Y).
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Overall CPRS Score
Mean score for the CPRS was 43.76 (SD = 5.49; coefficient α = 0.65). The analysis on
overall CPRS score indicated that there was a significant difference between reliability
condition, F(2, 287) = 4.72, p = .01, η² = 0.03. The extremely small eta squared value indicates
that even though this effect was significant it was of negligible size. All other effects were not
significant (p > .05 in all cases). Additional analysis indicated that there were no sex differences
in terms of complacency potential, (t(294) = 1.39, p = .16).
In regards to correlations there was an overall correlation of complacency potential to
self-rated trust (r = .18, p = .002) and reliance (r = .14, p = .014). In examining the data divided
among agent type there was a positive correlation between CPRS overall score and trust (r = .25)
and reliance (r = .24) for same-type robotic agents. Further analysis of the relationship indicates
that this trust correlation is driven by the same-type uniform low-reliability condition in which
there is a moderate correlation between overall CPRS score and trust in the agents (r = .35). A
second significant correlation was found in regards to reliability condition, that is in the mixed
reliability condition there were positive correlations between overall CPRS to trust (r = .28) and
reliance (r = .22). Further analysis of the mixed reliability condition, examining trust and
reliance in the high and low reliability aids, indicated that overall CPRS was significantly
correlated to trust in the low-reliability aid (r = .28, p = .006) and reliance in the high reliability
aid (r = .28, p = .01). Interestingly CPRS overall score was not significantly correlated to trust in
the high reliability aid or reliance on a concurrent low-reliability aid (p > .05 in both cases). A
significant correlation appeared for the different-type robotic mixed condition in which overall
CPRS score was moderately correlated with average trust (r = .56). Further examination of this
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effect, by examining the actual trust and reliance scores for the high and low reliability aids,
indicated that trust in the low-reliability aid (r = .47, p = .006), trust in the high reliability aid (r
= .49, p = .004), and reliance in the high reliability aid (r = .39, p = .02) were all significantly
positively related to CPRS overall score. CPRS overall score was not significantly correlated to
reliance on a concurrent low-reliability aid (r = .10, p = .57). These results indicate that
complacency potential in general increases trust and reliance, especially in ambiguous situation
(e.g., mixed reliability).
CPRS Confidence Factor
Mean score for the CPRS was 16.27 (SD = 2.36; coefficient α = 0.65). The analysis on
CPRS confidence factor indicated that there were no significant difference between groups (in all
cases p > .05). Additional analysis indicated that there was a trend for sex differences in terms of
complacency potential factor confidence, (t(294) = 1.90, p = .06). The trend indicated that males
(M = 16.59, SD = 2.32) were slightly higher than females (M = 16.09, SD = 2.23), but that it was
a small effect (g = .22).
In regards to correlations there were no overall correlations of confidence complacency
potential to self-rated trust (r = .09, p = .13) or reliance (r = .08, p = .18). In examining the data
divided among agent type there was a positive correlation within same-type robotic agent
condition for reliance (r = .20). There were no significant correlations for overall reliability level
(p > .05 in all cases). However, when breaking the data down further into agent by reliability
condition, it was found that within the different-type robotic aid the uniform-low reliability
level’s participant reliance was significantly correlated to CPRS confidence score (r = .37).
Additionally, also in the different-type robotic mixed condition, CRPS confidence score were
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significantly positively related to trust (r = .40) and reliance (r = .36). Analyzing this effect
further by examining the mixed condition for trust and reliance on the high and low reliability
aids themselves I found a positive correlation for CPRS confidence score and reliance on the
high reliability aid (r = .21, p = .04). Taking this a step further and analyzing by agent it was
apparent that the different-type robotic aid mixed condition had significant positive correlations
between CPRS confidence and trust in the high reliability aid (r = .39, p = .02) and reliance (r =
.44, p = .01) in the high reliability aid.
CPRS Reliance Factor
Mean score for the CPRS reliance factors was 10.90 (SD = 1.94; coefficient α = 0.15).
The analysis on CPRS reliance indicated that there were no significant difference between agent
or reliability grouping (in all cases p > .05). Additional analysis indicated that there was a small
sex difference in terms of CPRS reliance, (t(294) = 2.01, p = .045). The effect indicated that
males (M = 11.10, SD = 1.98) were slightly higher than females (M = 10.64, SD = 1.95) in terms
of reported CPRS reliance, but that it was a small effect (g = .23).
In regards to correlations there was an overall correlation of reliance complacency
potential to self-rated trust (r = .14, p = .02) but not on overall reliance (r = .06, p = .30). In
examining the data divided among agent type there was a positive correlation within same-type
robotic agent condition for trust (r = .27). Additionally in terms of reliability level there was a
positive significant correlation for mixed-reliability trust (r = .30). When breaking the data down
further by examining the trust and reliance within only the mixed condition by low and high
reliability aid, it was found the CPRS reliance is significantly correlated to trust in a low
reliability aid (r = .28, p = .01), trust in a high reliability aid (r = .21, p = .04), and reliance in a
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high reliability aid (r = .24, p = .02). An overall correlation analysis of agent by reliability
condition, found that the different-type robotic aid in the mixed reliability condition’s trust score
was significantly correlated to CPRS reliance rating (r = .43). By analyzing this in detail by
examining how user rating differed between the individual low- and high-reliability aids, I found
that the difference in trust at this level was determined primarily by trust in the high-reliability
aid (r = .42, p = .02) rather than the low-reliability aid (r = .33, p = .06). This indicates that
CPRS reliance factor is positively correlated with increased ratings of self-rated trust in general
and also in conditions of ambiguity (e.g., interacting two-agents of the same-type, mixed
reliability conditions, etc.).
CPRS Trust Factor
Mean score for the CPRS was 11.09 (SD = 2.11; coefficient α = 0.39). The analysis on
the CPRS trust factor indicated that there were no significant difference between agent or
reliability groups (in all cases p > .05). That is, random assignment allowed a relatively equal
distribution of CPRS trust scores across between-subjects conditions. Additional analysis
indicated that there were no sex differences in terms of trust complacency potential, (t(294) =
0.06, p = .95).
In regards to correlations there was an overall correlation of trust complacency potential
to self-rated trust (r = .18) but not on overall reliance. In examining the data divided among
reliability condition there was a positive correlation within the low-reliability condition for trust
(r = .20). There was no overall significant correlations among agent type. However, when results
were examined by agent type and across reliability levels there were two significant conditions.
These were, reported trust in the low-reliability same-type condition (r = .52; see Figure 53) and
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trust in the mixed-reliability in the different-type aids (r = .43; see Figure 54). Further
examination of CPRS trust within the mixed reliability condition indicated that in the differenttype aid condition score was moderately correlated to trust in the low reliability aid (r = .40, p =
.02) and trust in the high reliability aid (r = .37, p = .03).
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Figure 53. CPRS trust factor scores as a function of perceived trust in the low-reliability sametype robotic agent condition.
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Figure 54. CPRS trust factor scores as a function of perceived trust in the mixed-reliability
different-type robotic agent condition.

Overall Safety Factor
Mean score for the CPRS safety factor was 5.49 (SD = 1.66; coefficient α = 0.15). The
analysis on the safety factor indicated that there was a significant difference among reliability
conditions, F(2, 287) = 5.14, p = .006, η² = 0.04. The negligible eta squared factor however
indicates that this, while significant, was trivial result. All other results were not significant (in
all cases p > .05). Additional analysis indicated that there were no sex differences in terms of
safety complacency potential, (t(294) = 0.33, p = .75).
In regards to correlations there was an overall correlation of reliance complacency
potential to operator reliance (r = .16) but not on overall self-rated trust. In examining the data
divided among agent-type there was a positive correlation within the same-type robotic aid
condition for reliance (r = .22).All other correlations across agent type and reliability condition
were not significant.
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EXPERIMENT 4: DISCUSSION
Subjective Measures
The data concerning self-reported trust and automation reliance supported the hypotheses
in several regards. First, participants were capable of accurately rating perceived trust and
relying appropriately on the agents as a function of actual agent reliability. That is, even though
the task was quite difficult, participants were carefully processing the responses of the agents and
using these responses to rate perceived trust in the system. However, if trust and reliance always
followed reliability level then the measures of mixed- vs. uniform-reliability for the low- and
high-reliability aids would be equivalent. However, results demonstrated that there is biasing that
does occur. Biasing occurs such that the low-reliability aid when it appears with a high reliability
aid is viewed as significantly more trustworthy than when the low-reliability aids occur by them
selves. On the other hand dissociation occurs because even though there is a subjective
difference in the low-reliability aid depending on the reliability of the concurrent aid participant
behavior toward the aid (i.e., reliance) does not change. Even though the low-reliability aid in the
mixed condition is rated as significantly more trustworthy than the uniform low reliability aid,
reliance on this more trustworthy aid is not different from the perceived less trustworthy aid. On
the other hand, the high-reliability mixed- vs. uniform comparison indicates the opposite pattern
of effects such that the agents are not rated significantly different in terms of perceived trust
(though this effect was in the right direction), but do differ significantly in reliance, with
participants relying less on high-reliability aids that occur in conjunction with a low-reliability
aid.
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These results can be construed in several ways. First in regards to perceived trust this
indicates that the magnitude of the effect is much stronger for biasing trust upwards, when a lowreliability agent is portrayed with a high-reliability agent, then for biasing trust downwards when
a high-reliability agent is portrayed with a low-reliability agent. This effect is particularly
interesting when one takes into account that reliance on the aids differs for the high-reliability
agents but not for low-reliability agents. The results of this study could be taken to indicate that
operators respond in a more opened minded approach in a mixed-condition. That is, in the case
of interacting with mixed-reliability participants are more critical in agreeing with highreliability aids (reliance decreases – though their overall perceived trust in the agent is essentially
the same), participants also become more willing to ascribe trust to a low-reliability agent (trust
increase – though reliance does not change, that is operators still carefully weigh each of their
agreements). This finding is supported by the fact that workload does not differ among reliability
conditions, even under high-trust (i.e., high-reliability) situations workload is equivalent to
workload in low-trust (i.e., low-reliability) situations. This indicates that operators are still
mentally processing the task themselves regardless of their agents’ reliability. Therefore it stands
to reason that their reactions to the agents may be colored by their simultaneous processing of an
agent of an alternative reliability. This effect may be more prevalent in this study since a low
level of automation was used, that is while automation makes a recommendation an operator
must select it to choose it. With higher levels of automation there may be a greater impact on
reliance, such that operators become more complacent and less likely to process every trial when
the automation is more autonomous. A higher level of automation should be studied to examine
this issue.
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Regarding agent-type and perceived trust and reliance it was believed that users would
trust, rely on, and have less perceived workload when working with a pair of human agents.
However, the main effect for agent-type was not significant across all three measures. This
indicates that participants were not influenced by ‘what’ the agent was when determining their
overall trust, reliance, and workload. However, agent-type did influence temporal reliance when
observing agent errors. While, this effect was expected its pattern was contrary to that
hypothesized, in this study human agents had significantly less temporal reliance, compared to
robotic-agents, following an observed easy or moderate salience error. It was originally believed
that operators would be more forgiving of humans that made mistakes and less forgiving of
machines that made mistakes (polarization bias), but this opposite effect occurred and indicates
that users are actually more aware and punitively responsive to errors in other humans. Though
the hypotheses that people would be more forgiving of people erring on more difficult trials but
not simple ones was supported. However, the robotic agents did not followed the hypothesized
pattern of results (i.e., that any error would cause an equivalent drop in reliance). There are
several potential explanations for these findings. First, operators may assume that when human
agents make simple errors that they are not focusing on the task (e.g., humans may be distracted
or possibly not trying very hard); this could cause the operator to be negatively conditioned to
agreeing with them on the next trial. On the other hand a robotic agent could make a simple error
and this could be construed to be an accidental glitch (e.g., interpreting a stereo as an IED) that is
not a byproduct of negligence or inattention of the aid but merely bugs in the program. While
both would negatively impact overall reliance, purposeful and emotionally laden interpretations
of human errors could lead to greater drops in temporal reliance then ‘unintentional’ robotic
errors. This was supported by the fact that low-salience errors (i.e., difficult trials) did not
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experience this decrement for human operators. That is, when the participant found the trial quite
difficult themselves they became equally likely to negatively respond to the human on the next
trial compared to the robots. There are two alternative reasons for this explanation, the first is
that humans are more accepting of human-agent errors on difficult trials (i.e., they attribute faults
less to negligence and more to the difficulty of the task), the second explanation is that at this
level of difficulty many participants may have been unaware of the errors completely, thereby
minimizing the effectiveness to detect this effect. It would be recommended in a future study to
obtain a measure of participant error detection (i.e., whether the participant detected the agent
failure) and to analyze the temporal reliance in only those conditions where users did indeed
notice the failure. An alternative explanation could be that operators treat “intelligent” machines
with the same or more forgiveness than they would treat humans with. While observers may be
more critical of a calculator returning the correct answer every time, they may be more lenient to
more complex forms of automation. In this way “intelligent” automation benefits from both
worlds in that operators do not ascribe negative emotional connotations to the agent’s errors and
they also are forgiving of mistakes realizing that the system is imperfect but can on the whole
work quite well. This theory should be examined by future research.

Biasing-Effects and Trust
Agent-type also appeared to effect trust biasing on the mixed vs. uniform reliability
conditions. However, the pattern of trust biasing conflicts with the experimental hypothesis,
which had predicted the opposite pattern of results: that humans would be viewed as the most
independent agents (lowest ES difference), different-type robots would be viewed as semi-
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independent (moderate ES difference), and same-type robots would be viewed as the least
independent (largest ES difference). The rational for this argument was that two human beings
are unique, and interacting with one person should not influence your trust in another person
albeit if they are concurrent and of mixed reliability. However, two robotic agents of the sametype, whom you have been informed are operating under similar mathematical algorithms and
created by the same company, should appear to be less independent. Thus, an error on the part of
an inaccurate robot should be more likely to bias trust in a concurrent accurate robot, making an
operator trust it less. The opposite effect could occur where an accurate robot could bias trust in a
concurrent inaccurate robot, making an operator trust it more. As reported earlier, in general it
was observed that the mixed reliability condition did cause a biasing effect which caused greater
trust in inaccurate agents and less trust in accurate agents However, the predicted pattern of agent
biasing was not supported by the experiment. It appears that people interact with automation in a
complex manner when it comes to determining their perception of agent trust. While it was
demonstrated that people could indeed differentiate the difference between a high reliability aid
and a low reliability aid, depending on what they thought those aids were influenced their
adjustment in their trust level. The data indicated that, contrary to the hypotheses, the human
agents had the largest perceived changes in trust between mixed and uniform conditions. This
indicates that human beings are actually very sensitive to performance differences between
people, and that individuals change their criteria for trustworthiness in their human teammates
quite dramatically based on the combination of people they are viewing. For example, highreliability agents when paired with a low-reliability agent have significantly higher ratings of
trustworthiness compared to the uniform-high-reliability human agents. In this way it appears
that a human agent’s stellar performance contrasted against a less reliable human performer
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actually causes people to consistently rate the trust in the stellar performer much higher than they
would if they just viewed two high-performers. Surprisingly though our less stellar performer in
the human agent condition is not in contrast worse at the task, but instead benefits from
association with the high performer. The moral of the story appears that if you are good at a task
surround yourself with people who are not and you will be perceived as be more trusted by your
colleagues, on the other hand if you are not good at a task it would be wise to surround yourself
with people who are so that by association you can seem more trustworthy.
On the other hand when you interact with automation the story becomes slightly
different. According to this study, when one interacts with two agents of the same-type, the highreliability aid suffers in terms of trustworthiness by being associated with a lower reliability aid.
This is the equivalent of losing faith in a particular device when you experience low reliability on
a similar device. One becomes less trusting of the high reliability aid because of the now salient
chance of errors. Additionally, when the inanimate aids are of similar make and model there is
no trust benefit to the low reliability aid for occurring concurrently with a high reliability aid.
This is a very cynical model of trust, such that mixed reliability only brings no change or
decreased trust, a very strong contrast to the human-agent condition.
The final group of analysis for perceived trust is the different-type robotic aids. In this
condition the hypotheses supported the hypotheses in terms of the different-type robotic aids
having a mixed effect between what occurs for the human and same-type robotic agents. The
pattern of results follows the originally anticipated direction, such that a concurrent high
reliability aid raises trust in a low reliability aid (similar to what occurs with low-reliability
human agents) and a concurrent low reliability aid decreases trust in a high reliability aid (similar
to what occurs with high-reliability same-type robotic agents). However, it was unanticipated
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that this biasing would occur to such a point that there was not a significant difference in regards
to self-rated trust in the low- and high-reliability agents in the mixed-reliability different-type
robotic agent condition. That is, while participants were able to determine high- and lowreliability in the uniform conditions, the degree of bias in the mixed condition made the trust
ratings between the low and high reliability aids not significantly different. This could have
detrimental consequences in an applied setting in which individuals could fail to identify
inaccurate machine teammates because their inaccuracies are masked by the biasing effect of
more reliable machine teammates.

Biasing-Effects and Reliance
As mentioned earlier reliance data demonstrated that people were able to adjust their
reliance so that they could rely more on reliable aids and less on non-reliable aids. By examining
the amount of bias that occurs when a reliability condition is paired with a concurrent different
reliability, it was also apparent that the reliance bias between agents was minimal and in general
followed the predicted pattern of results: humans the least bias, different-type robotic an
intermediate amount of bias, and same-type robotic agents the most bias. This was particularly
interesting considering the odd pattern of results for perceived trust in the agents. For example,
ratings of trust for human agents were highly positively biased in the mixed-reliability condition;
it appeared that by adding a comparison, both human agents increase in terms of trustworthiness.
On the other hand, in terms of reliance, a mixed-reliability condition actually lead to less reliance
on the high-reliability human agent and no change in reliance on the low-reliability human agent.
Is there cognitive dissonance that is driving this hypocrisy? Why do participants report increased
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trust in the agents but then not follow their subjective reports with changes in their behavior?
One speculation is that individuals are more cautious with actions than with words, while trust
ratings varied more significantly across the groups reliability ratings were more consistent
(though this may also be due to the greater precision of the reliance measure). However, there is
additional evidence for a cautious reliance approach, in that the low-reliability aid rarely
benefited from its relationship to a high-reliability aid. Indeed, in all but one case individuals
mitigated their reliance on both the high- and low-reliability aids when they were paired with an
aid of conflicting reliability. Even in the case of high-reliability humans in whom trust was rated
as significantly higher in a mixed-condition, participants still hedged their bets by not increasing
their reliance. One possible explanation for this finding is that mixed-reliability allowed
participants to be more open-minded about whether or not they agreed with the aid. As Table 21
demonstrates in all but one condition the mixed-reliability ead to less reliance on the agent (even
compared to the low-uniform conditions). This indicates that teammate conflicting reliability
levels make it more acceptable to disagree with either teammate’s recommendation. This finding
exemplifies why it is important to gather both subjective and objective data on user perceptions
toward automation. If trust always followed reliance there would be little reason to collect them
both. Thus how the subjective measure of trust links to the behavioral measure of reliance and
the conditions in which trust and reliance dissociate are of distinct importance. There are
practical reasons to predict the conditions that will cause dissociations, particularly to alert
designers to the kinds of biases that they will encounter in operators of complex automated
systems.
An alternative hypothesis concerns the temporal nature of the measurements themselves.
Trust is measured at the end of the experiment, so as to gain a general measure of trust in the
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agent. On the other hand, reliance is measured on a trial-by-trial basis. Human memory does not
sum trust in the same way as a computer program sums their reliance score. Trust summed in this
experiment means greater trust for the low-reliability aid. These after-the-fact ratings of trust
indicate that biasing occurs to the benefit of the low-reliability aids. That is, participant’s
subjective evaluation of trust in the agents is positively affected by exposure to a higher
reliability aid. Though its interesting that this effect does not extend to greater reliance on a trialby-trial basis. These trial-by-trial reliance measures summed means less reliance for highreliability aid in a mixed condition. On a trial-by-trial basis operators are more susceptible to
negatively biasing their reliance on high-reliability aids when they are presented with a
concurrent low-reliability aid. That is, observed errors in the low-reliability aid may prompt the
observer to disagree with the high-reliability aid more often. Though again it is interesting that
overall trust scores do not change.

Individual Differences
This last section examines individual differences and how they related to participant trust
and reliance in the task. These analyses were done in an exploratory fashion.

Sex Differences
Participant sex overall did not affect user reliance on the aids or trust in the aids (p>.05 in
both cases). This was expected because the automation literature has not demonstrated a sex
effect. There were however some interesting sex effects in regards to several factors measured by
the individual differences questionnaires, these included pet anthropomorphism, God or Deity
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anthropomorphism, interpersonal trust, complacency confidence, and complacency reliance.
However, these effects were relatively small (g ranged from 0.22 to 0.29) and may be more
important predictors of performance in more specific cases (e.g., studies dealing with pets may
show a slightly different pattern of results for female participants that is not present for male
participants).

ATS
Through random assignment ATS scores were relatively equivalent across conditions,
and if there were differences eta squared values indicated that the differences were negligible.
This allowed for some interesting effects to be observed. For example, extreme
anthropomorphism was significantly related to the rating of trust individuals would assign a lowreliability aid in the different-type mixed reliability condition. This is interesting because it
indicates that people higher in extreme anthropomorphism have a stronger negative reaction to
low reliability aids when those aids appear physically different. That is they appear more
heightened to the independence of the aids in this condition than those with lower extreme
anthropomorphism scores, and this is reflected in their subjective-trust ratings. However, higher
levels of pet anthropomorphism had an opposite effect; participants became more likely to rely
on a low-reliability aid in the different-type mixed condition. This effect is unusual, individuals
with high pet anthropomorphism are more likely to ascribe human like traits to a familiar
animate object (i.e., pets), but it is somewhat unclear how this trait relates to reliance upon faulty
aids when those aids are different inanimate robotic agents. It is the author’s speculation that this
effect may be from anthropomorphism of pets being somewhat related to anthropomorphism of
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inanimate objects. Some of the questions querying pet anthropomorphism query participants on
whether they would reward a pet for doing something good and apologize for hurting a pet. In
this manner if individuals rewarded a robot for doing something good, that could be construed as
agreeing with the aid when it is correct. While apologizing for hurting a pet, could loosely be
construed as being considerate to a pet or in this case considerate of an agent’s recommendation.
Therefore, those high in pet anthropomorphism may be more likely to agree with the aid when it
is right to ‘reward’ it, while those low in pet anthropomorphism may not feel bad for ignoring
(i.e., being inconsiderate of the aids recommendation) low-reliability agent recommendations,
thus leading to the significant difference in reliance. However, this is only apparent in the
different-type robotic condition, perhaps because two same-type robots may be too similar to
activate pet anthropomorphism. However, this speculation should be studied further in future
studies.
Another interesting effect uncovered by the ATS is that anthropomorphism of God or
Diety leads to greater ratings of trust in two instances: high-reliability same-type robotic agents
and low-reliability different-type conditions. While religious faith has been found to be
positively related to generalized level of trust, these results were in very specific circumstances
Visual inspection of trust graphed across all the conditions indicated that as anthropomorphism
of God increased so did rated trust in the agents in general, but that possibly by chance these two
groups had fewer deviations from this general pattern and more favorable pattern of scores. It
was also a limitation that affiliated religion was not recorded; several participants reported
trouble answering the God anthropomorphism questions because they were Atheist or Agnostic.
It might clarify results if they were removed from analysis. It might also clarify results to divide
among the remaining religions as some participants reported that they believe that God became
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man thus they choose high anthropomorphism while other participants mentioned that God is
much greater than man so that they reported much lower anthropomorphism. However, in
regards to trust religious affiliation is know to be positively correlated to generalized trust, thus it
would be interesting to extend this to examine whether this relationship is related to how one
anthropomorphizes their God or Deity.
The final analysis of the ATS concerned negative anthropomorphism, that is how likely
one is to lash out at an inanimate object when it does something you do not like. Results
indicated that negative anthropomorphism can be beneficial or harmful depending on the
situation. That is, negative anthropomorphism can lead to punishing the aid by not relying on it
in inappropriate situations (e.g., both high reliability aids that look similar), but it can also
facilitate participants in allowing them to limit their punitive efforts to only the unreliable aid in
some conditions (e.g., the different-type aid mixed condition in which negative
anthropomorphism was correlated with greater reliance on the high reliability aid). This indicates
that negative anthropomorphism may help participants by having them harshly judge one
inanimate object but not a concurrent more reliable inanimate object, but that this relationship is
in part determined by external physical cues.

ITS
The results regarding interpersonal trust scores were quite surprising, the indicate that
those high in interpersonal trust were in general actually less trusting of the agents after
interacting with two unreliable aids then those scoring lower on the interpersonal trust scale. This
provides empirical evidence that not only are high generalized trust individuals not gullible, but

154

that they also respond more harshly to those items that violate their trust (i.e., they rate perceived
trust lower after interacting with low reliability aids).

CPRS
Analysis of the CPRS scores were found to be relatively lower than those found by Singh
et al (1993; current study: M = 43.76, SD = 5.49 vs. Singh et al. study: M = 57.69 SD = 6.09).
The CPRS tended to have a small positive correlation to gaming experience (r = .11, p = .05).
However, the CPRS did not obtain significance in relation to participant age, sex, or computer
experience (p > .10 in both cases). In regards to age and computer experience this was unusual
because age and computer experience are typically related to CPRS scores. However, our lack of
finding a correlation with age is most likely due to the restriction on the range of ages examined
(M = 21, SD = 5). On the other hand, computer experience, as measured by number of hours a
week spent on a computer, was normally distributed but still not related to CPRS scores (r = .05). This indicates that computer experience does not necessarily lead to automation
complacency, and that other factors are at work (e.g., type rather than quantity of computer
experience) or other individual variables within the sample studied.
Across the main variables of interest, trust and reliance, overall CPRS was significantly
positively related to trust and reliance on the agents. This was especially present in conditions of
ambiguity (e.g., same-type agents, mixed reliability condition) and in cases in which the observer
should not have relied upon the agents (e.g., when participants became complacent in the sametype low reliability agents and trust in the low-reliability aid in the mixed reliability condition).
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However, in the mixed reliability condition overall complacency in general increased trust in
both high and low reliability aids, but it only increased reliance on high reliability aids.
Examining the factors of CPRS it was not surprising to see that automation confidence
was significantly related to reliance and trust in automation in conditions of ambiguity (i.e.,
same-type agents, different-type low reliability agents). Complacency reliance was surprisingly
not related to reliance but was related to self-rated trust again in conditions of ambiguity (i.e.,
same-type agents, different-type low reliability agents, and mixed reliability conditions).
Complacency trust was significantly correlated with trust overall, and again was significant in
cases of ambiguity (i.e., same-type agents, and low reliability conditions). The last factor safety
indicated that it was correlated to reliance especially in terms of an ambiguous situation (i.e.,
interacting with two of the same type aids).
Overall the results of the CPRS indicate that automation complacency does indeed
increase reliance and trust in automation; however, these effects differ based on the nature of the
task. It seems that in general complacency helps guide behavior when the task is ambiguous; that
is, the operator is interacting with aids that differ in their reliability or appear physically the
same. In this way operators who have higher levels of complacency may give-up their choice
(i.e., rely or trust an agent) more quickly in cases of uncertainty because they trust that the agent
will operate in their best interest. Interestingly, it appears that this complacency does affect trust
in low-reliability aids but does not affect reliance in low-reliability aids as much. This may mean
that those high in complacency are more likely to trust their teammates (regardless of their
reliability) and actually rely on high reliability aids, but that often they do not typically have a
greater predisposition to rely on low reliability aids.
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Limitations to the Current Study
A limitation to the study is that some individuals questioned the human agents’ similarity.
The male and female human agents were strikingly similar, due to the facial compilation
software, and some participants found that uncanny and it may have weakened the effect of the
manipulation. It may be beneficial in future studies to actually not use averaged faces so as to
increase the believability of the manipulation. While this reduces the control of the agent
manipulation, in studies of trust it is imperative to limit skepticism in participants. However, the
human agents were believable to many participants as they often used pronouns (e.g., “he” and
“she”) when discussing their teammates in the open ended question on the exit questionnaire.
Another limitation is this study is the measure of overall trust was a single question on a
nine-point Likert scale given once at the end of the experiment. Many studies in this realm use
the same or a similar Likert scale to garner information on trust but query participants
continuously throughout the session, often after every trial. However, trust is an attitude that
develops over time and by querying participants repeatedly on this attitude the researcher may
not be measuring trust so much as belief the aid was just correct on the previous trial. By limiting
the trust query to the end I minimized distraction to the participants and obtained an overall view
of the agent (not a point by point report). However, other studies that have had their participants
perform trial by trial ratings may have increased accuracy and power of this measure to detect an
effect. In order to examine whether a temporal facet of the measures lead to the surprising trust
and reliance dissociations it would be fruitful to replicate this study taking a point-by-point
measure of trust. This would allow the examination of whether operators are more critical of
their trust on a trial-by-trial basis.
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Additionally, temporal reliance for low-salience errors was found to not significantly
differ between humans and automation. However, this lack of effect may have been due to the
low salience errors being so difficult that they were not detectable by the operators; hence,
operators were unaware of the automation error because the trial was difficult artificially
demonstrating no difference among the agents. It would be recommended in future studies to
measure participant error detection and to limit analysis to users who did in fact detect the
automation failure. Alternatively, the division of error salience could be shifted up to ensure
participants noticing the errors and their evaluation of the difficulty of the error then impacting
their perceived trust and reliance on the agents.

Proposed Future Research
The current research was a first step at examining how human operators calibrate their
trust and reliance to fellow humans and/or robotic agents. For robotic agents responses were
examined for whether people believed they were working with two agents of the same- or
different-type. For human agents only different-type agents were used (i.e., a male and a female
agent). It poses an interesting question about whether it is possible to vary the perceived
independence of human agents. Would humans that are more similar, such as identical twins,
clones, or more realistically individuals who are very similar based on their dress, training, and
appearance, have different patterns of trust and reliance bias compared to two distinct
individuals? The findings of this study also indicated that individuals did not respond differently
to the agents if they were male or female; however, it would be noteworthy to examine when
operators interact with teams of the same or different sex. In groups of all males is there more
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distrust than groups of all females, additionally if the participant is the opposite sex/different
age/different race than the human agents would that result in them feeling more like an outsider
and relying more on their teammates? Would facial expressions impact users perception and
behavior toward these human teammates? Additionally, what about the characteristics of the
robotic agents? In the current study two standard but distinct robotic agents were employed;
however, it would be interesting to examine how anthropomorphic robots (e.g., the Sony QRIO
or AIBO) might bridge the gap between the differences in how trust and reliance spreads in
human vs. robotic systems. These questions examine how different characteristics of the agent
can influence the social interaction between the agents and the operator. The purpose of the
current work was merely to see if there is a difference between how trust and reliance spreads in
human compared to robotic teams, now that it is evident that it does spread differently the next
step is naturally to see how characteristics of the agents can influence this spread (possibly
through human agent conformity or increasing anthropomorphic characteristics of robotic
agents).
The present study investigated the spread of bias in a system in which an operator
monitored two agents; it would be of interest to investigate how trust and reliance were biased in
more complex systems (3+ agents to monitor). Would bias between the agents decrease as more
agents were being monitored, similar to an averaging out effect? Or alternatively would there be
more bias because the complexity of the task may prevent users from developing accurate
representations of each agent’s reliability? The effect of the experimental test bed is another
avenue for future research. The current study operated under a scenario that people’s lives were
in danger while many previous trust studies have investigated trust using juice pasteurization
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tasks. Perceived importance of the task may effect how individuals allocate their trust and
reliance in agents.
The addition of stress and subsequent examination of its impact on operator trust and
reliance is another avenue of future research. I believe that stress would put participants in a
situation of greater need for reliance on automation, and that while trust levels may still fluctuate
reliance would be much more stable due to its greater need. Increased stress may however cause
a stabilization of trust levels if the operator becomes so stressed that it impairs their ability to
monitor the agents adequately to establish a set level of trust relative to their observed
performance.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The four studies entailed in this report allowed for the examination of task, which was
calibrated to be difficult but possible for manual performance, when that task was paired with an
automated aid that differed in reliability, perceived agent characteristics, and error salience.
These results are based on a task in which operators monitored the decisions of agents on remote
unmanned vehicles. Other possible applications of missions in which human operators would act
through remote vehicles are hazardous material handling, emergency response operations (e.g.,
bomb removal), fire operations in searching burning buildings, extreme environments (e.g., Mars
Land Rover), and even medical applications (e.g., nanomachines). For example even in the case
of injecting nanomachines with the goal of clearing plague from arteries, much of the process
could be preprogrammed but a physician/operator to monitor the activity and to provide ongoing
regulation, especially in the cases of unexpected circumstances. The environment of operation
and vehicle dynamics may be radically different, but the fundamental interface contains a
number of commonalties (Mouloua, Gilson, & Hancock, 2003).
One of the most essential elements of any social organization, whether it is a professional
soccer team or a military reconnaissance unit, is the willingness of the members of that social
group to trust one another. The efficiency, adjustment, and even survival of any social group
depend upon the presence or absence of such trust (Rotter, 1967). In fact, almost all of our daily
activities, from buying gasoline, paying taxes, going to the dentist, flying to a convention involve
explicitly trusting someone else (Rotter, 1971). Rotter (1980) has argued that as distrust
increases the social fabric disintegrates, in order to support a complex society we must accept
greater dependence on others. If trust in general weakens then this stands to reason that the social
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interaction may also weaken and possibly collapse. Trust in regards to user reliance on human
and robotic agents appears to be a fruitful area of investigation, and the previous analysis
demonstrats that people respond in complex and intelligent ways to imperfect teammates. This
interaction is of particular interest to engineers who should focus on how their design and the
environment in which the operator will be interacting with the agent will influence trust and
reliance on the aids. Without appropriate trust reliance on the system goes down, and the system
may fall into disuse and eventually be abandoned. On the other hand, with too much trust
operators may fall to detect automation failures and the safety of the system may come into
question. Engineers must take the social-interaction into account to ensure that their systems are
used safely.
These studies represent a first step in examining the complex interaction in how
individuals cooperate to complete a task when paired with teammates. Applications of this work
include understanding how subjective states impact reliance on automation and human
colleagues. This has important connotations for human-human and human-machine systems in
aviation, navigation, process control, military, and other applications. It also has important
implications for automated tasks from human-human systems to human-machine systems. The
present data suggest that while operators are able to differentiate between reliability levels in
terms of trust and reliance, trust becomes quite biased when dealing with two agents of mixed
reliability. However, individuals seem to be able to keep their reliance upon these agents to
relatively nonbiased levels. So it appears that people are able to compensate their behavior to
control for changes in subjective state at least in the bounds of this study. Additionally, some
differences in agent type on biasing between trust and reliance, were found lending empirical
support to the notion that humans and automation are not interchangeable and that users respond
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differently to the exact same recommendations depending on how they respond socially to that
agent (i.e., respond believing agent is robotic [same or different type] or respond believing the
agent is human).

Guidelines
Drawing on the conclusions of this study several guidelines for system design, for when
an operator and dual agents interact, have been created.
1. If possible use multiple agents of similiar high reliability.
2. If mixing agents of different reliabilities can not be avoided, expect and design for
a drop in reliance across both the low reliability aid and the high reliability aids.
3. When using robotic aids, to prevent polarization bias stress the ‘intelligent’ aspect
of the robotic automation.
4. In all cases, but particularly for those interacting with other human agents, there is
a drop in reliance following obvious errors. So design for residual drop in reliance
that may occur after teammate errors.
5. Dissociations can occur between trust and reliance, so even if operators report
verbally trusting a system their actual use of that system should also be examined.
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DEFINITIONS
Automation: Any sensing, detection, information-processing, decision-making, or control action
that could be performed by humans, but is actually performed by a machine
(Moray, Inagaki, & Itoh, 2000, p. 44). Alternative definition: The execution by a
machine agent of a function that was previously carried out by a human
(Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
Automation Reliance: Defined in terms of performance or behavioral measures such as
automation utilization and efficiency (Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001, p. 356).
Automation Trust: Defined in terms of subjective measures, such as users’ confidence ratings
in the automation or their verbal estimates of the automation’s reliability
(Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001, p. 356).
Automation Use: The voluntary activation or disengagement of automation by human operators
(Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
Disuse: The neglect or underutilization of automation. Often represented by ignoring or turning
off automated alarms or safety systems. A common cause of disuse is a high level
of false alarms in the system (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997, p. 233).
Misuse: Overreliance on automation, that is using automation when it should not be used, which
can result in failing to monitor it effectively (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997, p. 233).
Reliability: The accuracy of the machine or the likelihood that an objective can be achieved by
automation (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2002, p. 67).
Self-Confidence: Anticipated performance during manual control (Lee & Moray, 1994, p. 154).
Trust: Automation is seen as trustworthy to the extent that it is predictable, dependable, and
inspires faith that it will behave as expected in unknown situations (Beck,
Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2002, p. 68). Also defined as the expectancy held by an
individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of
another individual or group can be relied upon (Rotter, 1967, p. 651).
165

APPENDIX B: INFORMED CONSENT TO EXPERIMENT 1 AND 2

166

Informed Consent Form
Please read this consent document carefully before you decide to participate in this study.
You must be 18 years of age or older to participate.

Project title:

Empirical Examination of Trust in Automation across Multiple Agents in a Search and Rescue

Operation.

Purpose of the research study: The purpose of this data collection effort is to determine the impact of using
automated decision aids in a search-and-rescue scenario. The current effort seeks to determine under what
conditions automated decision aids increases or decreases reliance upon these decision aids.

What you will be asked to do in the study:
You will be asked to view a computer display running a
simulated scenario of a search-and-rescue scenario using one unmanned ground vehicle (UGV). You will be asked
to monitor the video images from the UGV for critical signals (e.g., enemy units, civilians, or weapons). At the end
of the session you will be asked to complete several questionnaires about your experience performing the searchand-rescue scenario.
Time required: Approximately one (1) hour.
Risks: Minimal. The risks to you are no greater than operating any other computer.
Benefits/Compensation: Participants will be offered the benefit of 2 points of course credit in undergraduate
psychology (equivalent to 1 hour research).

Confidentiality: Your identity will be kept confidential. Your information will be assigned a participant number.
The list connecting your name to this number will not be released to anyone who is not directly involved in
conducting this study. Your name will not be used in any report.
Voluntary participation: Your participation in this study is voluntary. There is no penalty for not participating.
You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty.
Whom to contact if you have questions about the study: Dr James L. Szalma, Department of Psychology,
University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL. Telephone (407) 823-0920, email jszalma@mail.ucf.edu.

Whom to contact about your rights in the study: Research at the University of Central Florida involving
human participants is carried out under the oversight of the Institutional Review Board (UCF). For information
about participants’ rights please contact: Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of
Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at
(407) 823-2901.
___ I have read the procedure described above.
___ I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure.

/
Participant

Date
/

Principle Investigator

Date
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Experimenter Script – Please Read Italic Sections Aloud to Participant
The goal of this study is to examine how interface design impacts one’s interaction with a distributed robot, in this
case an unmanned ground vehicle (commonly referred to as a UGV – these are typically similar to remote control
cars that are equipped with special equipment such as webcams). UGVs are frequently used when the environment
is too dangerous for a human operator.
In the following simulation you are operating under the premise that a group of terrorist have released a dangerous
chemical into a commercial office building, and we are sending in a reconnaissance UGV to ascertain the location
of terrorists, improvised explosive devices (IEDs – basically a bomb), and unconscious civilians before
reinforcements arrive. You can see examples of these objects at the top of your screen (POINT OUT IED –
PARTICIPANTS HAVE TROUBLE FINDING THIS).
We need you to monitor the video feed from the UGV and for each room report whether you detect the presence of a
terrorist, IED, civilian, or if that the room is clear. Due to time constraints the UGV must automatically move
through the building as quickly as possible, you will not be controlling the movement of the UGV, thus you will have
only one chance to view each room.
After the robot has sent each signal, it will conserve battery by turning off the video while it is moving to the next
room, during this short time period the response keys (POINT OUT RESPONSE KEYS – COMPARE
ACTIVATED PRACTICE KEY TO DEACTIVATED RESPONSE KEYS) will be activated and you can report
your observation. You will not be able to change your answer after pressing a key. Additionally you may notice that
after you respond it may take several seconds to move on to the next video, this is perfectly normal. Try to respond
as quickly and accurately as possible.
You will find a pair of headphones to the left on the monitor, please wear these during the experiment. No sound will
come out of the headphones, they are merely meant to attenuate any extraneous noise.
Now the most important item I will mention is that at several points in the experiment a message will pop-up stating,
“Please complete the form and press OK when you are ready to continue.” When this message appears do NOT
immediately click OK. I will give you a questionnaire; after you COMPLETE the questionnaire you may then click
OK to resume the simulation.
Do you have any questions or concerns at this point?
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Participant #: ____ ______
Experimenter: __________
Date: _________________
1. Did you feel that you had enough time to view each video clip (with 5 being neither too much nor too
little time)?
Definitely Not
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Definitely Too
Enough Time
Much Time
2. Did you feel that you had enough time to respond to each video clip (with 5 being neither too much nor
too little time)?
Definitely Not
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Definitely Too
Enough Time
Much Time
3. Do you believe you would have been able to monitor two video feeds at the same time?
Definitely not 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10 Definitely yes
4. Do you believe you would have been able to respond to two video feeds at the same time?
Definitely not 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10 Definitely yes
5. Do you believe you would have been able to monitor four video feeds at the same time?
Definitely not 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10 Definitely yes
6. Do you believe you would have been able to respond to four video feeds at the same time?
Definitely not 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10 Definitely yes
7. Please rate the MENTAL DEMAND of the task: How much mental and perceptual activity was
required?
Low
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10 High
8. Please rate the PHYSICAL DEMAND of the task: How much physical activity was required?
Low
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10 High
9. Please rate the TEMPORAL DEMAND of the task: How much time pressure did you feel due to the
pace at which the task elements occurred?
Low
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10 High
10. Please rate your PERFORMANCE: How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the
goals of the task?
Low
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10 High
11. Please rate your EFFORT: How hard did you have to work (mentally and physically) to accomplish
your level of performance?
Low
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10 High
12. Please rate your FRUSTRATION: How discouraged, irritated, stressed and annoyed did you feel
during the task?
Low
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10 High
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Group

Video with Errors (parenthesis contain # participants missing the

Condition

video)

Total Errors

1

G1C3.avi (1), G1I2.avi(7), G1N2.avi(1), G1T2.avi(1)

10

2

G2C3.avi(1), G2I1.avi(7),G2I2.avi(4), G2I3(3), G2N2.avi(1)

16

3

G3I2.avi(2), G3I3.avi(14), G3N2.avi(1), G3N3.avi(1)

18

4

G4C1.avi(7), G4C2.avi(1), G4I1(3), G4I3.avi(2), G4N2.avi(1)

14

5

G5C1.avi(1), G5I1.avi(1), G5I3.avi(3), G5N1.avi(1), G5N2.avi(4)

10

6

G6C2.avi(4), G6I1.avi(9), G6I3.avi(3), G6N1.avi(1), G6N3.avi(10)

27

7

G7I2.avi(10), G7I3(1), G7N2.avi(2), G7N3.avi(1)

14

8

G8I2.avi(3), G8N2.avi(1)

4

9

G9C3.avi(22), G9I1.avi(7), G9I2.avi(7), G9I3.avi(1), G9N1.avi(5),

47

G9N2.avi(4), G9N3.avi(1)
Note – File names of video files are written so that the first two characters reflect the condition (e.g., G1 equals
group 1, G2 group 2 and so forth). The third letter represents rather the clip presented a T for terrorist, C for
civilian, I for IED, or N for nothing. The fourth, and final letter, represented which of the three clips of each stimuli
type was presented (e.g., the three civilian videos for group one were named G1C1.avi, G1C2.avi, and G1C3.avi),
the numbers were assigned only for organizational reasons only. The .avi simply is the file extension for the video
files which were in AVI format.
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Participant Number:___________________
Date:___________________
Experimenter:___________________
Condition:___________________
Demographic Questionnaire
Male
Female

1.

What is your sex? (circle one)

2.

What is your age? ___________

3.

How many hours do you work on a computer per day? (circle one)
0

4.

<1 hour

1-2 hours

3-4 hours

5-6 hours

7+ hours

How many hours a day do you play video games on average? (circle one)
0

<1 hour

1-2 hours

3-4 hours

5-6 hours

7+ hours

IF YOU DO PLAY VIDEO GAMES, please describe what type:
______________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
5.

Are you are have you ever been involved in a search-and-rescue operation? (circle one)
Yes

No

IF YES, please describe:
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
6.

Are you familiar with any Unmanned/Uninhabited Vehicle (UV) system?
Yes

No

IF YES, please describe your experience:
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
7.

Do you have normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing?
Yes

No

IF NO, please describe:____________________________________________________________
8.

You have just opened an airport. As part of your responsibility for running an airport you have to ensure
that proper baggage screening procedures are in place to make sure that no illegal devices are allowed onto
aircraft. You have two choices for how to screen bags. Company A sells an object recognition computer
program that screens bags for illegal devices. Company B trains human operators to screen bags for illegal
devices. Assuming that cost is not an issue, which service do you trust to do the task better?
Company A: Computer

Company B: Human
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Experimenter Script – Please Read Italic Sections Aloud to Participant
The goal of this study is to examine how interface design impacts one’s interaction with a distributed robot, in this
case an unmanned ground vehicle (commonly referred to as a UGV – these are typically similar to remote control
cars that are equipped with special equipment such as webcams). UGVs are frequently used when the environment
is too dangerous for a human operator.
In the following simulation you are operating under the premise that a group of terrorist have released a dangerous
chemical into a commercial office building, and we are sending in a reconnaissance UGV to ascertain the location
of terrorists, improvised explosive devices (IEDs – basically a bomb), and unconscious civilians before
reinforcements arrive. You can see examples of these objects at the top of your screen (POINT OUT IED –
PARTICIPANTS HAVE TROUBLE FINDING THIS).
We need you to monitor the video feed from the UGV and for each room report whether you detect the presence of a
terrorist, IED, civilian, or if that the room is clear. Due to time constraints the UGV must automatically move
through the building as quickly as possible, you will not be controlling the movement of the UGV, thus you will have
only one chance to view each room.
After the robot has sent each signal, it will conserve battery by turning off the video while it is moving to the next
room, during this short time period the response keys (POINT OUT RESPONSE KEYS – COMPARE
ACTIVATED PRACTICE KEY TO DEACTIVATED RESPONSE KEYS) will be activated and you can report
your observation. You will not be able to change your answer after pressing a key. Additionally you may notice that
after you respond it may take several seconds to move on to the next video, this is perfectly normal. Try to respond
as quickly and accurately as possible.
You will find a pair of headphones to the left on the monitor, please wear these during the experiment. No sound will
come out of the headphones, they are merely meant to attenuate any extraneous noise.
Do you have any questions or concerns at this point?
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Civilian

Dif Index

IED

Dif Index

Terrorist

Dif Index

C01.avi

98.46

I01.avi

63.08

T01.avi

96.92

C02.avi

96.92

I02.avi

75.38

T02.avi

100.00

C03.avi

100.00

I03.avi

69.23

T03.avi

100.00

C04.avi

90.77

I04.avi

90.77

T04.avi

100.00

C05.avi

89.23

I05.avi

89.23

T05.avi

100.00

C06.avi

96.92

I06.avi

69.23

T06.avi

96.92

C07.avi

98.46

I07.avi

98.46

T07.avi

98.46

C08.avi

98.46

I08.avi

84.62

T08.avi

100.00

C09.avi

100.00

I09.avi

80.00

T09.avi

100.00

C10.avi

89.23

I10.avi

100.00

T10.avi

95.38

C11.avi

98.46

I11.avi

49.23

T11.avi

96.92

C12.avi

98.46

I12.avi

93.85

T12.avi

98.46

C13.avi

95.38

I13.avi

29.23

T13.avi

96.92

C14.avi

100.00

I14.avi

87.69

T14.avi

98.46

C15.avi

98.46

I15.avi

93.85

T15.avi

96.92

C16.avi

96.92

I16.avi

64.62

T16.avi

95.38

C17.avi

100.00

I17.avi

92.31

T17.avi

98.46

C18.avi

95.38

I18.avi

86.15

T18.avi

96.92

C19.avi

100.00

I19.avi

92.31

T19.avi

98.46

C20.avi

96.92

I20.avi

73.85

T20.avi

98.46

C21.avi

96.92

I21.avi

76.92

T21.avi

98.46

C22.avi

90.77

I22.avi

86.15

T22.avi

96.92

C23.avi

95.38

I23.avi

47.69

T23.avi

98.46

C24.avi

93.85

I24.avi

64.62

T24.avi

98.46

C25.avi

81.54

I25.avi

98.46

T25.avi

100.00

C26.avi

56.92

I26.avi

81.54

T26.avi

98.46

C27.avi

87.69

I27.avi

86.15

T27.avi

98.46

C28.avi

87.69

I28.avi

78.46

T28.avi

96.92

C29.avi

98.46

I29.avi

64.62

T29.avi

96.92

C30.avi

89.23

I30.avi

93.85

T30.avi

100.00

C31.avi

98.46

I31.avi

78.46

T31.avi

96.92

C32.avi

98.46

I32.avi

75.38

T32.avi

98.46

C33.avi

98.46

I33.avi

30.77

T33.avi

98.46
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Civilian

Dif Index

IED

Dif Index

Terrorist

Dif Index

C34.avi

95.38

I34.avi

63.08

T34.avi

100.00

C35.avi

96.92

I35.avi

52.31

T35.avi

96.92

C36.avi

60.00

I36.avi

53.85

T36.avi

98.46

C37.avi

81.54

I37.avi

66.15

T37.avi

100.00

C38.avi

92.31

I38.avi

67.69

T38.avi

100.00

C39.avi

98.46

I39.avi

27.69

T39.avi

100.00

C40.avi

98.46

I40.avi

47.69

T40.avi

96.92

C41.avi

95.38

I41.avi

33.85

T41.avi

100.00

C42.avi

96.92

I42.avi

50.77

T42.avi

98.46

C43.avi

98.46

I43.avi

76.92

T43.avi

98.46

C44.avi

56.92

I44.avi

66.15

T44.avi

100.00

C45.avi

63.08

I45.avi

92.31

T45.avi

96.92

C46.avi

98.46

I46.avi

92.31

T46.avi

100.00

C47.avi

98.46

I47.avi

87.69

T47.avi

96.92

C48.avi

73.85

I48.avi

75.38

T48.avi

98.46

C49.avi

80.00

I49.avi

60.00

T49.avi

100.00

C50.avi

98.46

I50.avi

64.62

T50.avi

98.46

C51.avi

84.62

I51.avi

32.31

T51.avi

98.46

C52.avi

16.92

I52.avi

83.08

T52.avi

98.46

C53.avi

67.69

I53.avi

83.08

T53.avi

96.92

C54.avi

100.00

I54.avi

69.23

T54.avi

96.92

C55.avi

87.69

I55.avi

84.62

T55.avi

98.46

C56.avi

73.85

I56.avi

66.15

T56.avi

100.00

C57.avi

89.23

I57.avi

75.38

T57.avi

95.38

C58.avi

87.69

I58.avi

84.62

T58.avi

95.38

C59.avi

89.23

I59.avi

73.85

T59.avi

98.46

C60.avi

95.38

I60.avi

80.00

T60.avi

98.46

C61.avi

98.46

I61.avi

84.62

T61.avi

98.46

C62.avi

98.46

I62.avi

87.69

T62.avi

98.46

C63.avi

100.00

I63.avi

83.08

T63.avi

95.38

C64.avi

86.15

I64.avi

98.46

T64.avi

100.00

C65.avi

93.85

I65.avi

92.31

T65.avi

96.92

C66.avi

100.00

I66.avi

90.77

T66.avi

98.46

C67.avi

96.92

I67.avi

83.08

T67.avi

100.00
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Civilian

Dif Index

IED

Dif Index

Terrorist

Dif Index

C68.avi

93.85

I68.avi

61.54

T68.avi

95.38

C69.avi

80.00

I69.avi

87.69

T69.avi

98.46

C70.avi

83.08

I70.avi

61.54

T70.avi

100.00

C71.avi

49.23

I71.avi

98.46

T71.avi

100.00

C72.avi

100.00

I72.avi

98.46

T72.avi

96.92

C73.avi

89.23

I73.avi

96.92

T73.avi

95.38

C74.avi

36.92

I74.avi

89.23

T74.avi

100.00

C75.avi

41.54

I75.avi

92.31

T75.avi

93.85
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Informed Consent Form
Please read this consent document carefully before you decide to participate in this study.
You must be 18 years of age or older to participate.

Project title:

Empirical Examination of Trust in Automation across Multiple Agents in a Search and Rescue

Operation.

Purpose of the research study: The purpose of this data collection effort is to determine the impact of using
automated decision aids in a search-and-rescue scenario. The current effort seeks to determine under what
conditions automated decision aids increases or decreases reliance upon these decision aids.

What you will be asked to do in the study:
You will be asked to view a computer display running a
simulated scenario of a search-and-rescue scenario using either one or two unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). You
will be asked to monitor the video images from these UGVs for critical signals (e.g., enemy units, civilians, or
weapons). You may receive automated decision aids while completing this task. At the end of the session you will
be asked to complete several questionnaires about your experience performing the search-and-rescue scenario.
Time required: Approximately thirty minutes (0.5 hour).
Risks: Minimal. The risks to you are no greater than operating any other computer.
Benefits/Compensation: Participants will be offered the benefit of 1 point of course credit in undergraduate
psychology (equivalent to 30 minutes research).

Confidentiality: Your identity will be kept confidential. Your information will be assigned a participant number.
The list connecting your name to this number will not be released to anyone who is not directly involved in
conducting this study. Your name will not be used in any report.

Voluntary participation: Your participation in this study is voluntary. There is no penalty for not participating.
You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty.
Whom to contact if you have questions about the study: Dr James L. Szalma, Department of Psychology,
University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL. Telephone (407) 823-0920, email jszalma@mail.ucf.edu.

Whom to contact about your rights in the study: Research at the University of Central Florida involving
human participants is carried out under the oversight of the Institutional Review Board (UCF). For information
about participants’ rights please contact: Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of
Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at
(407) 823-2901.
___ I have read the procedure described above.
___ I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure.

/
Participant

Date
/

Principle Investigator

Date
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Experimenter Script – Please Read Italic Sections Aloud to Participant
Welcome everyone, thank you for coming in today. Before we begin, please note that the
task we will be involved in today is a simulation. We are conducting a scientific experiment
which seeks to better understand how people interact with automated agents like unmanned
ground vehicles. In order to obtain accurate results, we need to mimic a real-world situation as
closely as possible. Therefore, today we will be working under the scenario that a terrorist
organization has infiltrated a commercial office building somewhere in the United States.
However, before we begin, I must again stress the fact that this is a simulation: there has been no
real terrorist attack, nor is anyone’s life truly in danger.
Are there any questions at this point?
We will now begin our background briefing. Please open your information packets to the
first page. The person you see here is Augustus Sol Invictus, the merciless leader of the Invictus
Terror Organization (or ITO), an extremist group bent on the destruction of the free world. There
are no known photographs of his face; he, along with all of the members of the ITO are rarely
seen, and when they are seen they always wear the black mask and uniform you see in the
photograph, making our estimations of their numbers highly unreliable. We know very little of
the ITO, other than that they are unpredictable, and very dangerous. This morning, the ITO
infiltrated a commercial office building occupied by more than a hundred U.S. civilians. There is
evidence that they released a gaseous chemical agent throughout the building. If you turn to page
two of your information packet you can see an aerial surveillance photo of the building.
Preliminary intelligence reports indicate that there are probably civilians in the building
who are still alive, but may have been rendered unconscious by the gaseous chemical agent.
However, it is unclear how many civilians there are or where they are located within the
building. Several of our own military forces have managed to covertly gain access into the
building. They have reported seeing a number of IED’s (or improvised explosive devices, which
are basically bombs) placed throughout the building. We have received an image of the type of
IED they have found, it is shown on page three of your information packet. Military intelligence
estimates a high likelihood that a full assault on the building might lead to the detonation of the
explosives after American forces have entered the building in order to maximize the number of
casualties. Battalion headquarters has decided to deploy an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) to
identify the locations of IEDs, terrorist suspects, as well as the locations of any unconscious
civilians. The UGV will patrol the building and transmit a video feed of each room. An example
of the UGV is shown on page four of your information packet. This is where you come in.
At this point, please turn to page five in your information packet to read your
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instructions. I will read these out loud and you should read along silently.
Your job will be to monitor the video feed from the UGV as it patrols through each room
in the building. The navigation of the UGV is fully automated and does not require any control
for its movement; that is, it has been programmed to move from room to room on its own.
The UGV will scan through each room, one at a time, and transmit the video feed to you.
Your mission is to monitor the video feeds sent in by the UGV and report what is in each room.
You may report your observation by selecting one of the response buttons below the video player
while the UGV moves onto the next room.
Although it takes the UGV several seconds to move from one room to the next, we ask
that you still respond as quickly as possible. If you do not respond by the time the UGV has
moved on to the next room it will not wait for you, it will automatically begin presenting the next
video feed and you will not have a chance to go back.
To prevent detection of the outgoing video feed by the Invictus Terror Organization, the
UGV has been programmed to randomly switch the frequency at which it transmits its video
feed. This is done randomly and may result in some video clips being presented at clearer
frequencies than others.
To aid you in your mission, the UGV may be equipped with an automated object
recognition system that allows it to recognize objects (e.g., IEDs). Please keep in mind that when
the system is engaged, it will provide a recommendation that it believes is correct, but it is still
ultimately your decision which response to select.
When you have completed the mission you may open the Exit Questionnaire envelope at
your desk. Please open this only after you have completed the mission. When you have finished
the questionnaire please come to the front of the room and you will be debriefed and receive
your compensation (cash payment or extra credit).
To help you focus on the task we ask that, during the mission, you wear the noise
canceling headphones, located to the left of the monitor. No noise will come out of the
headphones, they are used solely to block out environmental noise.
Do you have any questions regarding your mission?
At this point you are ready to begin your training. Please close the information packet and
place it somewhere where you can see the example pictures shown on the back. The training
scenario will give you a chance to see how the task will work, and show you examples of the
objects you will need to watch for. Please click the “Practice” button to begin the training. The
first practice clip will contain a terrorist, press OK to view the clip, then when you are prompted
to respond, click the “Terrorist” button below the video player.
(After participants have identified the terrorist, instruct them what to identify in the next
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three clips as the videos are playing; first IED, then Civilian, then Empty)
The next four practice clips will show you what the automated object recognition system
looks like. It will make a recommendation, but is still up to you to make the final selection (by
clicking one of the four response buttons or the agree aid button). Use of the aid is completely
optional and the responsibility of the final decision is your own and you can choose to either
accept the aid’s proposed diagnosis or to ignore it.
(Wait until participants identify all 4 clips, then continue).
The practice session is now complete. Does anyone have any questions about the task?
You may click the OK button to exit the training. The remainder of the experiment will
be self-paced and I will not give you any more instructions. When you have competed the study
fill out the questionairre about your experiences and come up to the front and I will compensate
you for your participation. Does anyone have any final questions before we get started?
Please put your headphones on. They are adjustable, so take a minute to make them as
comfortable as possible. I will come around to turn them on, once I have turned your headphones
on you may begin the mission.
(Turn on all headphones)
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Operation Silent Snake

Highly Sensitive Material

Do not open

until instructed
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Operation Silent Snake

Figure 1: Augustus Sol Invictus, leader of the Invictus Terror Organization
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Operation Silent Snake

Figure 2: The attack site
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Operation Silent Snake

Figure 3: Improvised Explosive Device (IED) found in the building
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Operation Silent Snake

Figure 4: The tread driven all-terrain autonomous surveillance robot
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Operation Silent Snake
Your Mission
Your job will be to monitor the video feed from the UGV as it patrols through
each room in the building. The navigation of the UGV is fully automated and does not
require any control for its movement; that is, it has been programmed to move from
room to room on its own.
The UGV will scan through each room, one at a time, and transmit the video
feed to you. Your mission is to monitor the video feeds sent in by the UGV and report
what is in each room. You may report your observation by selecting one of the
response buttons below the video player while the UGV moves onto the next room.
Although it takes the UGV several seconds to move from one room to the next,
we ask that you still respond as quickly as possible. If you do not respond by the time
the UGV has moved on to the next room it will not wait for you, it will automatically
begin presenting the next video feed and you will not have a chance to go back.
To prevent detection of the outgoing video feed by the Invictus Terror
Organization, the UGV has been programmed to randomly switch the frequency at
which it transmits its video feed. This is done randomly and may result in some video
clips being presented at clearer frequencies than others.
To aid you in your mission, the UGV may be equipped with an automated object
recognition system that allows it to recognize objects (e.g., IEDs). Please keep in mind
that when the system is engaged, it will provide a recommendation that it believes is
correct, but it is still ultimately your decision which response to select.
When you have completed the mission you may open the Exit Questionnaire
envelope at your desk. Please open this only after you have completed the mission.
When you have finished the questionnaire please come to the front of the room and
you will be debriefed and receive your compensation (cash payment or extra credit).
To help you focus on the task we ask that, during the mission, you wear the
noise canceling headphones, located to the left of the monitor. No noise will come out
of the headphones, they are used solely to block out environmental noise.
Do you have any questions regarding your mission?
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Informed Consent Form
Please read this consent document carefully before you decide to participate in this study.
You must be 18 years of age or older to participate.
Project Title: Robot Search-and-Rescue Study
Purpose of the Research Study: The purpose of this data collection effort is to determine the impact of using
automated decision aids in a search-and-rescue scenario.
What you will be asked to do in the Study: You will be asked to view a computer display running a simulated
search-and-rescue scenario using two unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). You will be asked to monitor the video
images from the UGV for critical signals (e.g., enemy units, unconscious civilians, or improvised explosive
devices). You may, or may not, receive recommendations while completing this task. The study will take
approximately 1 hour. At the end of the study you will be asked to complete a brief questionnaire about your
experience.
Time Required: 60 minutes (1 hour).
Risks: Minimal. The risks to you are no greater than operating any other computer.
Benefits/Compensation: Participants will be offered the benefit of 2 point of course credit in undergraduate
psychology (equivalent to 1 hour research) or $8.00 US paid compensation.
Confidentiality: Your identity will be anonymous. Your information will be assigned a participant number. The list
connecting your name will not be released to anyone who is not directly involved in conducting this study. Your
name will not be used in any report.
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in this study is voluntary. There is no penalty for not participating.
You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty.
Whom to Contact if you have Questions about the Study: Jennifer Ross, Graduate Research Fellow, University
of Central Florida, phone: 407-687-4435, e-mail: jmross@mail.ucf.edu, or Dr. James L. Szalma, Department of
Psychology, University of Central Florida, phone: 407-823-2901, e-mail: jszalma@mail.ucf.edu.
Whom to Contact about your rights in the study: Research at the University of Central Florida involving human
participants is carried out under the oversight of the Institutional Review Board. Questions or concerns about
research participants’ rights may be directed to the UCF IRB office, University of Central Florida, Office of
Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246, or by campus mail
32816-0150. The hours of operation are 8:00 am until 5:00 pm, Monday through Friday except on University of
Central Florida official holidays. The telephone numbers are (407) 882-2276 and (407) 823-2901.
I have read the procedure described above. I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure.
I elect to receive 2pts course credit for the course of my choosing through Sona System.
I elect to receive $8 hour for my participation.
_________________________________________________________________________________________
Participant Name Printed
_______________________________________________________________/_________________________
Participant Signature

Date
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ATS
Please read each statement carefully. Indicate the strength of your agreement with each statement by filling in the
blank using the following 5-point scale. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these statements. We are
interested in your honest reactions and opinions.

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

5
Strongly Agree

_____

1.

I would yell at a COMPUTER if it did something I did not like.

_____

2.

I would not praise a GOD OR HIGHER POWER when it does something I like.

_____

3.

A GOD OR HIGHER POWER does not have a personality like a person has a personality.

_____

4.

I would hit a CAR if it did something I did not like.

_____

5.

A GOD OR HIGHER POWER has a spirit or life-force like people do.

_____

6.

I would hit a BACKPACK if it did something I did not like.

_____

7.

A GOD OR HIGHER POWER cannot communicate with people.

_____

8.

I would not praise a PET when it does something I like.

_____

9.

I would hit a MICROWAVE if it did something I did not like.

_____

10.

When I am clearly upset, a GOD OR HIGHER POWER does not know.

_____

11.

A BACKPACK does not have a personality like a person has a personality.

_____

12.

I do not act as if a GOD OR HIGHER POWER has a spirit or life-force like people do.

_____

13.

When I talk to a PET, I do not believe it understands me.

_____

14.

I would yell at a CAR if it did something I did not like.

_____

15.

When I am clearly upset, an OCEAN does not know.

_____

16.

A GOD OR HIGHER POWER is intelligent like a human is intelligent.

_____

17.

If I were to get rid of a BACKPACK, it would feel abandoned.

_____

18.

When I talk to a GOD OR HIGHER POWER, I do not believe it understands me.

_____

19.

I would hit a COMPUTER if it did something I did not like.

_____

20.

A PET has a spirit or life-force like people do.

_____

21.

I treat a BACKPACK like a human.

_____

22.

I would apologize to a GOD OR HIGHER POWER for accidentally hurting it.

_____

23.

I would talk to a CAR.

_____

24.

A PET does not have a personality like a person has a personality.

_____

25.

I would talk to a COMPUTER.
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_____

26.

I would apologize to a PET for accidentally hurting it.

_____

27.

A PET is intelligent like a human is intelligent.

_____

28.

When I am clearly upset, a CAR does not know.

_____

29.

A CAR has a spirit or life-force like people do.

_____

30.

When I am clearly upset, a PET does not know.

_____

31.

I do not act as if a STOMACH has a spirit or life-force like people do.

_____

32.

A PET likes certain people better than others.

_____

33.

A PET cannot communicate with people.
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1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

5
Strongly Agree

_____

34.

I would not buy a present for a PET.

_____

35.

I do not act as if a MICROWAVE has a spirit or life-force like people do.

_____

36.

A COMPUTER does not do things just to annoy me.

_____

37.

I would not apologize to a GOD OR HIGHER POWER for neglecting it.

_____

38.

If I were to get rid of a COMPUTER, it would feel abandoned.

_____

39.

I would not praise a HOUSE PLANT when it does something I like.

_____

40.

A MICROWAVE has a spirit or life-force like people do.

_____

41.

A MICROWAVE is intelligent like a human is intelligent.

_____

42.

When I am clearly upset, a COMPUTER does not know.

_____

43.

If a PET were to be destroyed, I would not mourn it like I would mourn the loss of a human.

_____

44.

I do not act as if a COMPUTER has a spirit or life-force like people do.

_____

45.

A COMPUTER does not have a personality like a person has a personality.

_____

46.

A STUFFED TOY is intelligent like a human is intelligent.

_____

47.

I would not buy a present for a HOUSE PLANT.

_____

48.

A MICROWAVE likes certain people better than others.

_____

49.

LUCK is intelligent like a human is intelligent.

_____

50.

I treat an INSECT like a human.

_____

51.

A STUFFED TOY does not have a personality like a person has a personality.

_____

52.

When I am clearly upset, a MICROWAVE does not know.

_____

53.

I would not praise a MICROWAVE when it does something I like.

_____

54.

A STUFFED TOY cannot communicate with people.

_____

55.

I would talk to a GOD OR HIGHER POWER.

_____

56.

I would not apologize to a COMPUTER for neglecting it.

_____

57.

An OCEAN does not do things just to annoy me.

_____

58.

I do not act as if an OCEAN has a spirit or life-force like people do.

_____

59.

A STOMACH does not have a personality like a person has a personality.

_____

60.

If I were to get rid of a MICROWAVE, it would feel abandoned.

_____

61.

A COMPUTER has a spirit or life-force like people do.

_____

62.

An OCEAN does not have a personality like a person has a personality.

_____

63.

I would not apologize to a BACKPACK for neglecting it.
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_____

64.

I do not act as if a CAR has a spirit or life-force like people do.

_____

65.

I treat a PET like a human.

_____

66.

I do not act as if a PET has a spirit or life-force like people do.

_____

67.

I would name a PET.

_____

68.

I treat a COMPUTER like a human.

_____

69.

I would talk to a PET.
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1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

_____

70.

If I were to get rid of a STUFFED TOY, it would feel abandoned.

_____

71.

If I were to get rid of a PET, it would feel abandoned.

_____

72.

I treat a GOD OR HIGHER POWER like a human.

_____

73.

A MICROWAVE does not do things just to annoy me.

_____

74.

I do not act as if LUCK has a spirit or life-force like people do.

_____

75.

I would not buy a present for a BACKPACK.

_____

76.

If I were to get rid of a HOUSE PLANT, it would feel abandoned.

_____

77.

When I talk to a CAR, I do not believe it understands me.

_____

78.

I treat a MICROWAVE like a human.
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5
Strongly Agree
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Interpersonal Trust Scale
Please mark an ‘X’ in the box above the statement that best describes how you feel about that statement.
1. Hypocrisy is on the increase in our society.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
2. In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they have provided evidence that
they are trustworthy.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
3. This country has a dark future unless we can attract better people into politics.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
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4. Fear and social disgrace or punishment rather than conscience prevents most people from
breaking the law.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
5. Using the honor system of not having a teacher present during exams would probably result in
increased cheating.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
6. Parents usually can be relied on to keep their promises.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
7. The United Nations will never be an effective force in keeping world peace.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
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8. The judiciary is a place where we can all get unbiased treatment.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
9. Most people would be horrified if they knew how much news that the public hears and sees is
distorted.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
10. It is safe to believe that in spite of what people say most people are primarily interested in their
own welfare.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
11. Even though we have reports in newspaper, radio, and T.V., it is hard to get objective accounts of
public events.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
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12. The future seems very promising.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
13. If we really knew what was going on in international politics, the public would have reason to be
more frightened than they now seem to be.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
14. Most elected officials are really sincere in their campaign promises.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
15. Many major national sports contests are fixed in one way or another.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
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16. Most experts can be relied upon to tell the truth about the limits of their knowledge.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
17. Most parents can be relied upon to carry out their threats of punishment.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
18. Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
19. In these competitive times one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
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20. Most idealists are sincere and usually practice what they preach.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
21. Most salesmen are honest in describing their products.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
22. Most students in school would not cheat even if they were sure of getting away with it.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
23. Most repairmen will not overcharge even if they think you are ignorant of their specialty.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
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24. A large share of accident claims filed against insurance companies are phony.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
25. Most people answer public opinion polls honestly.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Mildly

Agree and

Mildly

Strongly

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

disagree

equally
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Complacency Potential Rating Scale
Please mark an ‘X’ in the box above the statement that best describes how you feel about that
statement.
1. I think that automated devices used in medicine, such as CT scans and ultrasound,
provide very reliable medical diagnosis.

1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Mildly
Disagree

3
Disagree
and agree
equally

4
Mildly
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

2. Automated devices in medicine save time and money in the diagnosis and treatment of
disease.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Mildly
Disagree

Disagree
and agree
equally

Mildly
Agree

Strongly
Agree

3. If I need to have a tumor in my body removed, I would choose to undergo computeraided surgery using laser technology because it is more reliable and safer than manual
surgery.

1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Mildly
Disagree

3
Disagree
and agree
equally
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4
Mildly
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

4. Automated systems used in modern aircraft, such as the automatic landing system, have
made air journeys safer.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Mildly
Disagree

Disagree
and agree
equally

Mildly
Agree

Strongly
Agree

5. ATMs provide a safeguard against the inappropriate use of an individual’s bank account
by dishonest people.

1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Mildly
Disagree

3
Disagree
and agree
equally

4
Mildly
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

6. Automated devices used in aviation and banking have made work easier for both
employees and customers.

1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Mildly
Disagree

3
Disagree
and agree
equally

4
Mildly
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

7. Even though the automatic cruise control in my car is set at a speed below the speed
limit, I worry when I pass a police radar speed trap in case the automatic control is not
working properly.

1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Mildly
Disagree

3
Disagree
and agree
equally

216

4
Mildly
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

8. Manually sorting through card catalogues is more reliable than computer-aided searches
for finding items in a library.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Mildly
Disagree

Disagree
and agree
equally

Mildly
Agree

Strongly
Agree

9. I would rather purchase an item using a computer than have to deal with a sales
representative on the phone because my order is more likely to be correct using the
computer.

1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Mildly
Disagree

3
Disagree
and agree
equally

4
Mildly
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

10. Bank transactions have become safer with the introduction of computer technology for
the transfer of funds.

1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Mildly
Disagree

3
Disagree
and agree
equally

4
Mildly
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

11. I feel safer depositing my money at an ATM than with a human teller.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Mildly
Disagree

Disagree
and agree
equally

Mildly
Agree

Strongly
Agree
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12. I have to tape an important TV program for a class assignment. To ensure that the correct
program is recorded, I would use the automatic programming facility on my VCR rather
than manual taping.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Mildly
Disagree

Disagree
and agree
equally

Mildly
Agree

Strongly
Agree
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Experimenter Script – Please Read Italic Sections Aloud to Participant
The goal of this study is to examine how interface design impacts one’s interaction with a distributed agent, in this
case an unmanned ground vehicle (commonly referred to as a UGV – these are typically similar to remote control
cars that are equipped with special equipment such as webcams). UGVs are frequently used when the environment
is too dangerous for a human operator.
In the following simulation you are operating under the premise that a group of terrorist have released a dangerous
chemical into a commercial office building, and we are sending in two reconnaissance UGVs to ascertain the
location of terrorists, improvised explosive devices (IEDs – basically a bomb), and unconscious civilians before
reinforcements arrive. You can see examples of these objects at the top of your screen (POINT OUT IED –
PARTICIPANTS HAVE TROUBLE FINDING THIS).
We need you to monitor the video feeds from these two UGVs for each room. For each UGV please report whether
you detect the presence of a terrorist, IED, civilian, or if that the room is clear. Due to time constraints the UGVs
must move through different parts of the office building. So the videos that you see will be from two different rooms.
The UGVs will automatically move through the building as quickly as possible. You will not be controlling the
movement of the UGVs, thus you will have only one chance to view each of the rooms.
After the UGVs have sent each signal, it will conserve battery by turning off their video feeds while moving to the
next room, during this short time period the response keys (POINT OUT RESPONSE KEYS – COMPARE
ACTIVATED PRACTICE KEY TO DEACTIVATED RESPONSE KEYS) will be activated and you can report
your observation. You will not be able to change your answer after pressing a key. Additionally you may notice that
after you respond it may take several seconds to move on to the next video, this is perfectly normal. Try to respond
as quickly and accurately as possible.
You will find a pair of headphones to the left on the monitor, please wear these during the experiment. No sound will
come out of the headphones, they are merely meant to attenuate any extraneous noise.
Do you have any questions or concerns at this point? (HAVE PARTICIPANT DO FIRST 4 PRACTICE TRIALS).
Now you will have the option in this study to accept the recommendation of your teammates. Your teammates will
report their recommendations (POINT OUT AID RESPONSE BOX ON SCREEN). Following your teammates’
recommendations is completely optional and the final decisions are your responsibility. You may choose to agree
with your teammates or select your own response. However, be sure to respond to each trial, any trials you do not
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respond to will be counted as incorrect. Before you begin I’d like to tell you a little bit about your teammates…
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (READ ONLY ONE TO EACH PARTICIPANT)
HUMAN CONDITION
Your teammates are two undergraduate students who have previously completed the experiment..
SIMILAR AUTOMATION
Your teammates are two “contrast detectors.” They work by using a computer algorithm to analyze the visual scene
for the target people and objects. These contrast detectors were developed to work with these specific UGV robots.
The contrast detectors will not receive feedback on whether you have accepted or rejected their recommendations.
DISSIMILAR AUTOMATION
Your teammates are two different “contrast detectors.” They work by using computer algorithms to analyze the
visual scene for the target people and objects. A different computer algorithm was created for each of the UGV
robots you will be using in this study. The contrast detectors will not receive feedback on whether you have accepted
or rejected their recommendations.
Do you have any questions or concerns at this point? (HAVE PARTICIPANT DO LAST 4 PRACTICE TRIALS
WITH AID). Are you ready to begin the study?
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Participant #: _______________

1. How well do you think Teammate A will perform during the 60 trials?
Not Very Well

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very Well

2. How well do you think Teammate B will perform the 60 trials?
Not Very Well

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very Well

8

9

Very Well

3. How well do you think You will perform the 120 trials?
Not Very Well

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Who do you think will make more errors during the 120 trials? I will make…
Many More Errors

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Far Fewer Errors

5. How many errors do you think You will make during the 120 trials?
I will make about _____ errors (numerical value b/n 0-120)
6. How many errors do you think Teammate A will make during the 60 trials?
Agent A will make about _____ errors (numerical value b/n 0-120)
7. How many errors do you think Teammate B will make during the 60 trials?
Agent B will make about _____ errors (numerical value b/n 0-120)
8. To what extent do you believe you can trust the decisions of Teammate A?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

A Great Amount

9. To what extent do you believe you can trust the decisions of Teammate B?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

A Great Amount

10. To what extent do you believe you can trust the decisions You will make?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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8

9

A Great Amount

11. How would you rate the expected performance of Teammate A relative to your expected
performance? Agent A will perform…
Better Than I

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Much Worse Than I

Will Perform

Will Perform

12. How would you rate the expected performance of Teammate B relative to your expected
performance? Agent A will perform…
Better Than I
Will Perform

1

2

3

4

5

6
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7

8

9

Much Worse Than I
Will Perform
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Participant # ________________

Please answer the following questions regarding how you
feel about YOUR performance only.
1. How high was your self-confidence in performing the search-and-rescue task?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

A Great Amount

4. Please complete the computer-based questionnaire using the following definitions:
Mental Demand
How much mental and perceptual activity was required (e.g., thinking, deciding, calculating,
remembering, looking, searching, etc.)? Was the task easy or demanding, simple or complex,
exacting or forgiving?
Physical Demand
How much physical activity was required (e.g., pushing, pulling, turning, controlling, activating,
etc.)? Was the task easy or demanding, slow or brisk, restful or laborious?
Temporal Demand
How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at which the tasks or task elements
occurred? Was the pace slow and leisurely or rapid and frantic?
Performance
How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the goals of the task set by the experimenter
(or yourself)? How satisfied were you with your performance in accomplishing these goals?
Effort
How hard did you have to work (mentally and physically) to accomplish your level of performance?
Frustration Level
How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed and annoyed versus secure, gratified, content, relaxed
and complacent did you feel during the task?
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Participant #: ____ ______

Please answer the following questions regarding how you
feel about Teammate A only.
1. To what extent does Teammate A perform this search-and-rescue task effectively?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

A Great Amount

5. To what extent can you anticipate Teammate A’s behavior with some degree of confidence?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

A Great Amount

8

9

A Great Amount

3. To what extent is the Teammate A free of errors?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. To what extent do you have a strong belief and trust in Teammate A to do the search-and-rescue
task in the future without being monitored?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

A Great Amount

5. How much did you trust the decisions of Teammate A overall?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

A Great Amount

6. What percentage of responses by Teammate A do you think were correct?
___________ (enter a value between 0% to 100%)
7. How often did you notice an error made by Teammate A?
Not At All

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Many Times

8. To what extent did you lose trust in Teammate A when you noticed it made an error?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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8

9

A Great Amount

9. Hypothetical Scenario: Imagine that there are ten more video clips that need to be examined for
terrorists, civilians, and IEDs. Also imagine that we were to offer you an additional compensation, of
either $5.00 or an extra credit point for each of these ten additional video clips that is correctly
identified. However, due to a software problem only you or Teammate A can make the decisions.
Would you prefer that this additional compensation be based on the decisions made by the automated
aid or the decisions made by you? (circle one)
Teammate A Decisions

My Own Decisions

10. We would like to know what led to your decision to base your performance on either your
decisions or on Teammate A’s decisions. Please tell us everything you thought of in coming to this
decision. Do not worry about spelling or grammatical errors. Please ask the experimenter for
additional paper if necessary.
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
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Participant #: ____ ______

Please answer the following questions regarding how you
feel about Teammate B only.
1. To what extent does Teammate B perform this search-and-rescue task effectively?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

A Great Amount

6. To what extent can you anticipate Teammate B’s behavior with some degree of confidence?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

A Great Amount

8

9

A Great Amount

3. To what extent is the Teammate B free of errors?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. To what extent do you have a strong belief and trust in Teammate B to do the search-and-rescue
task in the future without being monitored?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

A Great Amount

5. How much did you trust the decisions of Teammate B overall?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

A Great Amount

6. What percentage of responses by Teammate B do you think were correct?
___________ (enter a value between 0% to 100%)
7. How often did you notice an error made by Teammate B?
Not At All

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Many Times

8. To what extent did you lose trust in Teammate B when you noticed it made an error?
Very Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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8

9

A Great Amount

9. Hypothetical Scenario: Imagine that there are ten more video clips that need to be examined for
terrorists, civilians, and IEDs. Also imagine that we were to offer you an additional compensation, of
either $5.00 or an extra credit point for each of these ten additional video clips that is correctly
identified. However, due to a software problem only you or Teammate B can make the decisions.
Would you prefer that this additional compensation be based on the decisions made by the automated
aid or the decisions made by you? (circle one)
Teammate B Decisions

My Own Decisions

10. We would like to know what led to your decision to base your performance on either your
decisions or on Teammate B’s decisions. Please tell us everything you thought of in coming to this
decision. Do not worry about spelling or grammatical errors. Please ask the experimenter for
additional paper if necessary.
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
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Debriefing Form Robot Search-and-Rescue Study
You have now completed the study, thank you for your participation! This form is for you to take
with you and explains the purpose of our research. Please do not share this form with others who
plan to participate in this study as it may bias their responses.
The purpose of this study is to examine the issue of trust in multiple teammates. That is, how
one’s trust in a teammate changes given the type of teammates they are interacting with and the
reliability (i.e., accuracy) of the teammates. In the study you just completed, you were informed
that two distributed human agents or two intelligent robotic agents provided you with
recommendations after each video clip, as to what kind of signal was present in the clip.
However, another human or robot did not actually provide you with recommendations in the
preceding study. In order to standardize participant experience, that is to ensure that everyone
had the same experience with their teammates, your teammate’s responses (robotic and human)
were predetermined upon the condition you were randomly assigned to. Depending on the
condition you were assigned to your teammates may have both been very accurate, both very
inaccurate, or a mixture (with one accurate and one inaccurate).
If you have any complaints, concerns, or questions about this research, or you would like any
information about the results of the study once it is completed feel free to contact Ms. Jennifer
Ross at jmross@mail.ucf.edu / 407-687-4435 or Dr. James Szalma at jszalma@mail.ucf.edu /
407-823-0920.
Your responses are confidential to the experimenters and will be published anonymously as
group data.
If you are interested in obtaining more information on this topic we would recommend the
following articles available through the UCF library:
• Muir, B. M., & Moray, N. Trust in automation: Part 2. Experimental studies of trust and
human intervention in automated systems. Ergonomics, 37, (1996), 1905--1922.
• Parasuraman, R. & Riley, V. Humans and automation: Use, misuse, disuse, and abuse.
Human Factors, 39, (1997), 230--253.
Finally, thank you again for helping us with this research.
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Human

Uniform-High

Mixed

Uniform-Low

Trust

6.65 (1.83)

6.76 (0.94)

5.41 (1.42)

Reliance

83.89 (5.62)

78.51 (5.46)

75.45 (5.19)

78.51 (4.87)

76.64 (3.32)

MixedHigh
7.21
(1.29)
81.91
(6.35)
81.72
(6.00)

5.55 (2.12)
70.79 (9.47)

5.21 (1.82)
73.61 (10.97)

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

7.20 (1.05)

6.39 (1.65)

5.71 (1.56)

85.34 (6.14)

80.96 (5.68)

76.11 (6.85)

6.15
(2.25)
77.89
(6.56)
76.26
(4.45)

Performance 82.88 (4.82)
Selfconfidence
5.25 (1.76)
Workload
68.99 (14.50)
DifferentType
Robotic
Trust

Performance 83.96 (5.31)
Selfconfidence
5.53 (1.78)
Workload
68.24 (14.00)

79.65 (3.49)

75.83 (6.04)

6.64
(1.60)
84.05
(5.87)
83.03
(5.16)

5.09 (2.11)
73.02 (13.06)

4.61 (1.89)
72.09 (18.13)

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

Trust

7.21 (1.27)

6.05 (1.78)

5.53 (1.75)

Reliance

84.90 (6.80)

79.80 (5.32)

77.90 (5.76)

79.95 (3.42)

77.88 (3.66)

6.66
(1.84)
82.91
(5.90)
82.32
(4.86)

5.64
(2.28)
76.67
(6.35)
77.58
(4.79)

5.45 (2.17)
70.72 (14.06)

5.18 (1.70)
69.39 (11.48)

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

Reliance

SameType
Robotic

Performance 83.76 (6.06)
Selfconfidence
5.12 (2.15)
Workload
67.70 (13.04)
Control

MixedLow
6.3
(1.57)
75.03
(5.76)
75.30
(5.50)

Performance 76.62 (4.36)
Selfconfidence
4.52 (1.81)
Workload
71.40 (13.83)

Note: Values for each of the mixed-reliability agents are presented individually on the right of
the table and averaged in the fourth column.
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Overall correlations for the four factors: Extreme, Pet, God or Deity, and Negative
Anthropomorphism. No overall correlations were significant (p > .05 in all cases).
Type
Anthropomorphism
Extreme
Pet
God or Deity
Negative

Dependent
Measure
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

Correlation

Significance

N

-.07
-.05
.10
.02
.04
-.07
.02
.05

.24
.07
.52
.77
.37
.80
.24
.43

296
296
295
295
296
296
296
296

Next correlations were broken down by agent type: Human, Same-Type Robotic, or
Different-Type Robotic.
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Type
Anthropomorphism

Agent
Human

Extreme

Same
Dif.
Human

Pet

Same
Dif.
Human

God or Deity

Same
Dif.
Human

Negative

Same
Dif.

Dependent
Measure
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

Correlation

Significance

N

.07
.01
.03
-.07
-.29**
-.09
.09
-.03
.17
.04
.08
.05
-.03
-.09
.13
-.04
-.02
-.13
.07
-.08
.04
-.03
-.05
.22*

.50
.89
.75
.52
.004
.358
.37
.74
.10
.68
.41
.65
.79
.38
.19
.70
.86
.22
.50
.44
.72
.81
.66
.03

99
99
99
99
98
98
98
98
99
99
98
98
99
99
99
99
98
98
99
99
99
99
98
98

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Next correlations were broken down by reliability condition: Both High, Both Low, and
Mixed.
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Type
Anthropomorphism

Reliability
High

Extreme

Mixed
Low
High

Pet

Mixed
Low
High

God or Deity

Mixed
Low
High

Negative

Mixed
Low

Dependent
Measure
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

Correlation

Significance

N

-.04
-.06
-.12
-.08
-.06
-.02
.14
-.08
.01
.22*
.13
-.13
.11
-.06
-.07
-.12
.13
.02
-.01
-.10
-.07
.02
-.02
.07

.71
.53
.26
.42
.53
.89
.18
.45
.93
.03
.19
.19
.28
.55
.51
.23
.20
.81
.93
.34
.49
.82
.86
.50

98
98
99
99
99
99
97
97
99
99
99
99
98
98
99
99
99
99
98
98
99
99
99
99

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

The final breakdown looked at agent by reliability condition.

Human

Agent

Type
Dependent
Reliability
Correlation
Anthropomorphism
Measure
Trust
.12
High
Reliance
.15
Trust
-.06
Extreme
Mixed
Reliance
-.16
Trust
.02
Low
Reliance
.26
Pet

High

Significance

N

.49
.37
.76
.37
.92
.15

33
33
33
33
33
33

Trust

.33

.07

32

Reliance

-.20

.29

32
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Agent

Type
Dependent
Reliability
Correlation
Anthropomorphism
Measure
Trust
-.01
Mixed
Reliance
.35
Trust
-.12
Low
Reliance
-.27
Trust
-.09
High
Reliance
-.07
Trust
-.14
God or Deity
Mixed
Reliance
-.28
Trust
-.01
Low
Reliance
.00
High
Negative

Mixed
Low
High

Same-Type Robotic

Extreme

Mixed
Low
High

Pet

Mixed
Low

God or Deity

High
Mixed

Significance

N

.96

33

.05
.53
.13

33
33
33

.62
.70
.44
.11

33
33
33
33

.97
1.00

33
33

Trust

.10
-.07
-.20
-.31
.04

.59
.70
.27
.08
.82

33
33
33
33
33

Reliance

-.04

.83

33

Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

-.16
-.31
.17
.17
.06
.01

.37
.08
.34
.34
.74
.96

33
33
33
33
33
33

Trust

.02

.91

33

Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

-.01
.02
-.07
.18
-.11

.97
.91
.69
.33
.55

33
33
33
33
33

.49**
-.02
-.05
-.08

.004

33

.91
.79
.64

33
33
33

Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
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Agent

Type
Dependent
Reliability
Correlation
Anthropomorphism
Measure
Trust
.04
Low
Reliance
-.07
Trust
.02
High
Reliance
-.35*
Trust
-.01
Negative
Mixed
Reliance
.10
Trust
.02
Low
Reliance
.18
High
Extreme

Mixed
Low

Different-Type Robotic

High
Pet

Mixed
Low
High

God or Deity

Mixed
Low
High

Negative

Mixed
Low

Significance

N

.82

33

.71

33

.92
.05
.98
.59
.92
.33

33
33
33
33
33
33
32
32
33
33
33
33

Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

-.18
.01
-.47**
-.13
-.27
-.24

.33
.98
.01
.46
.12
.19

Trust

.00

1.00

32

Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

-.03
-.13

.89
.87
.02
.07
.67

32
33
33
33
33

Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

-.11
-.14
-.01
.03

.56
.44
.98
.89
.03
.38

32
32
33
33
33
33

Trust
Reliance
Trust

-.21
.11
-.06

Reliance
Trust
Reliance

.36*
-.12
.04

.25
.53
.78
.04
.50
.81

32
32
33
33
33
33
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.42*
.32
-.08

.39*
.16

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
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APPENDIX X: ITS QUESTIONNAIRE CORRELATIONS TO TRUST AND
RELIANCE
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Overall ITS correlations, no overall correlations were significant (p > .05 in all cases).
Dependent Measure
Trust
Reliance

Correlation
-.10
-.07

Significance
.07
.24

N
296
296

Next ITS correlations were broken down by agent type: Human, Same-Type Robotic, or
Different-Type Robotic.
Agent
Human
Same
Dif.

Dependent
Measure
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

Correlation

Significance

N

-.12
-.21*
-.28**
-.17
.10
.13

.24
.04
.01
.10
.33
.20

99
99
99
99
98
98

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Next ITS correlations were broken down by reliability condition: Both High, Both Low,
and Mixed.
Reliability
High
Mixed
Low

Dependent
Measure
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

Correlation

Significance

N

.07
.00
-.08
-.12
-.20*
.01

.48
.98
.46
.24
.05
.92

98
98
99
99
99
99

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

The final breakdown looked at agent by reliability condition.
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Agent Type

Reliability
High

Human

Mixed
Low
High

Different-Type
Robotic

Mixed
Low
High

Same-Type Robotic

Mixed
Low

Dependent
Correlation Significance
Measure
Trust
.04
.81
Reliance
-.21
.24
Trust
-.10
.59
Reliance
-.30
.09
Trust
-.35*
.05
Reliance
-.25
.15

N
33
33
33
33
33
33

Trust
Reliance

.31
.32

.08
.07

32
32

Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

.07
.07
.16
.27

.71
.70
.37
.13

33
33
33
33

Trust

-.02

.90

33

Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

-.09
-.18
-.13
-.43*
-.15

.63
.31
.46
.01
.42

33
33
33
33
33

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
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APPENDIX Y: CPRS QUESTIONNAIRE OVERALL AND FACTOR
CORRELATIONS TO TRUST AND RELIANCE
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Overall correlations for the four factors: Extreme, Pet, God or Deity, and Negative
Anthropomorphism. No overall correlations were significant (p > .05 in all cases).
Type CPRS
Overall
Confidence
Reliance
Trust
Safety

Dependent
Measure
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

Correlation

Significance

N

.18**
.14*
.09
.08
.14*
.06
.18*
.11
.09
.16**

.002
.014
.134
.185
.015
.298
.002
.065
.109
.007

296
296
296
296
296
296
296
296
296
296

Next correlations were broken down by agent type: Human, Same-Type Robotic, or
Different-Type Robotic.
Type CPRS

Agent
Human

Overall

Same
Dif.
Human

Confidence

Same
Dif.
Human

Reliance

Same
Dif.

Trust

Human
Same

Dependent
Measure
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
247

Correlation

Significance

N

.13
.14
.25*
.24*
.17
.05
.09
.03
.05
.20*
.12
.02
.08
.14
.27**
.09
.07
-.05
.17
.11
.19
.12

.19
.16
.01
.02
.10
.60
.37
.76
.62
.05
.24
.86
.42
.17
.01
.36
.48
.65
.09
.26
.07
.23

99
99
99
99
98
98
99
99
99
99
98
98
99
99
99
99
98
98
99
99
99
99

Type CPRS

Agent
Dif.
Human

Safety

Same
Dif.

Dependent
Measure
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

Correlation

Significance

N

.17
.07
.01
.13
.16
.22*
.09
.12

.09
.50
.94
.19
.11
.03
.38
.26

98
98
99
99
99
99
98
98

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Next correlations were broken down by reliability condition: Both High, Both Low, and
Mixed.
Type CPRS

Agent
High

Overall

Mixed
Low
High

Confidence

Mixed
Low
High

Reliance

Mixed
Low
High

Trust

Mixed
Low

Safety

High

Dependent
Measure
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
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Correlation

Significance

N

.01
.05
.28**
.22*
.09
-.06
.02
.05
.17
.19
-.02
-.12
-.00
-.01
.30**
.15
.01
-.13
.10
-.01
.12
.15
.20*
.07
-.12
.13

.93
.60
.01
.03
.37
.59
.86
.62
.10
.06
.85
.25
.97
.89
.00
.15
.91
.21
.32
.92
.23
.15
.05
.53
.25
.21

98
98
99
99
99
99
98
98
99
99
99
99
98
98
99
99
99
99
98
98
99
99
99
99
98
98

Type CPRS

Agent
Mixed
Low

Dependent
Measure
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

Correlation

Significance

N

.15
.08
.06
.03

.15
.44
.57
.76

99
99
99
99

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

The final breakdown looked at agent by reliability condition.

Agent

Type CPRS

Reliability
High

Overall

Mixed
Low
High

Confidence

Mixed

Human

Low
High
Reliance

Mixed
Low
High

Trust

Mixed
Low

Dependent
Correlation Significance
Measure
Trust
.11
.56
Reliance
-.01
.98
Trust
.16
.36
Reliance
.28
.11
Trust
.10
.59
Reliance
.09
.63

N
33
33
33
33
33
33

Trust
Reliance

.09
-.17

.62
.33

33
33

Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

.22
.25
.00
.10

.21
.17
.98
.58

33
33
33
33

Trust

.27

.13

33

Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

-.02
.14
.15
.09
-.03

.91
.43
.40
.62
.89

33
33
33
33
33

Trust

.33

.06

33

Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust

.00
-.03
.18
.20

1.00
.87
.33
.26

33
33
33
33

Reliance

.15

.41

33
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Agent

Type CPRS

Reliability
High

Safety

Mixed
Low
High

Overall

Mixed
Low
High

Same-Type Robotic

Confidence

Mixed
Low
High

Reliance

Mixed
Low
High

Trust

Mixed
Low

Safety

High

Dependent
Correlation Significance
N
Measure
Trust
-.13
.47
33
Reliance
-.10
.57
33
Trust
.03
.86
33
Reliance

.18

.33

33

Trust

-.03

.88

33

Reliance

.05

.79

33

Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

-.13
.10

.47
.57

33
33

.12
.10
.35*
.13

.49
.58
.05
.48

33
33
33
33

Trust

-.08

.68

33

Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

.17
-.02
.07
-.02
.16

.35
.90
.69
.93
.38

33
33
33
33
33

Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

.05
-.08
.24
.01

.79
.66
.19
.97

33
33
33
33

Trust
Reliance

.17
-.09

.34
.63

33
33

Trust

-.24

.18

33

Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

-.03
-.01
.13
.52**

.86
.94
.47
.002

33
33
33
33

.09

.62

33

Trust
Reliance

-.03
.23

.87
.19

33
33
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Agent

Type CPRS

Reliability
Mixed
Low
High

Overall

Mixed
Low
High

Different-Type Robotic

Confidence

Mixed
Low
High

Reliance

Mixed
Low
High

Trust

Mixed
Low

Safety

High
Mixed

Dependent
Correlation Significance
Measure
Trust
.16
.37
Reliance
.04
.82
Trust
.09
.61
Reliance
.15
.40

N
33
33
33
33

Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

-.11
.01
.56**
.26

.57
.95
.001
.14

32
32
33
33

-.12
-.26

.49
.15

33
33

Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

-.07
.13
.40*
.36*
-.04
-.37*

.70
.49
.02
.04
.81
.04

32
32
33
33
33
33

Trust

-.14

.46

32

Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

-.25
.43*
.21
-.28
-.25

.17
.01
.24
.12
.17

32
33
33
33
33

Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance

.16
-.02
.45**
.07
-.10
-.03

.38
.90
.01
.70
.58
.88

32
32
33
33
33
33

-.28
.18
.21
.02

.13
.34
.25
.91

32
32
33
33

Trust
Reliance
Trust
Reliance
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Agent

Type CPRS

Reliability
Low

Dependent
Correlation Significance
N
Measure
Trust
.07
.68
33
Reliance
-.05
.80
33

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
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